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Abstract
This thesis analyses the role of financial institutions in determining asset prices both
theoretically and empirically, and consists of three papers. Chapter 1 provides the moti-
vation and a detailed summary of the three papers. Chapter 2 focuses on the hedge fund
industry that has come to play a prominent role in today’s financial markets due to its
explosive growth. Fierce competition for funds generates relative performance objectives
for managers. This paper studies how a hedge-fund manager’s investment decision is af-
fected by her tournament concern, incentive contract and liquidation threat. Chapter 3
examines the impact of both managerial capital and delegated capital on asset-market
equilibrium by generalising the marginal investor to be a portfolio manager who is paid a
relative performance fee. This chapter studies whether it is possible to stabilise financial
markets by adopting a less centralized approach based on the idea of altering institutional
incentives before a crisis rather than remedial actions after a crisis. Given that the model
in Chapter 3 is an example of equity risk-capital models that fit the facts surrounding
bank-based intermediaries, Chapter 4 investigates the characteristics of banks’ balance
sheets and also suggest that banks’ balance sheets convey information on predicting sub-
sequent asset-market variations. Chapter 5 concludes.
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‘Financial institutions matter for asset pricing.’ Allen (2001)
Recent decades have witnessed the institutionalization of financial markets.1 A large
fraction of wealth is delegated to professional portfolio managers in financial institutions.
The explosive growth of the asset management industry has led to a growing trend towards
performance-based remuneration for asset managers and an increasing impact of financial
institutions on asset prices. The recent financial crises, such as the 1998 hedge fund
crisis and the 2007 sub-prime crisis, emphasize the importance of institutions for financial
stability.
This thesis explores the behavior of financial institutions and their impacts on de-
termining asset prices, both theoretically and empirically. In Chapter 2, we provide a
theoretical model to analyse how the risk-taking behavior of hedge fund managers is af-
fected by their relative performance when competing for new funds. We focus on the hedge
fund industry because of its high and sophisticated use of leverage, its inherent systematic
risk, and the characteristic of being overseen only indirectly by regulatory authorities.2 To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to theoretically examine the tournament
behavior in the hedge fund industry.3 As suggested by Allen (2001), financial institutions
play an important role in how asset prices are determined because they create an agency
problem and also because they provide liquidity in asset markets. Chapter 3 interprets
the marginal investor to be a portfolio manager who is paid a relative performance fee.
We start from a dynamic general-equilibrium model in which agency frictions, arising
from delegated portfolio management, destabilise asset markets. We analyse whether it
is possible to stabilise markets by altering institutional incentives before a crisis instead
of remedial actions after a crisis. In Chapter 4, we document the empirical evidence that
bank-based financial institutions (mainly commercial banks) provide liquidity in the face
1See Davis and Steil (2001), French (2008) and Brennan and Li (2008).
2Summarized by Ang, Gorovyy, and Van Inwegen (2011).
3According to my knowledge, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) were the very first to use the term
‘tournament’ to describe the behavior that fund managers attempt to outperform each other.
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of deteriorating market conditions, and how this liquidity can be used to forecast subse-
quent variations in the returns of a large set of traditional assets. The remainder of this
introduction provides a more detailed summary of these three chapters.
The model in Chapter 2 explores the combined effects of tournament concerns and
incentive contracts on hedge-fund managers’ risk-taking behavior. Managerial remunera-
tion is usually associated with a fund’s absolute performance, but it is not able to measure
managerial ability reliably when asset markets perform generally well or badly (Kapur
and Timmermann (2005)). In order to attract new funds, a fund manager would like
to perform well relative to her peer groups so that she obtains a higher management fee
that is typically a fixed percentage of funds under management.4 To this extent, relative
performance evaluation has become increasingly attractive.
We develop a two-period model to investigate how hedge-fund managers change the
riskiness of their portfolios over the second half of a year depending on their interim
mid-year performance. We assume there are a continuum of fund managers with different
interim performance. Investment opportunities span two assets: a riskless asset yielding
a constant return and a risky asset yielding a normally distributed return. Each manager
adjusts her risk to compete for the year-end fund flow in the middle of the year. We
denote the year-end fund flow by an exogenous piece-wise function of a fund’s expected
relative performance, with the feature of both concavity and convexity. The convexity
dominates as the fund’s relative performance approaches a lower bound, while the con-
cavity dominates as the performance is away from the bound.
Our results are different from Basak and Makarov (2012)’s results for mutual funds:
given the convexity of fund flows with respect to relative performance, interim winning
managers would like to choose more volatile portfolios than losing managers in equilib-
rium.5 We find that a risk-neutral manager’s risk shifting decision is determined by her
interim relative performance and the benchmark’s portfolio strategy. In order to maxi-
mize the inflows of funds, the manager has the incentive to maximize the expected relative
performance by increasing risk-taking. Moreover, based on their relative interim perfor-
mance, managers choose different risk shifting strategies: interim winners would like to
minimize the tracking error volatility of their portfolio by mimicking the benchmark port-
folio strategy; interim losers would maximize the tracking error volatility by deviating
4This positive flow-performance relationship has been found empirically in the families of both mutual
funds and hedge funds (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and
Tufano (1998), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011), Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2009), Chen
(2011), Getmansky (2012), and etc).
5This is also true if both of managers are active as in Taylor (2003). Their results are consistent
with the existing empirical evidence suggested by Busse (2001) and Qiu (2003). Busse (2001) argues
that the result that underperforming managers increase their risk relative to better performing managers
disappears with daily data. Qiu (2003) finds that managers with performance close to the top further
increase their portfolios’ risk.
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from the benchmark portfolio strategy. Interim winning positions correspond to the con-
cavity of the fund flow function, while interim losing positions are mainly related to the
convexity of the function.
To demonstrate the robustness of our results, we consider several generalizations.
Firstly, to account for risk aversion and also for the management fee being based on
the fund’s initial wealth, we document that a risk-averse manager’s optimal risk-taking
decision is determined by the interplay between the concavity of the manager’s objec-
tive function and the property of the fund flow function, either concavity or convexity.
For interim losers with very poor performance, the flow’s convexity dominates, and their
strategies are as before. As for interim losers with better performance and interim win-
ners, the concavity dominates. Although interim winners still have the incentive to mimic
the portfolio strategy of the benchmark, their risk-taking level is significantly depressed.
Second, we further generalize our model to include the HWM provision. Then the man-
ager’s compensation fee depends on both the fund’s absolute performance and relative
performance. When fund value is somewhat below the HWM, her incentive to increase
risk for pursing a high absolute performance fee is dramatically mitigated by her fund
flow concern; when fund value is above the HWM, the HWM-induced lock-in behavior
dominates the mimicking behavior. In a nutshell, our main insights for hedge fund man-
agers’ tournament behavior remain valid for the above two generalizations. The unique
flow-performance relation and the HWM provision lead hedge fund managers to have
different risk shifting patterns from mutual fund managers.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first theoretical piece that explicitly
addresses hedge fund managers’ relative objectives and tournament behavior. We show
that relative performance concerns induced by funds flows play a critical role in deter-
mining managers’ risk choices in equilibrium. In addition, we also disentangle multiple
sources of risks and document different risk-shifting patterns for systematic-risk assets
and idiosyncratic-risk assets. Specifically, hedge funds mainly shift idiosyncratic risk in
response to their poor performance relative to their peer groups, while they shift both
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk when fund value is just below the HWM. This is an
important contribution to our understanding of managerial incentives in the hedge fund
industry. Furthermore, we also extend the model by introducing liquidation threats. Fol-
lowing Hodder and Jackwerth (2007), we consider both exogenous and endogenous fund
closure. We assume that a fund is shut down exogenously once fund value approaches a
specified liquidation bound. In the absence of tournament concerns, the manager would
dramatically decrease risk to avoid fund closure, which is consistent with Hodder and
Jackwerth (2007); in the presence of tournament concerns, the manager would increase
the portfolio volatility to avoid fund withdrawals, when fund value approaches the liqui-
dation bound.
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The model in Chapter 3 is a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agency
frictions arising from delegated portfolio management constrain the level of intermediary
capital. For actively managed funds, investment decisions are made by fund managers
rather than investors, and the incentives of managers are different from those of investors
due to the agency problem.6 This suggests that traditional asset pricing is not appropriate
since it turns a blind eye to the impact of institutional incentives.
He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) is the only paper to analyse how bad shocks are
amplified by the agency problem, leading to the capital-related crisis. Their model is able
to explain (i) how agency frictions bring about financial frictions, which limit the flow of
funds between investors and managers; (ii) why financial frictions contribute to a crisis
and (iii) at which situation the economy falls into the crisis regime. He and Krishnamurthy
(2013) further suggest that centralized remedial actions, such as government intervention,
can alleviate financial market stability. However, such ex-post intervention is well know
to create potentially severe moral hazard problems. Instead, this chapter investigates
whether financial markets can be stabilized by a less centralized approach based on the
idea of altering pre-crisis institutional incentives rather than post-crisis remedial actions.
We extend the work of He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) by introducing a symmetric
relative performance fee and find that this benchmark-linked fulcrum fee can stabilise
asset prices. The benchmark is chosen explicitly and is denoted by the market return.
We assume that there are two agents, a fund manager and a fund investor, and two assets,
a risky asset and a riskless asset. The fund investor is allowed to indirectly invest in the
risky asset by delegating her wealth to the fund manager, and the manager is allowed
to divert a fraction of the realized profit of the fund portfolio. In order to eliminate
the manager’s incentive to divert, she is required to hold the ‘skin-in-the-game’, i.e., an
inside stake of the fund. Furthermore, the inclusion of a relative performance fee in the
compensation contract provides the manager with an additional incentive not to divert
cash. We find that the minimum inside stake (i.e., the fraction of the manager’s wealth in
the fund) is reduced by the increased performance fee (rate). This leads to the key result
of this chapter: the incentive compatibility constraint can be alleviated by increasing the
performance fee being paid to the manager.
We first examine the tilt in the manager’s portfolio choice which is caused by the
presence of the benchmark-linked fulcrum fee. We find that, compared to the mean-
variance portfolio, the manager increases the fraction of the risky asset invested in the
portfolio so as not to fall behind the benchmark, but becomes more risk-averse due to
the fear of paying a high penalty if falling behind. Symmetric performance fees align
the interests of the manager and the investor better than asymmetric performance fees
(Stracca (2006)). More interestingly, we suggest that institutional leverage is positively
6The delegated portfolio management problem can be regarded as a standard principal-agent problem
in which the portfolio performance is analogous to the output for a project.
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related to the severity of agency frictions, which corresponds to the level of intermediary
capital. This is different from Basak and Pavlova (2013a) who argue that institutional
leverage varies with the benchmark return. They find that the institution ends up taking
more risk than the retail investor does, because the institution always has the incentive
to beat the benchmark. The higher the benchmark return, the higher the institutional
leverage.
We next investigate how the presence of agency frictions influences asset pricing.
Equilibrium parameters, depending on whether the friction binds or not, are nonlinear
functions of managerial wealth. The economy is in normal states when the capital con-
straint is slack, corresponding to high managerial wealth and sufficient intermediary capi-
tal for the fund. The economy falls in the crisis regime when the capital constraint binds,
which corresponds to low managerial wealth due to an exogenous negative shock. Never-
theless, the increased relative performance fee induces asset prices to become less sensitive
to changes in intermediary capital. Expected risk premia, volatilities and demands for
precautionary savings are reduced as compared to the results in He and Krishnamurthy
(2012b).
Our above insights remain valid when we extend the model by introducing a third
agent, an active investor who directly invests in the risky asset. Then equilibrium param-
eters are affected also by delegated capital in the economy. We find that the impact of the
increased share of available delegated capital is based on the severity of agency frictions:
it depresses risk premia and volatilities, and pushes up interest rates, when the friction is
being alleviated or even slack. The opposite is true as the friction is more severe. This
is different from Kaniel and Kondor (2013) who argue that there is an inverse U-shaped
relation between the size of delegated capital and the Sharpe ratio. Finally, comparing the
case with and without delegation, we can summarize that delegation benefits all agents
by depressing market volatilities and raising fund investors’ profits.
Therefore, we conclude that the inclusion of relative performance fees stabilises asset
prices in the states of severe crisis. This finding (i) emphasizes the wealth effect also
being discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Xiong (2001); (ii) contributes to the
literature on the role of delegated portfolio management in asset market equilibrium (e.g.,
Kaniel and Kondor (2013), He and Krishnamurthy (2012a), and Vayanos and Woolley
(2013)); and also (iii) contributes to the literature on the role of relative performance
evaluation to reduce risk premia (e.g., Brennan and Li (2008), Kapur and Timmermann
(2005), Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), Basak and Pavlova (2013a)).
Given that Chapter 3 is an example of equity risk-capital models that fit the facts
surrounding bank-based intermediaries, Chapter 4 is an empirical paper that analyses
the role of financial institutions on traditional asset markets in terms of the balance-sheet
changes of bank-based institutions (commercial banks). In traditional asset pricing theory,
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there is a strong assumption that the marginal value of wealth of average household can
price all assets. As discussed before, this is not appropriate since it treats institutions
as a ‘veil’. There has been plenty of theoretical work on intermediary asset pricing,
while little empirical research has been done, mostly because of the difficulty in obtaining
data. Cochrane (2011) argue that, in order to analyse institutional finance empirically,
one should tie the stochastic discount factor to central items in the model, such as the
balance sheet of leveraged intermediaries.
Before the 2007-2008 sub-prime crisis, market-based institutions that always adopt
high leverage played a growing role in supplying credit and thus liquidity in financial
markets, both absolutely and relative to bank-based institutions. (see Adrian and Shin
(2009)). However, re-intermediation was observed during this crisis period: funds flow
from market-based intermediaries into bank-based intermediaries, which suggests the ad-
vantage of bank-based intermediaries in providing liquidity in the state of adversity. Due
to the prominent role of market-based institutions in recent decades, their leverage and
liquidity as well as their effects on asset prices have been extensively analysed by a series
of papers by Adrian and Shin,7 while less attention has been paid to bank-based institu-
tions. The contribution of this paper is therefore to empirically analyse the balance-sheet
fluctuations of commercial banks and the market-wide consequences of such fluctuations
using weekly data.
We first track, in time series from 1993 to 2012, the quarterly balance sheet changes
of both broker dealers and commercial banks, which are the main sub-sectors of market-
based and bank-based intermediaries, respectively. During this period, the role of bank-
based institutions to supply credit was being largely supplanted by that of market-based
institutions. We find that leverage is positively related to total assets for both types of
institutions, suggesting the active management of their balance sheets. Adrian, Moench,
and Shin (2010b) refer this relation as procyclical leverage. However, the magnitude
and time of adjusting balance sheets are different for these two types of institutions: (i)
banks’ leverage is less volatile than broker dealers’; (ii) banks raise their leverage rather
than reduce leverage during the worst periods of crises and show relatively persistence
in normal times, as compared to broker dealers. One plausible explanation is that, in
bad states, commercial banks with the government support can still obtain cheap funding
from retail markets, while market-based intermediaries mainly borrow from the short-term
wholesale market and thus suffer liquidity dry-ups.
Given these preliminary results, we adopt vector autoregressions (VARs hereafter)
with weekly data to test the following two hypothesis: (i) banks provide liquidity in the
7For example, Adrian and Shin (2008), Adrian and Shin (2009), Adrian and Shin (2010a), Adrian,
Moench, and Shin (2010a), Adrian and Shin (2010b), Adrian and Shin (2010c), Adrian, Moench, and Shin
(2010b), Adrian and Shin (2011), Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2011), Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012), Adrian
and Shin (2013).
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states of adversity; (ii) banks’ balance sheets convey information on the subsequent mar-
ket variations in traditional assets, including stocks, corporate bonds, and treasury bonds.
Our results for the first hypothesis show that banks actively adjust their balance sheets
in response to varying financial and economic variables. Specifically, banks’ leverage and
total assets increase faster in bad times than those in normal times, and this accelerated
growth also appears in banks’ particular assets and liabilities. Furthermore, the simul-
taneous increased loans, liquid assets, deposits, and borrowings indicate that banks fund
their loans by taking additional deposits and borrowings rather than by running down
their liquid asset holdings. This is consistent with Gatev and Strahan (2006). However,
by using various financial variables instead of non-financial commercial paper bill as in
Gatev and Strahan (2006), we find that banks’ loans and liquid assets are more influenced
by funding risk in financial markets than non-financial market liquidity risk. Addition-
ally, investors regain the confidence for risky assets as soon as the funding risk declines,
suggested by the dynamic relation between deposits and financial variables.
Our results for the second hypothesis confirm the asset-pricing consequences of banks’
balance sheet changes. We find that three banking variables (leverage, loans to commercial
banks, and treasury and agency securities) have robust explanatory powers in predicting
subsequent market variations of traditional assets. Specifically, the increased leverage is
followed by lower excess returns, market value growth, and higher volatility innovations
in stock markets. Leverage growth can be interpreted as a proxy for the tightness of
banks’ funding constraints. The looser constraint that is reflected by a growing leverage
indicates a stronger risk appetite of banks, being able to provide more liquidity in stock
markets. Moreover, the decreased market value and increased volatility are consistent with
our previous results: banks expand their balance sheets during crises. In addition, lower
excess returns on corporate bonds can be predicted by either increased loans to commercial
banks or decreased treasury and agency securities. The magnitude of changes in corporate
bond excess returns are related to bonds’ ratings and maturities. The lower the rating
rank or the higher the maturity, the larger the size of changes in excess returns. Here the
increased loans to commercial banks implies higher loans demands and thus higher credit
supply to the markets. The positive relation between treasury and agency securities and
bond excess returns also confirms banks’ timing to expand balance sheets. Finally, we
find that the growth of treasury and agency securities can only weakly predict treasury
bond excess returns, but it is significantly and positively correlated with the changes of
treasury constant maturity rates. The plausible explanation is that the increased treasury
holdings lead to increased bond prices that are negatively correlated with interest rates.
In summary, the negative relationship between leverage/loans to commercial banks
and equity/corporate bond returns are consistent with Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010a)’s
quarterly results that a faster expansion (contraction) of broker dealers’ balance sheets
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indicates a higher (lower) risk-bearing capacity and hence leads to lower (higher) equi-
ty/bond risk premia. Additionally, Chava, Park, and Gallmeyer (2010) is another paper
to analyse the role of banks in asset pricing: they provide evidence for the predictability
of US stock returns by measuring credit standard derived from Banks’ loan report. Nev-
ertheless, these papers that utilize low frequency data (quarterly data) miss short-term
variations in asset returns.
Chapter 2
Risk-taking Choice in Hedge Fund
Tournaments
We propose a parsimonious model to theoretically investigate how a hedge fund manager’s
portfolio decision is determined by the manager’s tournament concern, incentive contract,
and liquidation threat. We show that facing a concave fund-flow-to-performance relation-
ship as has empirically been shown to be the case in reality, a hedge fund manager’s
risk-taking level varies dramatically as a function of her interim absolute performance,
her interim performance relative to the industry, and the industry’s interim portfolio
strategy. We find that when fund competing for more funds, managers adopt two dis-
tinctive portfolio strategies — contrarian and mimicking — depending on their relative
standing in the industry. Moreover, the combined effects of the performance incentive and
the tournament incentive suggest that the extreme risk-taking propensity induced by the
performance fee can be substantially mitigated by the manager’s fund flow concern. We
also uncover different risk-taking patterns for systematic-risk assets and idiosyncratic-risk
assets, which is largely supported by the extant empirical work. Finally, we find that
managers with fund flow concerns might choose to gamble to avoid fund outflows rather
than playing it safe; if given an outside opportunity, the manager would like to voluntarily
shut down the fund, especially when the industry as a whole has the large risk exposure.
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2.1 Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed the explosive growth of hedge funds.1 Fierce compe-
tition in the industry induces fund managers to take into account not only their absolute
performance but also their relative standing in the industry when they make investment
decisions. This is because investors are usually allowed to withdraw money at certain
points of the investment period and hence have the opportunity to shift their money to
better-performing funds.2 Since hedge fund managers are also typically paid a fraction
of assets under management (AUM hereafter) like mutual fund managers, they have a
strong incentive to outperform their peers in order to attract more money. This behavior
is described as ‘tournament’, which is firstly documented by Brown, Goetzmann, and
Park (2001) in the hedge fund industry.
Although extensive research has been conducted on the tournament behavior in the
mutual fund industry, the existing models for mutual funds cannot be directly applied to
hedge funds as there are some remarkable distinctions between these two types of invest-
ment tools.3 Firstly, hedge funds have been empirically documented to have a concave
flow-performance relationship, while this relationship has been found to be convex for
mutual funds.4 The different shape of the fund flow function might lead to different risk
shifting behavior. Secondly, in comparison with mutual funds, hedge funds have a more
complex compensation structure featuring a High-Water-Mark (HWM hereafter) provi-
sion, which entails different risk taking incentives from those of mutual funds.5 Thirdly,
hedge funds generally have a higher attrition rate as compared to mutual funds.6 The
possibility of funds’ shutdown is neglected in most of mutual fund models but we believe
1The number of hedge funds increased rapidly from only 610 to more than 3600 during the 1990s. As
of June 2009, there were more than 8900 hedge funds operating worldwide and managing assets worth
1.43 trillion dollars according to Hedge Fund Research. The total assets under management went up to
2.04 trillion in early 2012.
2In practice, various hedge fund indices have been created for both managers’ and investors’ reference.
3For example, Taylor (2003), Goriaev, Palomino, and Prat (2003) and Basak and Makarov (2012).
4For example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997),Sirri and Tufano (1998),Goet-
zmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), Chen (2011) and Getmansky (2012) and etc.
5A distinctive characteristic of the hedge fund industry is that investors usually face restrictions on
withdrawing capital (for example, lock-up provisions and redemption notice periods), and hence managers
have a greater incentive to certify their quality ex-ante by adopting a HWM. In addition, since hedge funds
are open-ended private investment vehicles that exempt from the Investment Act of 1940, information
asymmetry between managers and investors is both a logical and important premise for the industry.
Therefore, the terms of compensation contract provide a natural means through which managers can
signal their quality. Including a HWM in the compensation contract is more costly for lower-quality
managers as they have relatively low alpha. Aragon and Qian (2007) provide the corresponding empirical
support that HWMs are more commonly used by hedge funds with short track records and hedge funds
that impose lockup provisions and longer redemption notice periods; HWM usage is also positively related
with survival rates (indicating managers’ quality) and with the sensitivity of flows to past performance
(due to the fact that fund flows reflect investors’ updating of manager quality).
6According to Getmansky (2012), on average, approximately 7.1% of all hedge funds go out of business
every year. During the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis, 70% of the hedge funds had negative returns,
which caused a liquidation rate of 23%, the highest in hedge fund history.
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that fund termination plays a non-trivial role in hedge fund managers’ risk taking deci-
sions.7 Therefore, this paper analyses how a hedge fund manager’s portfolio strategy is
affected by her tournament concern, incentive contract, and liquidation threat.
To highlight the role of money flows in determining managerial risk-taking decisions,
we develop a parsimonious discrete-time model to study hedge fund managers’ interim
mid-year risk-shifting decisions in the context of tournaments over a one-year horizon.
Motivated by the extant empirical evidence, we assume that the year-end fund flow is an
increasing and concave function of a fund’s expected relative performance.8 In the baseline
model, there are two assets, a risky asset and a risk-free asset. Managers are assumed to
take a random portfolio allocation strategy at the beginning of the year. In the middle
of the year, managers have the opportunity to reallocate their investments after funds’
mid-year performance is revealed. With year-end money flows depending on a fund’s
relative standing, the hedge fund manager needs to take into account her competitors’
performance and their portfolio strategies in addition to her own performance when she
makes interim investment decisions. We show that all these factors substantially influence
her portfolio choice.
First, we analyse risk-neutral managers’ risk-taking choices when they are driven
only by the motive to win more funds. Due to the concavity of the flow-performance
function, we show that a fund manager has a strong incentive to minimize the volatility
of her expected relative performance (the tracking error variance of her portfolio).9 In
a more realistic setting, we impose a lower bound of year-end capital flow due to the
fact that money outflow cannot exceed the value of the fund. In the presence of the
lower bound, the flow-performance function has a convexity region near the lower bound,
which induces the manager with extremely poor relative performance to deviate from
the industry’s portfolio in order to maximize the tracking error variance. Therefore, we
conclude that relative performance (or the distance to the industry benchmark) plays
a critical role in determining a manager’s optimal risk shifting strategy. This finding
remains valid for a risk-averse manager who is paid a management fee based on the size
7Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) empirically examine the termination of hedge funds and point
out that once a manager exits the market, her chance of reappearing in the hedge fund industry is very
small, which emphasizes the importance of the liquidation threat in manager’s risk choice.
8Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), Chen (2011) and Getmansky (2012) all document a concave
flow-performance relation based on hedge fund data, and they suggest that the shape of the relation might
be attributed to various share restrictions which are usually imposed on money flows by hedge funds.
9In the absence of risk premium for the risky asset, it is optimal for managers to mimic the benchmark
and choose a risk level which is proportional to the industry average; and the proportion is determined
by the funds’ relative performance to the benchmark. Since there is only one risk asset in our model, the
return of the risky asset can be regarded as the return of the portfolio constructed by the fund manager.
Therefore, the case in the absence of risk premium can be referred to as a benchmark case where investors
lose out from investing in the fund but managers benefit from investing in the risky asset without risk
premium to win the competition for fund flow. In this case, investors would be better off investing in
a savings account rather than through delegated investment management. With a risk premium, the
manager predictably deviates from perfect mimicking, but her risk-taking is still very much tied to that
of the industry benchmark.
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of AUM. In contrast, it has been shown empirically that mutual fund managers have a
fund flow function which is convex everywhere, hence managers should always maximize
the tracking error variance by deviating from the industry benchmark (See Basak and
Makarov (2012)).
A distinctive feature of the hedge fund industry is that most fund managers are re-
warded based on an asymmetric compensation plan. In addition to the management fee
based on the size of AUM, they also get paid a performance fee based on HWMs. Specif-
ically, managers will receive a proportion of the increase in the net asset value. Several
papers that focus on the implications of HWM suggest that the convex compensation
structure resembles a call option on a fund’s value, which causes excessive risk taking
when the fund’s value is somewhat below its HWM. However, the extant hedge fund
models overlook the implicit incentive effects of the prevalent contract, which is caused
by potential fund flows. Since a manager’s compensation includes a fraction of asset under
management, and the growth of the funds largely depends on managers’ relative perfor-
mance, to perform well in relative terms is also one of the manager’s major concerns. We
find that HWM provisions and fund flow concerns can separately generate two distinctive
risk shifting patterns.10 Consistent with the existing work, the HWM provision results in
a bell-shaped relation between absolute performance and the risk-taking level (See Hodder
and Jackwerth (2007) and Buraschi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul (2014)). When combining
the HWM and fund flow concerns, however, our model yields some novel results. First,
when fund value is below the HWM, a manager’s incentive to take on more risks can be
significantly moderated by the incentive to mimic the benchmark. Hence, managers be-
low HWMs do not necessarily increase risks, especially when their peers choose small risk
exposures. In the equilibrium of the model, managers’ optimal risk level near the HWM is
considerably decreased when we introduce year-end fund flows. Secondly, when a fund’s
mid-year performance surpasses its HWM, managers have a strong tendency to reduce
risks in order to lock in performance fees, and thus the mimicking behavior induced by
the tournament concern is substantially suppressed. Therefore, our model suggests that
interim losers tend to be more concerned about possible money outflows, while interim
winners focus more on securing performance fees. This paper adds another perspective to
the hedge fund literature by showing that external factors (competition between different
funds) can significantly contribute to managerial risk choice.
Most hedge funds bear manager-specific risk. According to Deutsche Bank’s Alter-
native Investment Survey (2009), investors choose hedge funds largely because of their
diversified or uncorrelated returns. As a result, we also study hedge fund managers’ port-
folio allocations across different sources of risks, namely market risk and idiosyncratic
10We note that since we model the manager’s mid-year risk-taking behavior in a one-year model, the
HWM for us is simply the level above which a performance fee is paid. We talk about the incentives induced
by the HWM and by the performance fee interchangeably, without invoking the special characteristics and
effects that the HWM would have in a multi-year setting.
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risk. In particular, we extend our baseline model so that in addition to the market asset,
each fund has access to a fund-specific asset. Our model with multiple risky assets reveals
that in the contrarian region (where managers try to deviate from the benchmark), hedge
fund managers opt for the maximum idiosyncratic risk in order to maximize the tracking
error variance, no matter whether the fund-specific asset generates risk premium or not.
Moreover, we find that only hedge fund managers who are interim losers increase their
risk exposure to the fund-specific asset, and that they increase their exposure to this asset
much more than that to market risk. Finally, we find that the bell-shaped risk-taking
propensity induced by the HWM is more evident in the fund-specific asset than in the
market asset when the fund-specific asset generates a higher return than the market asset.
Since hedge funds generally have a higher attrition rate, fund termination plays
a non-trivial part in hedge fund managers’ risk-taking decisions. Brown, Goetzmann,
and Park (2001) empirically examine the termination of hedge funds and point out that
once a manager exits the market, her chance of reappearing in the hedge fund industry
is very small, which emphasizes the importance of liquidation threat in manager’s risk
choice. Like Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013), we examine
the case with exogenous liquidation bound and the case with endogenous fund closure
option, respectively. In the absence of year-end fund flows, managers with fund values
approaching the liquidation bound would take minimal risk to avoid hitting the bound.
However, when investors can freely withdraw money at the end of the year, investing in
the riskless asset is no longer a safe strategy for the under-performing managers, due to
the fact that massive fund outflows will also lead to fund closure. Hence, funds ranked at
the very bottom in the middle of the year would try to increase the tracking error variance
by deviating from the benchmark. Their risk choices will thus primarily depend on the
benchmark portfolio instead of their own absolute performance. When managers have the
option to shut down the fund after they observe mid-year performance, we find that the
endogenous closure region is enlarged after we introduce fund flows, and managers with
poor relative performance are more likely to liquidate their funds when the industry on
average opts for high risks.
In this paper, we endeavor to theoretically explore the combined effects of typical com-
pensation contracts (explicit incentives) and tournaments (implicit incentives) on hedge
fund managers’ risk-taking behavior. Compared with existing hedge fund studies which
are primarily focused on the effects of HWM provisions,11 our model incorporates an ad-
ditional layer of managers’ incentives and yields a rich set of predictions on investment
behavior, as we find that funds’ absolute performance, their relative performance, and
the benchmark’s portfolio strategy all have significant influences on managers’ risk-taking
decisions. Our model also offers new explanations to some stylized facts of hedge fund
11For example, Hodder and Jackwerth (2007), Chakraborty and Ray (2010) , Buraschi, Kosowski, and
Sritrakul (2014), Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013) and etc.
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risk-taking patterns. Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) use a multi-period model to show
that a long investment horizon mitigates manager’s aggressive risk-taking near the HWM
as it would adversely affect the fund manager’s compensation in the long run. Alterna-
tively, our model shows that the desire to attract new investors would also moderate the
extreme risk entailed by the HWM in the short run. Another important contribution to
the literature about understanding managerial incentives in the hedge fund industry is
that we disentangle multiple sources of risks and document different risk shifting patterns
for systematic-risk asset and idiosyncratic asset. Our results confirm Chen (2011)’s em-
pirical finding that hedge funds mainly shift idiosyncratic risk in response to their poor
performance relative to peer funds and distort both systematic and idiosyncratic risks
when their option-like fee contracts are just out-of-the-money. Furthermore, we find that
tournament concerns also alter the effect of liquidation threat on managerial risk choices
as shown in Hodder and Jackwerth (2007).
Our model setup is similar in spirit to Taylor (2003) and Basak and Makarov (2012)
who examine mutual funds’ tournament behavior. They both argue that interim winners
in equilibrium would increase the volatility of their investments while interim losers tend
to reduce risk. Nevertheless, this prediction does not appear to hold in practice for hedge
funds as Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) and other empirical papers on hedge fund
tournaments all suggest the opposite pattern in reality. In contrast to the findings in
Taylor (2003) and Basak and Makarov (2012), our model shows that interim hedge fund
winners do not always increase risk due to the combined effects of fund flow concerns
and HWM provisions. First, interim winners have a strong incentive to mimic the in-
dustry benchmark, which leads to low risk-taking if the industry’s average risk level is
low. Second, the HWM-induced lock-in behavior leads to moderate risk-taking when the
fund value is above the HWM. Hence, the hedge funds’ unique flow-performance relation
and asymmetric payoffs cause managers’ risk-taking patterns different from mutual fund
managers’. Additionally, interim hedge fund losers would not always reduce risk due to
the fact that hedge funds generally have a higher attrition rate as compared to mutual
funds. When fund value approaches the liquidation bound, interim losers will choose a
high risk-taking level if the industry’s average risk is low.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related work
in the literature. Sections 2.3 presents the economic setup, and section 2.4 provides the
analytical solution of a toy model that incorporates concave fund flows that depend on
relative performance. Section 2.5 provides numerical solutions to the baseline model in
which a performance incentive is incorporated together with fund flow concerns. Section
2.6 and 2.7 extend the model by introducing liquidation threats and idiosyncratic risks
respectively. Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
Our work is related to four streams of the theoretical literature. First, the most related
to ours are Taylor (2003) and Basak and Makarov (2012), who examine mutual funds’
tournament behavior. Taylor (2003) is the first paper to study how fund managers adjust
their risk taking according to their mid-year performance when they compete for cash
inflows. He distinguishes between scenarios with a passive benchmark (e.g. market index)
and with an active benchmark (peers in the industry). When one of the managers is an
exogenous benchmark, the winning manager indexes and the losing manager gambles;
however, when both managers are active, the winning manager is more likely to gamble,
especially when the midyear performance gap is high and meanwhile stocks offer high
returns and low volatilities.
The tournament model of Basak and Makarov (2012) is the closest one to ours in
the literature. They investigate managers’ equilibrium portfolios and predict that the
portfolio volatility of an interim winner is higher than that of an interim loser. The
intuition is that the convexity of the flow-performance relation implies that a manager
seeks to maximize the volatility of her tracking error (the difference between her own and
industry-average returns). Moreover, since the year-end return volatility is proportional
to its corresponding interim performance, the interim winner would invest in risky assets
to leverage her high interim performance, driving the interim loser into bonds. One of
the main departures of our model from theirs is that hedge fund industry has been found
to have a concave flow-performance relationship, which should significantly affect fund
managers’ objective function.
The literature related to fund tournaments also involves Berk and Green (2004),
Palomino (2005), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Christoffersen and Musto (2008),
Chen and Pennacchi (2009) and etc. Berk and Green (2004) study the relationship be-
tween endogenous fund flows and mutual fund performance. They suggest that, although
the investors chase high-performance funds, fund performance is unpredictable due to
the competitive provision of capitals by investors and decreasing returns for managers in
deploying their skills. In their belief-updating process, the duration between time 0 and
time t matters. In other words, flows to younger funds respond much more dramatically
to performance than flows to more mature funds. Christoffersen and Musto (2008) focus
on examining the effect of HWM on investors’ equilibrium investment levels in competi-
tive capital markets. Like Berk and Green (2004), they also adopt decreasing returns to
scale and learning process of managers’ abilities. They find that the alteration of expected
returns due to the HWM provision is mainly determined by the confidence in manager’s
ability. The HWM effect is to boost the initial fund size and to depress initial expected
returns while increasing subsequent expected returns.
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Palomino (2005) aims to investigate how the entry and investment decisions of fund
managers are affected by their relative performance objectives. Their main difference
from Taylor (2003) is that they assume that some managers have superior information,
and for this reason, the difference in interim performance of different funds are no longer
exogenously-specified. In comparison with the objective of absolute performance maxi-
mization, relative performance objectives increase managers’ risk taking level and reduce
the number of low-quality funds. Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007) investigate a mutual
fund manager’s risk taking incentives induced by a piecewise convex relationship between
money flows and fund’s relative performance. The optimal risk exposure is determined
by the interplay of managers’ risk aversion and the risk-shifting incentive due to potential
fund flows. Similarly, Chen and Pennacchi (2009) model a manager’s portfolio choice by
assuming that the compensation scheme can be either a linear, concave or convex function
of the fund’s performance relative to a benchmark. Both Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro
(2007) and Chen and Pennacchi (2009) find that poor-performing funds would increase
their tracking error volatility, but not necessarily the volatility of the fund’s absolute
return.
A second stream of the literature studies the role of incentive contracts in hedge fund
risk taking strategies. Our model setup is most related to Hodder and Jackwerth (2007)
who study the incentive effects of a typical hedge fund contract and liquidation barrier
for a manager with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility. Their main finding is
that, with a one-year horizon, managerial risk-taking varies dramatically with fund value.
However, when the model is extended to the one with multiple valuation periods, the
manager’s excessive risk-taking induced by HWM is rapidly moderated. Although our
model only involves one-year period, the fund outflow concern also mitigates the excess
risk taking that HWM entails.
Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) provide a closed-form solution to the cost of
the HWM contract under certain conditions. Also they suggest that the pervasive use of
HWM in the hedge fund industry might be due to the fact that investors’ payoff is a pure
bet on managers’ skill and that hedge fund technology might have diminishing returns
to scale. However, they argue that, as opposed to the mutual fund managers, hedge
fund managers hedge may not be able to take or even want new funds, contradicting
the empirical findings on the existence of tournament behavior in hedge fund industry.
(see Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001), Chen (2011), Getmansky (2012) and Aragon
and Nanda (2012)) Chakraborty and Ray (2010) study an intricate set of risk, effort and
walkaway decisions, which are driven by the HWM feature of the hedge fund contract and
depend on how far the fund is from the previous HWM. They find that fund managers are
more likely to expand costly effort when fund value approaches the HWM, while taking
too much risk as fund value is far below the HWM. Once fund value falls to some certain
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point below the HWM, managers reduce effort spending, causing the volatility of future
returns and the probability of fund liquidation to increase.
More recent work tackles the dynamic investment problems of hedge fund managers.
For example, Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013) investigate the optimal leverage that hedge
fund managers would choose to maximize the expected present value of their management
fees and incentive fees. They assume that hedge managers are risk-neutral in a multiple-
period setup with path-dependent HWM and a downside exogenous liquidation bound.
Their results show that a fund’s leverage increases with alpha (which is a manager’s ability
to generate abnormal returns) and decreases with volatility and the manager’s endogenous
effective risk attitude. However, they do not consider tournament behavior or investors’
fund flow decisions. Buraschi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul (2014) study the dynamic optimal
portfolio strategies of hedge fund managers by creating a non-linear contractual structure.
In particular, the compensation function of managers consists of management fees, call
option-like performance fees and put option-like deadweight costs, which are incurred if
fund value drops below a certain threshold. Their theoretical results show that the optimal
leverage depends on the distance of the net asset value from HWM. The call option-like
feature induces managers to use more leverage, while the put option-like feature induces
the manager to reduce leverage. This leads to a bell-shaped risk taking pattern of hedge
fund managers.
Third, our paper also contributes to the literature regarding how fund managers
shift risk loadings between systematic risks and idiosyncratic risks. Basak, Pavlova, and
Shapiro (2007) examine this issue in the context of mutual fund tournaments. They use
two risky assets representing systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk respectively to see
whether managers would take on idiosyncratic risk to win more fund inflow or not. When
there is no risk premium for the fund-specific asset, managers would choose to have zero
exposure to idiosyncratic risk and adjust the exposure to systematic risk based on their
relative performance. Also, Chen and Pennacchi (2009) study mutual fund managers’
risk shifting problems with their compensation depending on their performance relative
to the benchmark. They assume a smooth fund flow function, and study two correlated
assets, one benchmark asset and one alternative asset. Ozdenoren and Yuan (2012) seek
to explain why compensation contracts would encourage mangers to take on excessive
systematic as opposed to idiosyncratic risks.
More broadly, our paper is also related to the work on optimal contracts. Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999) derive the optimal contract in a principal-agent model of strategic
competition in which managers can be compensated on both their own profits and their
rivals’ profits. They argue that strategic interaction among firms can explain the lack
of relative-performance-based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm
performance. Biais and Casamatta (1999) analyse the optimal financing of investment
projects when managers must exert unobservable effort and also engage in value-reducing
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risk shifting. They argue that if the risk-shifting problem is dominant, then the optimal
financing scheme is a combination of debt and outside equity. When the effort problem
is the major source of moral hazard, stock options should be awarded to the managers.
Makarov and Plantin (2010) develop a model of active portfolio management in which
fund managers may secretly gamble in order to manipulate their reputation and attract
more funds. They study the optimal long-term contract that deters this risk shifting
behavior, and show that contracts that simultaneously increase and defer the managers’
expected fees after abnormally high returns eliminate risk-shifting incentives. DeMarzo,
Livdan, and Tchistyi (2011) try to solve another two-dimensional moral hazard problem:
managers’ risk shifting problem and cash flow diversion (stealing), simultaneously. First
of all, any incentive compatible contracts must reward the agent for reporting high cash
flow. Otherwise, they would steal the cash or shirk. However, this type of contract also
creates incentives for managers to take on disaster risk. For this reason, they argue that
this extreme risk taking can be mitigated if disaster states can be identified ex-post by
paying the manager a large bonus if the firm survives. But when the performance is
sufficiently weak, the manager will give up the bonus, and take on disaster risk. Their
model explains why suboptimal risk taking can emerge even when investors are fully
rational and managers are compensated optimally.
Empirical flow-performance relation: Some recent empirical papers suggest that
the tournament behavior exists in the hedge fund industry and that the risk-shifting deci-
sions of hedge fund managers depend upon relative rather than absolute fund performance.
Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) is the first to document hedge funds’ tournament
behavior. They find that performance relative to peer funds is important in managers’
strategic use of variance, while performance relative to HWM is not. Specifically, mid-year
winning funds significantly reduce portfolio variance, while mid-year losing funds tend to
increase their risk exposures. Moreover, their survival analysis suggests that hedge fund
managers are seriously concerned with fund closure, as opposed to maximizing the option-
like feature of their incentive contracts. Consistent with Brown, Goetzmann, and Park
(2001), Chen (2011) finds that annual net fund flows are positively related to last year’s
fund performance, indicating that investors make investment decisions based on funds’
past performance. Specifically, hedge funds with poor relative performance in the first
half of a year exhibit a greater risk-increasing propensity in the second half of the year.
Getmansky (2012) examines how the life cycle of hedge funds is affected by fund
characteristics (such as age, asset size, fund returns, and fund flows) and industry charac-
teristics (such as favorable positioning and competition). They find a concave relationship
between hedge fund’s past relative performance and year-end fund flows. Aragon and
Nanda (2012) analyse if a hedge fund’s risk shifting is related to the manager’s incentive
contract, personal capital stake and the possibility of fund closure. They document that
HWM provisions, managerial stakes in the fund, and low risk of fund closure appear to
Chapter 2. Risk-taking Choice in Hedge Fund Tournaments 31
make a hedge fund manager more conservative with regard to risk shifting. It worths
noting that their results indicate that HWM can actually reduce the propensity of los-
ing hedge fund managers to increase risk in tournaments. The intuition is that a hedge
fund manager is essentially given a sequence of options within a long investment horizon.
While a riskier portfolio can increase the probability of crossing the current HWM, it also
increases the probability that the assets will be worth less, causing the future options to
be even more out of the money.
Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2009) investigate the impacts of share re-
strictions (including lockup period, redemption, advance notice and so on) on the flow-
performance relation of hedge funds. They find a convex flow-performance relation in the
absence of share restrictions and a concave flow-performance relation in the presence of
significant share restrictions. They also document that funds with more volatile returns
tend to be smaller and younger, as these funds are more aggressive and competing more
vigorously for money inflows. Also, these funds in general impose looser share restrictions.
In addition, their test results suggest a concave flow-performance relation for live funds
and a convex relation for defunct funds. Moreover, they relate share restrictions with
‘Smart money’ effect and find that funds experiencing prior net inflow outperform funds
experiencing prior net outflow only when they have no share restrictions. Hence, they
conclude that restrictions on flow prevent investors from shifting money to better funds.
2.3 The Setup
We consider an economy where financial investment opportunities are represented by a
riskless asset and a risky asset. The riskless asset yields a constant rate of return r, and
the risky asset yields a random rate of return x that is normally distributed with mean
µ > r and standard deviation σ > 0; r, µ and σ are constants whose values are common
knowledge. The economy is populated by n hedge funds indexed by i, while j denotes the
industry average (or benchmark).
We assume that there are three dates, t = 0, t = 1 and t = 2, which we refer to as
year-start, mid-year or interim, and year-end. At time 0, all funds start with the same
assets under management Wi,0 (after initial management fees have been paid); without
loss of generality, we assume that a fund has a unit wealth at year-start, i.e., Wi,0 = 1.
At t = 0 and at t = 1, the manager of fund i invests proportion θi,t ∈ [0, θ] of the fund’s
wealth in the risky asset and proportion 1 − θi,t in the riskless asset, where θ > 0 is the
upper bound of allowed leverage, and θi,t > 0 imposes the shorting constraint.
At time 0, each fund has a (potentially different) exogenously given investment strat-
egy θi,0; this yields a mid-year total return mi for each fund i. An average investment
strategy θj,0 and a mid-year average total return mj for the industry (the benchmark) are
exogenously given. At time 1, mid-year returns mi and mj are revealed, and the mid-year
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wealth of fund i is Wi,1 = mi, while the mid-year average wealth of all funds (the wealth
of the benchmark) is Wj,1 = mj . Manager i is said to be in a winning (losing) position if
mi > mj (mi < mj).
At time 1, the average investment strategy θj,1 for the industry (the benchmark
strategy) is again assumed to be public knowledge and exogenously given, since it is
regarded as an exogenously specified industry index.12 Taking the benchmark’s risk-taking
level θj,1, the benchmark’s interim performance mj , and her own interim performance mi
as given, at t = 1 the fund manager chooses the level of risk-taking θi,1 that maximizes
her expected utility from end-year compensation, which consists of a management fee at
rate k on assets under management plus fund flows and a performance fee at rate y on
potential profits.
At time 2, fund i ’s year-end wealth is realized based on θi,1 and the realization of x;
in particular, fund i’s wealth is Wi,2 = mi[1 + r+ θi,1(x− r)] 13 and the resulting industry
average wealth is Wj,2 = mj [1 + r + θj,1(x − r)]. We assume that fund i experiences
fund inflow or outflow, denoted as Fi, based on its performance relative to the benchmark
index. Given the fund’s total wealth including the fund flow Fi, manager i receives
year-end compensation Ci, which consists of three components, namely the management
fee from the old investors, the management fee from the new investors (which could be
negative due to fund outflow), and the performance fee if the fund value exceeds the High
Water Mark (HWM). As a result, manager i’s objective function in choosing portfolio
allocation θi,1 at t = 1 is
max
θi∈[0,θ]
E[U ] = E[
C1−γi
1− γ ], (2.1)
where Ci = k(Wi,2 +Fi) + ymax{Wi,2−Wi,0, 0}, and where γ is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion of the fund manager. More importantly, we assume that the year-end fund
flow Fi of fund i is an increasing and concave function of the fund’s performance relative
to the benchmark, i.e., Fi = f(∆Wi), with f an increasing and concave function of relative
performance ∆Wi = Wi,2−Wj,2. For analytic tractability, we assume that f is quadratic,
but we need to bound it above some threshold ∆W to ensure that it is (weakly) increasing
everywhere.14
12We note that we make this assumption because we want to study the fund manager’s risk-taking
behavior for arbitrary levels of relative performance mi and benchmark risk-taking θj,1 in a model that
incorporates an incentive fee and fund flow concerns that depend on relative performance. This assumption
is relaxed later, when we solve for the equilibrium.
13In general, i.e., for Wi,0 not equal to 1, this is Wi,2 = Wi,0mi · [1 + r + θi,1(x− r)].
14For plausible parameter values, ∆W is very large so it has an insignificant effect on optimal decisions.
We also note that assuming instead that f is logarithmic does not alter our qualitative results in the
numerical solutions, but it is analytically intractable even for the simple case that we examine analytically.
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Specifically, the fund flow function is assumed to be
f(∆Wi) =
a(∆Wi)2 + b∆Wi + c if ∆Wi ≤ ∆W,c− b24a Otherwise, (2.2)
where a < 0 and b > 0 (to ensure that f is increasing and concave, respectively), c is the
fund flow for funds whose performance equals the industry average, and ∆W = − b2a is the
threshold of relative performance above which fund flows flatten out. This assumption
of the fund flow function is consistent with empirical findings. Brown, Goetzmann, and
Park (2001) provide the evidence that managers pay more attention to their performance
relative to peer funds than the traditional market index such as S&P500 index, which
justifies our choice of benchmark. Additionally, Chen (2011) and Getmansky (2012)
document that there exists a concave relationship between individual net fund flow and
individual fund performance in excess of the industry’s average performance. Chen (2011)
also estimates the impacts of the relative performance and its square term on net fund
flow. His estimated coefficients will be used to numerically solve the model in the later
sections.
We also extend the model by incorporating an exogenous liquidation bound. If this
bound is hit at any time, investors will withdraw all the money from the fund, and the
manager’s compensation will be nil in this case. Following Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013),
we set the liquidation bound as a fraction of the HWM, i.e., W = p ·H, where H is the
high water mark. Like Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013), we will also analyse the endogenous
shutdown scenario in which managers can voluntarily choose to close the fund at the
mid-year (i.e., at time 1) to take outside opportunities.
2.4 The Concave Flow-Performance Relationship
In order to examine the pure effect of the tournament-induced incentives on the manager’s
optimal risk-taking decision, we first assume that the manager is risk-neutral, and that
she does not receive a performance fee. As a result, the manager is solely driven by the
incentive to maximize the expected fund flow, which is a function of performance relative
to the benchmark. In short, we find that to maximize the expected fund flow, a hedge
fund manager has incentives to maximize the expected relative performance as well as to
minimize the tracking error variance. The manager’s optimal risk-taking decision in the
middle of the year, at t = 1, is the tradeoff between these two concerns.
In particular, taking as given the industry average portfolio strategy θj , the industry
average interim performance mj , and her own interim performance mi, at t = 1 the
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The fund’s performance relative to the benchmark is
∆Wi = (miθi −mjθj)(x− r) + (mi −mj)(1 + r), (2.4)
and using the assumption that the return x of the risky asset is normally distributed, then
relative performance is also normally distributed with mean µw and standard deviation
σw given, respectively, by
µω = (miθi −mjθj)(µ− r) + (mi −mj)(1 + r),
σω = |miθi −mjθj |σ.
(2.5)
Expected relative performance µw depends on the difference between the product of
interim relative performance and risk-taking for the fund miθi and for the benchmark
mjθj ; this relationship is strictly increasing as long as risk is priced in the market, i.e.,
µ > r. The expectation µw also depends directly on the difference in interim relative
performance between the fund mi and the benchmark mj , since mid-year profits will
yield an additional return even if they are invested in the risk-free asset.
The standard deviation σw of relative performance — the tracking error or (square
root of) the tracking error variance — is proportional to the absolute difference between
the product of interim performance and risk-taking for the fund and for the benchmark.
Essentially, a manager who wants to minimize the tracking error will compensate for poor
(good) interim relative performance — mi < mj (mi > mj) — by increasing (reducing)
her risk-taking θi relative to the risk-taking θj of the benchmark.
Combining the expressions for µw and σw with the assumption that f is a bounded
quadratic (see Equation 2.2), we find that the expected fund flow is16






w) + bµw +
b2
4a




where φ and Φ are the standard normal density and distribution functions respectively,
and d = −b/2a−µwσw . The parameter dmeasures the distance (number of standard deviations
σw) between the mean µw of relative performance ∆Wi and the threshold ∆W of relative
performance above which fund flows flatten out. For plausible parameter values, d is large,
hence φ(d) is close to 0 and Φ(d) is close to 1, and the threshold ∆W has an insignificant
15Note that, for ease of notation, in what follows we use θi and θj instead of θi,1 and θj,1, respectively,
since θi,t and θj,t for t 6= 1 do not appear again in the remaining of the paper.
16See the proof in Appendix A.1.1.
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w) + bµw + c, which is clearly decreasing in tracking error variance
σ2w and increasing in expected relative performance µw.
17 For arbitrary d, we can use
Equation 2.6 to show generally that the expected fund flow E[f(∆Wi)] is decreasing in
σ2w and increasing in µw.
Having examined relative performance ∆Wi and its distribution, and the expected
fund flows E[f(∆Wi)] which enter the manager’s objective function in Equation 2.3, we
now examine the manager’s optimal risk-taking decision.
Proposition 2.1. (Optimal risk-taking decision)18
(i)If there is no risk premium for the risky asset (µ = r), then the optimal unconstrained
risk-taking decision is θ∗,µ=ri =
mj
mi
θj, which minimizes (in fact eliminates) tracking error
variance with respect to the benchmark.
(ii)If risk is priced (µ > r), then the optimal unconstrained risk-taking θ∗,µ>ri is above
(equal to) the level θ∗,µ=ri that minimizes tracking error variance if interim relative per-
formance is sufficiently small (large) relative to the threshold for relative performance
above which fund flows flatten out, i.e., if mi−mj is smaller (greater) than the threshold
∆m = ∆W1+r .
(iii)Imposing the leverage constraint θ ∈ [0, θ] simply bounds the optimal risk-taking de-
cision from above at θ. As a result, the risk-taking level that minimizes tracking error
variance may not eliminate it.
It is instructive to present a sketch of the proof.19 The first derivative of E[f(w)]





Φ(d)[b+ 2a(1 + r)(mi −mj)]
+ 2aσw[sgn(miθi −mjθj)Φ(d)((µ− r)
2
σ2




where sgn denotes the sign function which equals the sign of its argument.
If mi −mj ≥ ∆m, then using Equation 2.4 we have that ∆W ≥ (miθi −mjθj)(x −
r) + ∆W . But from Equation 2.2 we know that maximum fund flows are achieved for
∆W ≥ ∆W , and given that the manager only cares about maximizing fund flows, she




17Note that a(µ2w + σ
2
w) + bµw + c is increasing in µw as long as d > 0; for d ≤ 0, the values
φ(d) = 0 and Φ(d) = 1 would not be applicable, so in that case we would need to use the more





Φ(d)dd > 0 and ∂E[f(∆Wi)]
∂σw
= a(µ2w + 2σw)Φ(d) < 0.
18See Appendix A.1.3 and A.1.4.
19For details, see Appendix A.1.2.
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that eliminates tracking error variance.20 Next we consider the case mi−mj < ∆m.21 In
order to examine the incentives of hedge fund managers, we analyse the sign of each term
in Equation 2.7. The first term is always positive and gives the manager an incentive to
increase her holdings in the risky asset in order to maximize fund flow.
For the second term, we have the following two cases:
• If θi > mjmi θj , then 2aσw[Φ(d)(
(µ−r)2
σ2
+ 1)− µ−rσ φ(d)] < 0.22
This indicates that the manager has the incentive to reduce risk-taking in order to
maximize the fund flow. Since θi >
mj
mi
θj , the decreased risk-taking induces the
tracking error variance σw = |miθi −mjθj |σ to decline.
• If θi < mjmi θj , then −2aσw[Φ(d)(
(µ−r)2
σ2
+ 1) + µ−rσ φ(d)] > 0.
This indicates that the manager is prone to increase risk-taking to maximize the
fund flow, which also lowers the tracking error variance.
From the above analysis on the second term of the derivative, we can see that the fund
manager would always try to minimize the tracking error variance due to the concavity
of the fund flow function. Moreover, these two terms of the derivative function, Equation
2.7, reveal two motives of managers when they make the optimal risk-taking decision. On
the one hand, they are prone to take high risk to win more money flow at year-end; on the
other hand, they have an incentive to minimize the volatility of their relative performance
to their peers.
For µ = r (i.e., no risk premium for the risky asset), it is now clear that the opti-
mal unconstrained risk level for fund managers is θ∗,µ=ri =
mj
mi
θj ; in the absence of risk
premium, the manager’s only motive is to minimize tracking error variance. For µ > r,
combining the aforementioned incentives induced by the two terms in Equation 2.7, it
becomes clear that the optimal unconstrained risk-taking level would be greater than
θ∗,µ=ri .
2.4.1 Fund Flow With A Lower Bound
Like most models in the extant literature (see, e.g., Taylor (2003)), the setup presented
above assumes that there is no lower bound of fund value; this is not entirely ideal,
as in reality fund wealth cannot become negative, and fund managers do not receive
negative compensation. To account for this, here we impose the constraint Fi ≥ −Wi,2,
i.e., that fund outflows are smaller than the year-end fund value Wi,2, where Wi,2 :=
20With a binding leverage constraint (i.e., if mi
mj
θj > θ), the manager cannot lock in the maximum fund
flows, but she still chooses θi = min{mjmi θj , θ} in order to minimize tracking error variance.
21According to Chen (2011)’s estimates, a = −0.196, b = 1.088 and r = 0.02. Hence, we can obtain
that − b
2a(1+r)
= 2.72. Moreover, the average mid-year return of the hedge fund industry is 1.054 based
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Figure 2.1: Manager i’s fund flow Function
Figure 2.1 displays Manager i’s fund flow Fi as a function of performance ∆Wi relative
to the benchmark. Fund flow is a quadratic function of relative performance that is
bounded i) below at flow level −Wi,2, because outflows cannot exceed existing year-end
funds Wi,2; and ii) above for values of relative performance greater than the threshold
level ∆W , to ensure that fund flow is an increasing function of relative performance.
max{mi[θi(x − r) + 1 + r], 0}. Thus, the fund flow becomes Fi = max{−Wi,2, f(∆Wi)}.
This specification for fund flows will be used for the remainder of the paper.
Figure 2.1 depicts fund flow Fi as a quadratic function of relative performance ∆Wi
that is bounded both below (to ensure non-negative fund value) and above (to ensure an
increasing fund-flow-to-performance relationship). In short, we find that the convexity
feature of the fund flow function dominates over the concavity when a fund’s relative
performance is close to the lower bound of the money flow, and the hedge fund manager
would increase tracking error variance. As the relative performance improves, the con-
cavity of the fund flow function becomes dominant, and the manager mimics the industry
to minimize the tracking error variance. Managers’ optimal risk-taking strategy therefore
depends crucially on their interim relative performance. In order to illustrate the tourna-
ment behavior, we solve numerically for the optimal portfolio of a manager who aims to
maximize the expected fund flow. The standard set of parameters are displayed in Table
2.1.
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Table 2.1: Standard Parameters (Chapter 2)
Mean µ 0.05
Volatility σ 0.10
Interest rate r 0.02
Industry mid-year performance mj 1.054
Individual mid-year performance mi [0.1,2]
Industry risk-taking θj [0,5]
Risk Aversion γ 4
The coefficient of squared relative performance a -0.196
The coefficient of relative performance b 1.088
The average net fund flow c 0.0568
Management fee k 0.02
Incentive fee y 0.2
Initial fund value W0 1
Current HWM H 1
Liquidation boundary B 0.5
Outside compensation Cout 0.005
Note: we assume the risky asset has random rate of return with mean
µ = 0.05 and standard deviation σ = 0.10. The riskless asset yields a
constant rate of return set at r = 0.02. Based on the empirical findings
of Chen (2011), we assume that a = −0.196, b = 1.088. According to
Getmansky (2012), the average net flows into hedge funds is 5.68% and
the average monthly return of the industry is 0.9%. Thus we set c =
0.0568 and the average industry mid-year performance of hedge funds at
mj = 1.054. The basic management fee and incentive performance fee
are set at the standard rates of 2% and 20% respectively. The relative
risk aversion coefficient of the manager’s power utility is set at γ = 4.
In addition, the starting fund value of 1 equals the current high water
mark and the liquidation boundary is set at B = 0.5.
Introducing the lower bound to fund flows leads to a very different optimal risk-taking
choice from before, for funds with poor interim relative performance. A manager with
sufficiently poor interim relative performance essentially faces a mostly convex fund-flow-
to-performance relationship, because the distribution of possible end-year relative perfor-
mance ∆W is concentrated near the region where fund flows are bounded from below.
Essentially, an under-perfoming fund manager faces a call option, so she has an incen-
tive to increase the variance of her relative performance. On the other hand, a manager
with sufficiently good interim relative performance can effectively ignore the lower bound
to fund flows, because the distribution of possible end-year relative performance ∆W is
away from the region where the constraint binds. That is, the manager faces essentially
the same fund-flow-to-performance relationship as before, and her optimal risk-taking
behavior is not significantly different from before.
Thus, we conclude that because the fund flow function exhibits both concavity and
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Figure 2.2: Risk-neutral Manager i’s Optimal Portfolio Choice
Figure 2.2 displays Optimal portfolio choice θi of a risk-neutral manager who maximizes
the expectation of the fund flow Fi = max{−Wi,2, f(∆Wi)}. The horizontal axis labeled
mi represents the fund’s level of interim performance, the horizontal axis labeled θj rep-
resents the benchmark’s risky-asset allocation, and the vertical axis labeled θi represents
the manager’s optimal risky-asset allocation. The figure indicates the contrarian region
at small values of interim performance mi, where managers maximize tracking error, and
the mimicking region at high values of interim performance, where managers minimize
tracking error.
convexity features as shown in Figure 2.1, hedge fund managers’ risk-taking choice de-
pends on the interplay of these two opposing effects: When a fund’s performance is lagging
behind that of the industry average, convexity dominates and the fund manager optimally
chooses to increase tracking error variance, while otherwise concavity dominates and man-
agers mimic the benchmark to decrease the variance of their performance relative to the
industry average.
In Figure 2.2, we identify the two regions where managers opt for the divergent
risk-taking strategies described above: the contrarian region where managers maximize
tracking error corresponds to low values of fund interim performance mi, while the mim-
icking region where managers minimize tracking error corresponds to high values of fund
interim performance. Recalling that tracking error σw is proportional to |miθi −mjθj |,
we note that the strategy that maximizes tracking error depends on the benchmark risk-
taking strategy θj : if risk is priced (µ > r), managers have an incentive to choose a higher
risk level θi, so they generally choose to maximize tracking error by taking as much risk
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as allowed by leverage constraints (i.e., they would set θi = θ), but if the benchmark
risk level θj is sufficiently high then setting θi = θ may not generate a sufficient wedge
in performance, hence managers may optimally choose to set θi = 0. Indeed, we see in
Figure 2.2 that for a given level of interim performance mi in the contrarian region, θi = θ
is optimal for small θj while θi = 0 is optimal for large θj .
2.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 2.3: Sensitivity Analysis of the Industry’s Interim Performance mj
Figure 2.3 presents the sensitivity analysis of a risk-neutral manager’s optimal risky-asset
allocation θi with respect to various levels of the industry’s interim performance mj . In all
panels, the horizontal axis labeled mi represents the fund’s level of interim performance,
the horizontal axis labeled θj represents the benchmark’s risky-asset allocation, and the
vertical axis labeled θi represents the fund’s optimal risky-asset allocation. Starting from
the top left and ending at the bottom right, the four panels plot the fund’s optimal risk-
taking θi for four values of the industry’s interim performance mj : 0.5, 1.054, 1.2, and
1.5, respectively.
Since relative performance plays a critical role in the manager’s risk shifting decision,
we alter the value of mid-year industry average performance mj to see how it would change
the manager’s optimal risk choice. Figure 2.3 reveals that with increasing mj (and thus
decreasing interim relative performance mi −mj), the ‘contrarian’ region widens, which
means that with poor interim performance, managers are more likely to allocate all the
money to the riskless asset in order to maximize their tracking error variance instead of
minimizing it. This is because with lower relative performance mi −mj , they are closer
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Figure 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis of the Concavity of the Fund Flow Function a
Figure 2.4 presents the sensitivity analysis of a risk-neutral manager’s optimal risky-asset
allocation θi with respect to various levels of the concavity — measured by the coefficient
a of the second-degree term — of the fund flow function f . Starting from the top left
and ending at the bottom right, the four panels plot the fund’s optimal risk-taking θi for
four values of the measure of concavity a: -0.01, -0.196, -0.4, and -0.6, respectively.
to the lower bound of the fund flow function. On the other hand, the optimal risk level
is more likely to hit the upper bound θ when mj is higher in the mimicking region. This




Next, we investigate the effect of the concavity of the fund flow function on the opti-
mal risk-taking behavior.23 As mentioned above, when the fund’s interim relative perfor-
mance is sufficiently high, then the manager is in the mimicking region where she faces an
essentially concave fund-flow-to-performance relationship which generates a strong incen-
tive to minimize tracking error σw; in this case, the more concave the fund flow function is,




θj . On the other hand, when the fund’s interim relative performance is suffi-
ciently poor, then the manager finds herself in the contrarian region where the convexity
of the fund flow is dominant and there is a strong incentive to maximize tracking error;
as a result, parameter a does not affect the manager’s risk choice. Figure 2.4 illustrates
23In particular, remembering that Fi = a(∆Wi)
2 + b(∆Wi) + c between the boundaries, to investigate
the effect of the concavity we vary the parameter a keeping parameters b and c constant.
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this discussion: for low values of mi, which correspond to the contrarian region, we see
that increasing the concavity from the top left to the bottom right panel has no effect
on the optimal risk taking decision θi; while for high values of mi which correspond to
the mimicking region, we see that increasing the concavity results in tighter mimicking
behavior.
2.5 The Baseline Model
Next we will firstly focus on the tournament behavior of risk-averse hedge fund managers
and then introduce the HWM provision to examine the combined effects of fund flow and
HWM on managers’ risk shifting decisions.
2.5.1 Tournament Behavior without Incentive Fee
Figure 2.5: Risk-averse Manager i’s Optimal Choice with Tournament Concerns
Figure 2.5 displays the optimal portfolio choice θi of a risk-averse manager with CRRA
preferences, who maximizes her expected utility from the management fee she will earn
on year-end funds and new fund flows.
We assume that the manager has a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function defined over her compensation at the end of year. In the absence of a
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Figure 2.6: Sensitivity Analysis of the Industry’s Interim Performance mj
Figure 2.6 presents the sensitivity analysis of a risk-averse manager’s optimal risky-asset
allocation θi with respect to various levels of the interim industry performance mj . Start-
ing from the top left and ending at the bottom right, the four panels plot the fund’s op-
timal risk-taking θi for four values of the industry’s interim performance mj : 0.5, 1.054,
1.2 and 1.5, respectively.
where U(Ci) =
C1−γi
1−γ and Ci = k[Wi,2 + Fi)]. The introduction of risk aversion results in
a concave objective function over both absolute performance Wi2 and fund flow Fi.
With our standard parameters, we present the numerical solution to the manager’s
optimal risk-taking in Figure 2.5. See Appendix B.1.1 for details of the numerical pro-
cedure. Without fund flow concern, Merton (1969) predicts that one’s risk-taking level
should be constant and equal to µ−r
γσ2
. Figure 2.5 reveals that the potential money flow
induces a manager’s risk choice to deviate from Merton’s prediction. As analysed before,
the interplay of the convexity of the fund flow function and the concavity of the objective
function largely affects fund managers’ risk-taking decisions. The contrarian region ap-
pears when a fund has poor interim performance (when mi < 0.5). When the fund moves
out of the contrarian region (when mi > 0.5), hedge fund managers closely follow the
industry benchmark, and the optimal risk level is strongly depressed due to risk aversion.
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Figure 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis of the Coefficient of Risk Aversion γ
Figure 2.7 presents the sensitivity analysis of the optimal risky-asset allocation θi with
respect to various levels of the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ. Starting from the top
left and ending at the bottom right, the four panels plot the fund’s optimal risk-taking
θi for four values of the relative risk aversion γ: 1.1, 2, 4 and 6, respectively.
Figure 2.6 presents the results from a sensitivity analysis of managers’ optimal risk-
taking with respect to the industry’s interim performance. As expected, as mj increases,




managers’ risk-taking decision becomes more sensitive to the industry’s average risk level
θj . This trend can be identified by comparing the mimicking regions of the four sub-figures
in Figure 2.6: as mj rises, the surface of the mimicking area becomes steeper.
Figure 2.7 presents a sensitivity analysis of optimal risky-asset allocation θi with
respect to the manager’s relative risk aversion γ. We see that for an interim “loser” —
a fund manager with low interim performance mi — who finds herself in the contrarian
region, optimal behavior does not depend on the coefficient of risk aversion. On the other
hand, for interim “winners” who find themselves in the mimicking region, the optimal
risk-taking level θi decreases with risk aversion, because risk aversion tilts the balance
between higher returns (hence higher compensation and higher fund inflows) and lower
volatility (hence more stable compensation and inflows) towards the latter.
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2.5.2 Tournament Behavior with Incentive Fee
The prevalent use of the HWM provision in hedge fund managers’ compensation has
raised concerns about the inappropriate risk-taking incentive it brings about. Under
HWM, a manager not only receives the management fee based on the size of assets under
management (AUM), but also gets rewarded if the fund value exceeds the pre-determined
HWM. Thus the manager’s compensation equals the management fee based on the fund’s
year-end wealth and fund inflows/outflows plus a call option struck at the HWM (which
equals Wi,0 = 1 in our setting). In short, we find that in the presence of hedge fund
tournaments and the HWM provision, a hedge fund manager’s incentive to increase risk
is largely mitigated by her fund flow concern when fund value is somewhat below HWM. In
the meanwhile, the HWM-induced lock-in behavior suppresses mimicking behavior when
fund value is above HWM.
Figure 2.8(a) shows how a hedge fund manager alters her risk-taking decision in the
presence of an incentive fee. First, Panel (a) of the figure shows the managers’ optimal
risk-taking θi in the presence of an incentive fee but without fund flows at year-end.
When a fund’s interim performance (equivalently its value) is far below the HWM (i.e.,
mi ∈ [0.1, 0.8] on the graph), the option represented by the incentive fee is so far out-of-
the-money that it is worthless and the manager cannot alter its value by taking additional
risk, hence the manager’s portfolio choice is driven solely by her risk aversion. As a
result, the optimal risk level can be characterized by Merton’s constant which equals µ−r
γσ2
.
Following Hodder and Jackwerth (2007), we label this region of low interim performance as
Merton’s flats. When the fund’s interim value approaches the HWM (i.e., mi ∈ [0.8, 1] on
the graph), the manager rapidly increases the volatility of her portfolio by investing more
in the risky asset, because the fund’s interim value is sufficiently close to the “strike price”
represented by the HWM that the manager can increase the option value of the incentive
fee to be earned on year-end profits by increasing her portfolio’s volatility. However, this
incentive to increase volatility tails off rapidly when the interim fund value is very close
to the HWM (i.e., mi = 1), and is entirely reversed once the interim fund value crosses
the HWM. This is because the manager wants to play it safe to lock in the performance
fee, hence the optimal risk level is much lower than Merton’s constant for values of mi
above but close to 1. Following Hodder and Jackwerth (2007), in the figure we label this
region of interim performance close to the value 1 as the Option ridge. Finally, for levels
of mid-year performance mi above the HWM, the manager’s risk-taking level increases as
performance increases, until it reaches Merton’s constant again; this is because in this case,
the higher the mid-year performance, the further in-the-money is the option represented
by the incentive fee, hence the less the option’s value is affected by the manager’s risk-
taking behavior, and thus the manager’s portfolio strategy is more dominated by her pure
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(a) With Incentive Fee Only
(b) With Incentive Fee and Fund Flow
Figure 2.8: Risk-averse Manager i’s Optimal Portfolio Choice
with Tournament Concerns and Incentive Contracts
Figure 2.8 displays the optimal portfolio choice θi of a risk-averse manager with CRRA
preferences, who maximizes her expected utility. In Panel (a), the manager derives utility
only from the management fee she will earn on year-end funds and new fund flows. In
Panel (b), the manager derives utility form the aforementioned management fee as well
as from the incentive fee she will earn on year-end profits.
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attitude towards risk.24
Panel (b) of Figure 2.8(b) shows the optimal portfolio strategy for a hedge fund
manager whose compensation consists not only of an incentive fee for beating the HWM,
but also of a management fee on new fund flows which depend on the fund’s performance
relative to the industry average (the benchmark). Comparing the two panels of Figure
2.8(a), we can clearly see the effect of introducing these relative performance concerns
into the manager’s compensation function. First, as explained in detail before, when
mi is very low (i.e., mi ∈ [0.1, 0.6] on the graph), in the presence of fund flows the
manager finds herself in the contrarian region where the optimal strategy is to maximize
the tracking error variance by choosing a risk-taking level far from the benchmark’s risk-
taking level, rather than to choose a risky-asset allocation equal to Merton’s constant.
Second, for intermediate levels of interim performance (i.e., mi ∈ [0.6, 1] on the graph),
the manager’s optimal risk-taking is affected both by the mimicking motive introduced by
the fee associated with the fund flows and by the increased risk-taking motive introduced
by the option-like nature of the incentive fee. As a result, while the option ridge that is
prominent in Panel (a) of the figure still features in Panel (b), it is much less pronounced,
and rather the manager’s risk-taking behavior is dominated by the mimicking motive
which induces high levels of risk-taking when the industry average risk-taking level is high
and low levels of risk taking when the industry average risk-taking level is low. Third,
for higher levels of interim performance (i.e., mi > 1 on the graph), we have already
discussed that the mimicking motive is weakened due to the concavity of the fund-flow-
to-performance relationship. Hence the manager’s risk-taking behavior is dominated by
the incentive to lock in the performance causing a sharp (though not as sharp as before)
drop in risk-taking for values of mi immediately above 1 and a gradual ramp up to the
risk-taking level that equals Merton’s constant.
2.6 Liquidation Threat
As suggested by empirical studies, hedge funds have higher attrition rates (8% per year)
than mutual funds. Therefore, it is important to consider the liquidation possibility and
its impact on fund managers’ risk-taking decision. In this section we consider two forms of
liquidation, exogenous and endogenous. In Section 2.6.1 we extend our model to include
the possibility of exogenous liquidation in the case of severe under-performance, while
in Section 2.6.2 we additionally include the possibility of voluntary fund closure, which
occurs when a fund manager prefers her outside opportunity to the compensation she
expects to receive from keeping the fund open.
24We note that these observations essentially summarize the findings of the extant literature that studies
hedge fund managers’ risk-taking behavior in the presence of an incentive fee without fund flows (see, e.g.,
Hodder and Jackwerth (2007)).
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2.6.1 Exogenous Fund Closure
In short, we find that facing a liquidation bound, a hedge fund manager without tourna-
ment incentive will considerably reduce risk when her interim performance is close to the
bound, while with tournament concerns a manager with poor relative performance will
maximize tracking error volatility and a manager with intermediate relative performance
will minimize tracking error volatility, both due to potential fund flows that depend on
relative performance.
Following Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013), we set the liquidation bound as a fraction
of the High Water Mark (HWM), i.e., W = p ·H, where H is the HWM and we assume
that p equals 0.5. Once the fund value hits the bound, the fund gets liquidated, and
the hedge fund manager receives no compensation. Thus, the manager’s compensation at
t = 2 becomes
Ci =
k(Wi,2 + Fi) + ymax{Wi,2 −Wi,0, 0} if Wi,2 > 0.5,0 Otherwise. (2.9)
Figure 2.9 presents a graph of the numerical solution to the risk-averse manager’s
optimal risk-taking decision θi in the presence of exogenous fund closure. Since we assume
that the liquidation bound is 0.5, the manager’s interim performance mi starts from 0.5
rather than 0.1. Comparing Figures 2.8(a) and 2.9(a) for the case with an incentive fee
but without fund flows, we can see how the manager’s risk-taking behavior changes due
to the liquidation concern: To avoid hitting the liquidation bound, the manager becomes
very cautious as mi approaches 0.5.
In contrast to this, comparing Figures 2.9(a) and 2.9(b) for the case with an incen-
tive fee and fund flows, we find that even though managers curb their risk-taking for
intermediate levels of interim performance mi, managers with poor interim performance
(i.e., mi ∈ [0.5, 0.8] on the graph) take a lot of risk even when the fund is close to the
liquidation bound. For example, when the fund’s interim performance is mi < 0.6 and
the industry average allocation is θj < 3, we can see on the graph that managers actually
choose the highest level of possible risk given the leverage constraint. Moreover, for a wide
range of mid-year performance (mi ∈ [0.55, 0.8] on the graph), managers closely follow
the industry benchmark in choosing their portfolio weights.
It is worth mentioning that our results are different from Hodder and Jackwerth
(2007) who focus on funds’ absolute performance and argue that managers with poor
interim performance would play it safe to avoid hitting the bound (which is similar to the
pattern in Figure 2.9(a)), while this strategy is not optimal anymore when we consider
hedge fund tournaments. When the fund’s interim performance is far behind its peers,
investors would withdraw money from the fund; and in the worst case, investors would
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(a) With Incentive Fee Only
(b) With Incentive Fee and Fund Flow
Figure 2.9: Risk-averse Manager i’s Optimal Portfolio Choice
with Exogenous Fund Closure
Figure 2.9 displays the optimal portfolio choice θi of a risk-averse manager who maximizes
expected utility in the presence of a potential exogenous fund closure in the case of severe
under-performance. In Panel (a), the manager derives utility only from the management
fee she will earn on year-end funds and new fund flows. In Panel (b), the manager derives
utility form the aforementioned management fee as well as from the incentive fee she will
earn on year-end profits.
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withdraw all the investment, which would effectively liquidate the fund. Thus, in order
to avoid fund withdrawals, the manager would maximize the tracking error volatility.
2.6.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 2.10: Sensitivity Analysis of the Industry’s Interim Performance mj
Sensitivity analysis of a risk-averse manager’s optimal risky-asset allocation θi with re-
spect to various levels of the industry’s interim performance, in the case where the man-
ager derives utility both from management and from incentive fees, while she faces a
potential exogenous fund closure in the case of severe under-performance. Starting from
the top left and ending at the bottom right, the four panels plot the fund’s optimal risk-
taking θi for four values of the industry’s interim performance mj : 0.5, 1.054, 1.2 and
1.5, respectively.
Figure 2.10 presents a sensitivity analysis of the managers’ optimal portfolio alloca-
tion with respect to the industry’s interim performance mj . Intuitively, mj can be con-
sidered as an indicator of the overall market condition. During a recession (e.g., mj = 0.5
on the graph), managers do not worry about fund outflow too much as the whole indus-
try has performed poorly. Hence their main incentive is to avoid hitting the liquidation
bound or to lock in performance fees. As mj increases, the contrarian region enlarges and
more managers will want to maximize their tracking error variance by deviating from the
industry benchmark. Moreover, as long as the fund value is above the HWM level, the
relative standing in the industry has little effect on the manager’s risk-taking decision as
she would in all cases take low risk to avoid the call option falling out of the money.
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2.6.1.2 Equilibrium with Exogenous Fund Closure
In this subsection, we analyse the manager’s equilibrium portfolio strategy. Suppose there
are n funds indexed by i in the market with mid-year performance mi, and the industry
average mid-year performance can be computed as mj =
∑n
i=1mi
n , and the benchmark risk





θi, a weighted average of θi. (See Appendix A.1.5)
Definition 1. The equilibrium of the model is a hedge fund manager i’s risk-taking level
θ∗i and a benchmark risk level θ
∗
j such that:
i) Given the benchmark risk level θ∗j , hedge fund manager i’s optimal level of risk-taking
is θ∗i , and







We solve numerically for the equilibrium of the model using the following procedure.
First, we need to make an assumption for the distribution of interim performance mi; to
simplify our analysis, we assume that mi is uniformly distributed in [0.5, 1.6], in which
case average industry mid-year performance mj is equal to 1.05. This is approximately
equal to our standard parameter, mj = 1.054, when we assume that industry level is
exogenously given. Then, we compute the optimal risk-taking choice θi for each possible
value of θj (which lies in [0, 5]), and then the implied θj which is the weighted average of
optimal θi across different funds. The computation continues until it reaches the point
when the given value of θj equals the weighted average of the optimal θi.
A standard hedge fund contract with the HWM provision is in effect a call option
for hedge fund managers. Figure 2.11(a) presents the optimal risk shifting pattern in
equilibrium, which is consistent with Hodder and Jackwerth (2007). Hedge fund managers
would substantially increase portfolio risks when the fund value approaches the HWM
and gradually reduce risk when the fund value is close to the liquidation bound. The
combined effects of the HWM and fund flows is shown in Figure 2.11(b). By comparing
Figure 2.11(a) and Figure 2.11(b), we can see that the option ridge induced by the HWM
is significantly mitigated by managers’ fundflow concern. Also, the optimal risk level
around the HWM with potential year-end capital flows is in general considerably lower
than in the case without capital flows.
Moreover, in contrast to mutual fund tournaments, our paper suggests that hedge
fund managers who are facing a concave flow-performance function and are compensated
based on the HWM contract would not increase risks when they outperform the peers
as they have a strong incentive to secure performance fee. In the equilibrium shown in
Figure 2.11(b), hedge fund interim winners would actually choose small risk exposures
while interim losers who are close to the liquidation bound would increase risks. This
finding is consistent with the empirical studies on hedge fund tournaments. (See Brown,
Goetzmann, and Park (2001) and Aragon and Nanda (2012).)
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(a) With Incentive Fee Only
(b) With Incentive Fee and Fund Flow
Figure 2.11: Risk-averse Manager i’s Equilibrium Portfolio Strategy
with Exogenous Fund Closure
Figure 2.11 displays the equilibrium optimal portfolio allocation θi of a risk-averse man-
ager, in the case where the manager derives utility both from management and from
incentive fees, while she faces a potential exogenous fund closure in the case of severe
under-performance. The level of average industry interim performance mj equals its equi-
librium given that all other model parameters are set at their calibrated values shown in
Table 2.1.
2.6.2 Endogenous Fund Closure
Many hedge fund managers choose to close their funds voluntarily, so in addition to using
a predetermined liquidation boundary, in this section we employ a managerial shutdown
option as in Hodder and Jackwerth (2007). An endogenous fund closure option in our
model is essentially an American option where managers can choose to liquidate their fund
whenever it is above the pre-specified liquidation boundary. After comparing the value
of their outside opportunities and the expected value of continuing to run the funds,
managers decide whether they will exercise the option or not. In short, we find that,
given a shutdown option, a hedge fund manager with poor interim performance chooses
to close the fund, especially when the industry on average takes high risk. Moreover, the
voluntary closure region enlarges with the value of the manager’s outside opportunity, her
risk aversion level, as well as with the industry’s average interim returns.
Instead of using a predetermined liquidation boundary, we next employ a managerial
shutdown option following Hodder and Jackwerth (2007). In other words, hedge fund
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(a) With Incentive Fee Only
(b) With Incentive Fee and Fund Flow
Figure 2.12: Risk-averse Manager i’s Optimal Choice
with Endogenous Fund Closure Option
Figure 2.12 displays the optimal portfolio choice θi of a risk averse manager who maxi-
mizes expected utility and has the option to voluntarily shut down the fund at mid-year.
In Panel (a), the manager derives utility only from the management fee she will earn
on year-end funds and new fund flows. In Panel (b), the manager derives utility form
the aforementioned management fee as well as from the incentive fee she will earn on
year-end profits. In both panels, the manager’s outside opportunity is assumed to to
have utility value Cout = 0.005.
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managers are allowed to close their funds voluntarily. An endogenous fund closure option
in our model is essentially an American option where managers can choose to liquidate
hedge funds whenever fund value is above the pre-specified liquidation boundary. We
assume that managers decide whether they will exercise the option or not, after comparing
the value of their outside opportunities and the expected value of continuing to run the
funds.
In particular, we assume that at time 1, the manager can choose between shutting
down the fund to take the outside opportunity Cout and continuing running the fund.
25
When mid-year performance is revealed, if a manager expects that the value of her outside
opportunity is higher than the compensation from running the current fund, she will opt
to close the fund at time t = 1 rather than waiting until time t = 2. The manager’s
compensation at time t = 2 for continuing the fund is the same as shown by Equation
2.9, while if the manager chooses to close the fund at time t = 1, she receives the outside
opportunity Cout, so
Ci = Cout. (2.10)
Figures 2.12(a) and 2.12(b) present hedge fund managers’ optimal risk taking choices
in the presence of a HWM, the threat of exogenous liquidation, and the possibility of
endogenous liquidation, without and with fund flow concerns, respectively. Comparing
Figure 2.9(a) with Figure 2.12(a), we find that the pattern of managers’ risk taking
behavior is not changed when there are no fund flows. This is because the benefit of
outside opportunity is smaller than that of continuing the current fund and thus the
manager would lower the portfolio risk to avoid hitting the liquidation bound.
In Figure 2.12(b), to distinguish between the extreme risk-taking level θi = 0 and
fund closure, we use the risk-taking level θi = −0.5 to represent the latter. We can see in
this figure that the contrarian region disappears.26 Moreover, the fund closure decision
is affected not only by a fund’s interim performance mi, but also by other funds’ average
risk-taking level; this result is different from that in Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) who
show that hedge fund managers would prefer to close the fund only when the fund value
is far below the high water mark. Due to the fund outflow concern, in our model the fund
closure region is larger than that in Hodder and Jackwerth (2007). Finally, managers’
25This is similar to Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013)’s setting, which assume that (1) the restart boundary
to be 80% of the fund (2) the subsequent fund’s to be 75% of the previous funds and (3) the new fund’s size
is zero when the manager is forced to liquidate. Our assumption is also similar to Hodder and Jackwerth
(2007) who assume that the manager will receive a prorated fraction management fee plus an prorated
annual compensation rate.
26We note that — like the result in the previous paragraph that without fund flows there is no voluntary
fund closure — the result that with fund flows the contrarian region disappears and the manager prefers
to close the fund when relative performance is poor depends on the value of the outside option Cout.
A better outside option would provide enough of an incentive for voluntary fund closures to occur even
without fund flows, and a worse outside option would not completely eliminate the contrarian region in
the presence of fund flows. However, the point stands that, for the calibrated parameter values of the
model as shown in Table 2.1, the outside option has a stronger effect in the presence than in the absence
of fund flows.
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endogenous fund closure decision is largely affected by the industry’s risk level. When the
industry on average takes extreme risk, funds with mid-year performance (i.e., mi < 0.9
on the graph) would be closed; when the industry takes modest risk (i.e., θj < 1), only
funds with substantially smaller mid-year performance (i.e., mi < 0.7 on the graph) would
exit the market.
2.6.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 2.13: Sensitivity Analysis of the Outside Opportunity Cout
Figure 2.13 represents the sensitivity analysis of a risk-averse manager’s optimal risky-
asset allocation θi with respect to the value of the manager’s outside opportunity, in the
presence of the possibility of endogenous fund closure. The manager derives utility from
management as well as from incentive fees.
Next, we examine how the fund manager’s decision changes in response to different
levels of outside compensation, different levels of industry interim performance, and dif-
ferent levels of risk aversion for the manager. By comparing the four sub-figures in Figure
2.13 below, we can see that the outside opportunity mainly affects risk-taking behavior
for interim losers. In contrast to this, looking at Figures 2.14 and 2.15 we can see that
the benchmark’s interim performance and the manager’s risk aversion can also influence
the risk-taking behavior for mid-year winning funds and for mid-year losing funds.
Figure 2.14 shows that with poor industry average performance (mj = 0.5), the fund
manager will shut down the fund only when the fund is on the verge of liquidation and
the industry as a whole opts for high risky position (i.e., θj > 2). As mj increases, the
relative interim performance of the fund worsens and fund managers are more likely to
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Figure 2.14: Sensitivity Analysis of the Industry’s Interim Performance mj
Figure 2.14 represents the sensitivity analysis of a risk-averse manager’s optimal risky-
asset allocation θi with respect to various levels of the industry’s average performance
mi, in the presence of the possibility of endogenous fund closure.
Figure 2.15: Sensitivity Analysis of the Coefficient of Risk Aversion γ
Figure 2.15 represents the sensitivity analysis of a risk-averse manager’s optimal risky-
asset allocation θi with respect to various levels of the industry’s average performance
mi, in the presence of the possibility of endogenous fund closure.
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close the fund due to possible fund outflow at the end of year. This is similar to the
effect of increasing Cout. In the meantime, the mimicking tendency of managers is more
prominent when the industry on average has better mid-year performance.
Figure 2.15 suggests that the endogenous fund closure region is widened when hedge
fund managers become more risk averse, the reason being that risk-averse managers would
prefer certain outside compensation over uncertain compensation from managing the fund.
As can be seen from Figure 2.15, the risk aversion level also influences the risk levels in
general. As γ goes up, the optimal risk is decreased for all the funds.
2.7 Systematic Risk versus Idiosyncratic Risk
Chen (2011) empirically documents first that fund managers with poor interim perfor-
mance relative to a benchmark increase their risk exposure, and second that they increase
their exposure to idiosyncratic risk much more than that in market risk.27 In order to
examine how fund managers choose their risk profiles when various types of risks are
available, we introduce a second risky asset to our model: We assume that each fund has
access to a fund-specific asset which has a random return xdi , independent from the return
of the market asset, with xdi normally distributed with mean µ
d
i and standard deviation
σdi = σ.
28 In the literature, this additional risky asset is widely regarded as manager-
specific investment technology and the risk premium µdi − r is interpreted as manager’s
skill.29
In the presence of these two risky assets, fund i’s year-end wealth becomes Wi,2 =
mi[1+r+θ
s
i (x−r)+θdi (xdi −r)], where θsi and θdi denote, respectively, the proportion of the
fund’s assets that manager i invests in the systematic-risk asset and in the idiosyncratic-
risk asset. Meanwhile, the industry’s year-end total assets under management are not
affected by individual funds’ exposures to idiosyncratic risks, since fund-level uncertainty
is canceled out when we compute the industry’s average performance, hence, the industry’s
year-end wealth Wj,2 = mj [1 + r + θ
s
j (x− r)], as before.
The manager of find i chooses portfolio allocations θsi and θ
d
i to maximize expected




27This is shown by the results in Table 9 and Table 10 in his paper.
28For the case σdi > σ, the results are almost identical to the case σ
d
i = σ. On the other hand, if σ
d
i
is sufficiently smaller than σ, then introducing fund-specific assets in the model has almost no effect on
managers’ optimal risk-taking behavior (unless they can generate high alpha), since — as we discuss in
detail below — managers mainly use fund-specific assets as a means of maximizing tracking error variance
when they find themselves in the contrarian region.
29See, for instance, Buraschi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul (2014)
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s.t. θs + θid ≤ θ,
where U(Ci) =
C1−γi
1−γ and Ci = k(Wi,2 + Fi) + ymax{Wi,2 −Wi,0, 0}, and θsi + θdi ∈ [0, θ]
represents the combined shorting and leverage constraints.
Intuitively, we would not expect risk-averse agents to invest in the fund-specific risky
asset if they were not compensated for carrying its risk. In the context of hedge fund
tournaments, however, hedge fund managers sometimes will have the incentive to take
on idiosyncratic (hence non-priced) risk in order to maximize the tracking error variance.
To provide more insight on this issue, we analyse two cases: one where the fund-specific
asset generates a return equal to the risk-free rate, and one where the fund-specific asset
generates excess return, i.e., alpha.
Figure 2.16 illustrates the manager’s optimal asset allocation over the two risky assets,
in each of the two aforementioned cases; Panel (a) of the figure presents optimal allocations
for the case µdi = r, and Panel (b) presents optimal allocations for the case µ
d
i = 0.1 > r.
30 We make the following observations from this figure. First, in the contrarian region,
hedge fund managers almost never invest in the market asset, opting instead for maximum
exposure to idiosyncratic risk. The reason is that the dominant incentive in the contrarian
region is to maximize tracking error variance, and for any given level of risk-taking θ, the
portfolio (0, θ) that invests 0 in the systematic-risk asset and all of θ in the idiosyncratic-
risk asset yields a greater divergence from the benchmark portfolio (θsj , 0), hence a larger
tracking error, than the portfolio (θ, 0) which invests all of θ in the systematic-risk asset.31
As we can see in the figure, the preference for the fund-specific asset in the contrarian
region is almost as prevalent in the case without an alpha-generating ability as in the
case with such an ability. On the contrary, hedge fund managers invest much less in the
fund-specific asset when they find themselves outside the contrarian region. Indeed, our
result that managers invest in the fund-specific asset heavily in the contrarian region of
poor relative performance, and almost not at all outside this region is consistent with the
empirical finding in Chen (2011) that hedge funds mainly increase idiosyncratic risk when
they fall behind their peers.
Second, in the presence of an alpha-generating ability (as in Figure 2.16(b)), when
interim performance mj is close to the HWM and the manager has the incentive to sharply
increase risk-taking (to increase the value of the option-like incentive fee), she can also
use the idiosyncratic asset to achieve the same effect. As a result, there is an option ridge
in the optimal allocation of the fund-specific asset as well (see the second graph in Figure
2.16(b)), while the option ridge in the optimal allocation of the systematic-risk asset is
30We note that these figures correspond to a model without the possibility of (exogenous or endogenous)
fund closure; however, introducing fund closure does not qualitatively change the results.





j )(x − r) + miθdi (xdi − r)], which can be written as (miθsi −mjθsj )2σ2 + (miθdi )2(σsi )2, and it is easy
to show that σ2w(θ
s
i = 0, θ
d
i = θ)− σ2w(θsi = θ, θdi = 0) = 2(miθ)(mjθsj )σ2 > 0, for arbitrary θ.
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(a) without alpha generating abilities: µ = 0.05, µid = 0.02
(b) with alpha generating abilities: µ = 0.05, µid = 0.1
Figure 2.16: Risk-averse Manager i’s Optimal Portfolio Choice
on Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk
Figure 2.16 presents the optimal portfolio allocations θsi and θ
d
i to the common and
to the fund-specific risky assets, respectively, of a risk-averse manager who maximizes
expected utility form management and incentive fees. In each of the two panels, the
graphs shows the optimal allocation θsi to the common risky asset, and the bottom panel
graphs optimal allocation θdi to the fund-specific risky asset. Panel (a) presents optimal
portfolio allocations in the case that the fund-specific risky asset earns the same return as
the risk-free asset (µdi = r = 0.02), while Panel (b) presents optimal portfolio allocations
in the case that the fund-specific risky asset earns a higher return than the risk-free asset
(µdi = 0.1), hence the manager can generate alpha. In both panels, the common risky
asset earns a return µ = 0.05, which is its calibrated value shown in Table 2.1.
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less pronounced than in the absence of a fund-specific asset (to see this, compare the first
graph in Figure 2.16(b) with the graph in Figure 2.8).
Finally, although the industry’s allocation θsj to the systematic-risk asset plays a key
role in determining the proportion of money θsi that a fund manager optimally invests
in the systematic-risk asset, her allocation θdi to the fund-specific asset is almost entirely
unaffected by the risk level of the industry θsj . This is unsurprising, since the only reason
that the fund manager cares about the industry’s exposure to the systematic-risk asset is
because — depending on whether interim performance is poor or good — she wants to
manipulate her own exposure to the same asset to manipulate the tracking error; since
the fund-specific asset is independent of the systematic-risk asset, the effect that varying
the allocation of the fund-specific asset has on the tracking error does not depend on the
industry’s allocation θsj .
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest a role for the theory of tournaments in studying hedge funds’ risk
taking behavior. A typical compensation contract for hedge funds would induce managers
to pursue high absolute performance, while the year-end competition for funds between
managers also generates relative performance objectives. Our paper extends the work of
Basak and Makarov (2012) on mutual funds by explicitly modeling hedge funds’ features
such as (i) high water marks; (ii) the concave flow-performance relation; (iii) and high
attribution rates. We characterize managers’ portfolio strategies in a two-period (one-
year) model where managers’ compensation depends on both their absolute and relative
performance to examine the interplay of tournament concerns, incentive contracts and
liquidation threats.
For future research, investment horizon would be an interesting issue to investigate.
As suggested by Hodder and Jackwerth (2007), the extreme risk-taking induced by the
HWM should dampen as the number of managers’ evaluation periods increases. However,
the tournament behavior in our model should be more pronounced when the manager
has a longer investment horizon as then he can earn a fee on new fund flows multiple
times. Also, due to the fact that old investors always have a higher HWM level than new
investors, new funds will lower the average HWM. Our assumption that the initial fund
size is the same for all funds could also be relaxed, as empirical evidence suggests that
managers with larger assets under management will be more cautious and less prone to
take high risk compared to smaller and younger funds. Finally, the fund flow function in
our paper is exogenously given. In contrast, Berk and Green (2004) examine endogenous
fund flows in (a simpler) model by assuming that investors use past returns to update
their beliefs about managers’ abilities. It would be interesting, to study the effects of
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investors’ endogenous fund-flow decisions in the context of hedge fund tournaments that
we study here.
Chapter 3
Financial Fragility and Incentives
We use a dynamic general equilibrium model, where the marginal investor is a financial
intermediary and agency frictions arising from delegated portfolio management constrain
the level of intermediary capital. Such frictions can destabilize financial markets, driv-
ing up risk premia and volatilities and pushing down riskless interest rates, when fund
managers’ wealth falls. We evaluate how changing fund managers’ incentives via a rela-
tive performance fee impacts financial market stability, in contrast to undertaking policy
interventions after a crisis. The increased relative performance fee reduces managerial
risk-taking, loosening the capital constraint. Asset prices become less sensitive to ad-
verse shocks, reducing risk premia, volatilities and demands for precautionary savings
and thereby increasing financial stability. We also analyse the impact of delegated capital
on asset prices by assuming that some investors delegate their wealth to fund managers,
while others trade on their own account. The relation between the share of delegated
capital and asset prices varies with the severity of agency frictions.
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3.1 Introduction
Financial intermediaries have come to play an important role in how asset prices are
determined within today’s financial markets. A new status quo has arisen, because of
a sea-change in the way money is invested in financial markets. In 2007, individuals
held only 21.5% of US equities. Yet, in the mid-1960’s, they held a far greater share of
85%.1 Such figures bear witness to the institutionalization of financial markets. Until
recently, the way asset prices are determined within dynamic models has turned a blind
eye to the impact of institutions.2 Capital-related crises such as the 1998 hedge fund crisis
and 2007-2009 subprime crisis have focused attention on the importance of institutions
as intermediaries and the issue of financial stability. During recent financial crises risk
premia have risen rapidly and intermediaries have benefited from centralized intervention.
Recent work, He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) and He and Krishnamurthy (2013),
shows that when the capital held by intermediaries declines, relatively small losses lead
to ‘financial fragility’, that is indicated by surges in risk premia and volatilities of asset
prices, and falls in interest rates. He and Krishnamurthy (2013) also provide theoretical
support for the idea that centralized remedial action, such as government or central bank
intervention, can alleviate financial market instability. However, remedial intervention
occurs after the onset of a crisis; and it is beset by problems related to agency, timing,
anticipation, and funding. In this paper, we ask whether it is possible to stabilize financial
markets by reducing the likelihood of a crisis via a less centralized approach based on the
idea of altering pre-crisis institutional incentives, rather than taking post-crisis remedial
actions.
We use a dynamic continuous-time framework based on He and Krishnamurthy
(2012b). Agents come in two types, institutional investors and retail investors, or equiva-
lently fund managers and fund investors, respectively.3 There is a locally riskless asset in
zero net supply and a risky asset, which is a claim on an exogenous dividend stream. The
fund investor cannot directly invest in the risky asset, but can delegate a fraction of her
wealth to the fund manager via an optimal financial contract characterized by an equity
capital constraint. The agency problem between the manager and the investor leads to
an endogenous incentive compatibility constraint, which creates a financial friction. The
1See French (2008) and Brennan and Li (2008). French (2008) also provides the evidence that the U.S.
equity holdings of open-end mutual funds increase from 4.6% in 1980 to 32.4% in 2007. Additionally,
Bank for international settlements summarize that mutual fund managed assets more than $8 trillion and
pension funds in excess of $12 trillion in 2004. (Cuoco and Kaniel (2011)). Hedge fund assets under
management reached $2.13 trillion in 2012. (Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013))
2In the traditional asset pricing paradigm, a representative household is marginal pricing all assets,
indicating that institutional investors or professional managers fully reflect the preferences of their clients.
However, this is not true to the extent that there exists a principal-agent problem between managers and
investors.
3Fund managers are taken as the professional managers for various institutions such as hedge funds,
mutual funds, pension funds and asset management team in the bank and other financial institutions.
Fund investors are taken as clients of managers.
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friction limits the flow of funds between the manager and the investor. When an interme-
diary has less wealth, the manager’s ‘skin in the game’ is reduced, and less capital can be
invested in the fund by the outside investor, endogenously making the financial friction
more severe. The effect on equilibrium asset prices is instability reflected in greater risk
premia, more volatility, and increased demand for precautionary savings. We investigate
whether this financial instability can be reduced by changing managerial incentives as
opposed to treating the symptoms of instability once they have occurred.
The key difference between our setting and He and Krishnamurthy (2012b)’s is that
the manager is paid a compensation fee containing a symmetric performance fee relative to
a benchmark in addition to the single risk exposure fee in He and Krishnamurthy (2012b).
The second difference is that we analyse the moral hazard problem by adopting a diversion
model instead of a model of hidden effort.4 As such, we can capture the idea that finance
industry professionals are interested in increasing their financial compensation rather than
exerting less effort. When the performance of a fund is realized, the manager can divert
a fraction φ of profits for her own private benefit. In order to eliminate the incentive to
divert, the manager is also required to have some ‘skin in the game’, in the form of a
minimum stake inside the fund.
Our main contribution is to show that the introduction of a symmetric relative per-
formance fee stabilizes financial markets. The resulting fund level, i.e. the local change in
managerial incentives, endogenously reduces the financial friction. Asset prices thus be-
come less sensitive to changes in managerial capital. Risk premia, volatility and demand
for precautionary savings are reduced. To understand how the symmetric relative perfor-
mance fee changes managerial incentives in way which stabilizes markets, we examine the
manager’s portfolio choice. The symmetric performance fee curbs the manager’s excessive
risk taking arising from the incentive to catch the benchmark, because she is penalized
if she fails to meet the benchmark. The interests of the manager and the investor are
more closely aligned than with an asymmetric performance fee (see for example Stracca
(2006)).
Our insights remain valid when we further extend the model by introducing a third
agent, an active investor who directly invest in the risky asset. We assume that there is a
continuum of retail investors and denote the mass of fund investors by λt ∈ [0, 1] and the
4See for example, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) who consider a standard principal-agent model in two
versions. When a risk-neural agent needs outside financial support to invest in a project, the agent may
(i) always provides costly effort to generate cash flows but divert cash flows for her own private benefit
(diversion model) or (ii) stop providing costly effort and get a private pecuniary benefit (hidden effort).
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) find that the solutions are identical for both versions of model. However,
the diversion model is used in our paper because the moral hazard problem can be overcome at no cost in
the hidden effort model when we introduce the benchmark. Specifically, the benchmark induces the fund
investor to detect shirking perfectly in the hidden effort model. In order to catch the performance fee, the
manager has to take costly effort to ensure their performance to surpass the benchmark. Thus, the fund
investor doesn’t need provide additional incentives. Therefore, if we include a relative performance fee,
the diversion model is more realistic than the hidden effort model.
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mass of active investors by 1− λt. Then equilibrium parameters are also affected by the
share of available delegated capital represented by λt.
5 We find that the impact of the
increased share of available delegated capital is based on the severity of agency frictions:
it depresses risk premia/ volatilities and pushes up interest rates as the friction is being
alleviated, while the opposite is true as the friction binds and becomes more severe. This
is different from Kaniel and Kondor (2013) who argue that there is an inverse U-shaped
relation between the size of delegated capital and the Sharpe ratio. Finally, comparing
the case with and without delegation, we summarize that delegation leads fund investors
to be able to earn higher profits. On the other hand, delegation also benefits all agents by
depressing risk premia and market volatilities. The lower risk premium in the presence of
delegation and benchmarking is consistent with Kapur and Timmermann (2005), which
is supported by empirical evidence of declined risk premia in recent years (e.g., Welch
(2000) and Claus and Thomas (2001), Leippold and Rohner (2012)).
Therefore, we conclude that the inclusion of relative performance fees stabilizes asset
prices in the states of severe crisis. This finding contributes to the literature on the role of
delegation under benchmarking in asset market equilibrium. Brennan (1993) is the first
to introduce benchmark investors into an asset pricing model with a single period, static
model and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utilities. He shows that equilibrium ex-
pected returns are also related to the assets’ covariance with the return on the benchmark
portfolio, in addition to market risk. Similar two-factor CAPM models combined with
empirical evidence are provided in Go´mez and Zapatero (2003), Brennan and Li (2008),
Petajisto (2009) and Leippold and Rohner (2012). Kapur and Timmermann (2005) also
adopt a single-period model to examine the effect of benchmark considerations on equity
premium, but they endogenously determine delegation contracts and decisions. These
models find that relative performance objectives lower equilibrium risk premia within a
static framework.
More recent work focuses on asset price dynamics. For example, Cuoco and Kaniel
(2011) explicitly model the compensation contract with constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) agents, but the contract parameters are exogenous. They find that the presence
of a symmetric performance fee depresses the price of assets included in the benchmark.
However, asymmetric performance fees induce managers to maximize the tracking error
variance of their portfolio, which leads to an ambiguous effect on the Sharpe ratio. Basak
and Pavlova (2013a) take a reduced-form approach to indirectly modeling the contract
involving relative performance fees and simply endow institutional investors with an initial
portfolio. They emphasize the wealth effect, arguing that the market volatility increases
and the Sharpe ratio decreases as the size of institutions increases relative to that of
retail investors. In contrast, we disentangle the manager’s wealth from the total fund in
5As the constraint binds, a fraction of fund investors’ capital is not delegated. Thus we use ’available
delegated capital’ rather than ’delegated capital’.
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institutions by assuming that the manager also has private wealth invested in the fund
and optimally determine the level of delegation.
In comparison with the papers mentioned above, our paper analyses all equilibrium
parameters (including the risk premium, volatility and interest rate) in an infinite-horizon
model where the role of intermediary capital is endogenously derived based on optimal
contracting considerations. Our paper is part of the recent literature focusing on the
amplification of bad shocks through financial frictions that limit the flow of funds among
investors (e.g., He and Krishnamurthy (2012a), He and Krishnamurthy (2012b), He and
Krishnamurthy (2013) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012)). More importantly, we
show that an increased relative performance fee can alleviate financial frictions even when
managerial capital is low.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides the related literature.
Section 3.3 describes the model and derives the incentive constraint leading to the financial
friction. We solve the agents’ optimal strategies in section 3.4. In sections 3.5 and 3.6, a
two-agent model and a three-agent model are solved in general equilibrium respectively.
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to several strands of the theoretical literature. One strand focuses
on the equilibrium effects of delegated portfolio management. One part of this literature
directly studies the effect of agency problems by investigating the flow of funds among
agents.(e.g.He and Krishnamurthy (2012a), He and Krishnamurthy (2012b), He and Kr-
ishnamurthy (2013), Vayanos and Woolley (2013), Kaniel and Kondor (2013) and etc.)
The closest paper to ours is He and Krishnamurthy (2012b), in which poor perfor-
mance of fund managers triggers money outflows due to agency frictions.6 They consider
a general equilibrium model in which the role of the manager’s wealth is derived en-
dogenously based on the optimal contracting consideration. In order to induce the fund
manager to make effort, the fund investor requires the manager to have ”the-skin-in-the-
game” (a minimum inside stake of the intermediary) through determining the equilibrium
intermediation fee based on the risk exposure. Thus, low managers’ wealth attracts low
outside equity, reducing the risk-bearing capacity of the intermediary. This helps to
explain patterns during financial crises: high risk premium and market volatility and
low interest rates. The companion paper He and Krishnamurthy (2012a) and He and
Krishnamurthy (2013) calibrate the model by adding additional realistic features and
quantitatively match these market behavior in bad times.
6Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that agency problems for professional traders result from asymmetric
information and moral hazard, therefore leading to imperfect capital inflows to the convergence-trading
industry.
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Vayanos and Woolley (2013) propose an institutional theory of momentum and re-
versal based on flows between investment funds by modeling exogenous agency costs.
Specifically, when the fundamental value of some assets is hit by a negative shock, invest-
ment funds holding these assets have low fund returns and thus fund investors transfer
the money from the active fund to the passive fund due to the negative updating about
these fund managers’ efficiency. Facing fund outflows, managers sell assets owned by the
fund and hence depress the price of assets hit by the exogenous shock. If outflows are
gradual, momentum aries; if outflows push the asset prices further below fundamental
values, reversal arises.7
Kaniel and Kondor (2013) develop a standard (discrete-time) Lucas tree economy
with exogenous flow-based considerations. They present a stationary equilibrium where
the equilibrium share of delegated capital is constant and adopt a specified convex flow-
performance relation to describe how much of capital will be contributed to funds at each
date. Their results show that all funds choose the same portfolio at low levels of delegation;
however, above some certain threshold, funds will adopt different portfolio strategies in
order to beat the market. Thus, the sharpe ratio follows an inverted U-pattern as the
share of delegation increases.
Another part of agency-based asset pricing (such as Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), Kapur
and Timmermann (2005) and Arora, Ju, and Ou-Yang (2013)) focus on directly modeling
the executive compensations. Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) distinguish between symmetric
and asymmetric performance fee and study their impacts on asset pricing. The contract is
explicitly modeled by including a flat fee, a proportional fee and a performance fee based
on a benchmark portfolio; and the extend of delegation is endogenously determined in
equilibrium. With symmetric performance fees, managers tilt the portfolio to the assets
included in the benchmark, leading to an unambiguous positive effect on these assets
and a negative effect on Sharpe Ratio. While asymmetric performance fees can stabilize
prices by decreasing equilibrium volatilities of both benchmark and non-benchmark stocks,
their effects on Sharpe ratios are ambiguous. This is because risk averse managers might
either select portfolios having high correlation with benchmark in attempt to hedge their
compensation, or select portfolio having low correlation with benchmark in an attempt to
maximize the variance of the excess return of the managed portfolio over the benchmark.
Kapur and Timmermann (2005) and Arora, Ju, and Ou-Yang (2013) are two pa-
pers involving information: Kapur and Timmermann (2005) assume that fund managers
have better information than fund investors; Arora, Ju, and Ou-Yang (2013) further as-
sume that fund managers have different information. Both of two papers assume that a
7Both He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) and Vayanos and Woolley (2013) assume that fund investors
have private wealth in the fund and the utilities of all agents are based on intertemporal consumptions
rather than terminal wealth.
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continuum of fund managers must satisfy participation constraints and incentive compat-
ibility constraints; and delegation with better information or an optimal contract based
on various signals can induce higher risky asset demand and lower risk premium. Kapur
and Timmermann (2005) assume that that managerial remuneration is exogenously given,
consisting of a component independent of performance, an absolute performance fee and a
relative performance fee. Their results show that, in the presence of relative performance-
based contracts, funds tend to herd depending on whether the participation constraint
binds or not. Arora, Ju, and Ou-Yang (2013) provides an optimal contract depending on
all observable state variables. In addition to different information, the manager incurs a
cumulative cost associated with operating costs and effort levels, which will lead to higher
risk premia. They find that the less optimal risk sharing contract can lead stock risk
premium as well as the autocorrelations in both stock and fund returns to be higher; ad-
ditionally, the presence of differential information among funds reduces autocorrelations
but the costs associated with managing the portfolio enhance them.
Additionally, this strand of literature also involves the the role of career concerns (such
as Guerrieri and Kondor (2012)) and the effects of benchmarking considerations (such as
Basak and Pavlova (2013a)) on asset prices. Guerrieri and Kondor (2012) consider a
model where investors delegate their portfolio decisions to risk-neutral investors who can
invest either in a risky asset or in a riskless asset, where the risky asset is assumed to be a
bond subject to default. Investors would like to delegate their fund to informed managers
with superior information on the realization of the default state, while a manager’s type
is private information. At each period, a manager is working for an investor; and at the
end of period, the investor will infer the manager’s type from the manager’s performance
and make a retaining or firing decision. This leads to a reputational premium that is
generated on the return of risky bonds based on the default risk. The premium is positive
when the default probability is high; and the premium becomes negative when the default
risk is low. Thus, investors’ firing decisions distort the investment decision of uninformed
managers, who would like to be perceived as informed. They also explore a more general
version of the model that allows for persistent default risk where career concerns have
additional effects on asset price volatility.
Basak and Pavlova (2013a) construct an economy populated by both standard retail
investors and institutional investors by simply endowing institutional investors with initial
wealth instead of explicitly modeling households that delegating assets to institutions to
manage. Investment opportunities include one riskless asset and multiple risky stocks,
grouping into index stocks and non-index stocks. In order to beat the index, institutional
investors would like to generally increase the fraction of holdings on the index stocks, hence
pushing up the overall stock market level and the prices of stocks included in the bench-
mark index. Since institutional investors demand more risky stocks than retail investors,
both the aggregate market volatility and index stock volatilities are amplified, resulting
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in countercyclical Sharpe ratios. Additionally, an asset-class effect is generated due to
the fact that there arise excess correlations among stocks belonging to their benchmark.
Basak and Pavlova (2013b) find similar results in commodity markets.
The second strand of literature corresponds to limits on arbitrage investigating how
the capital available to marginal investors may affect equilibrium asset prices. The study
of arbitrageurs’ wealth effect is related to that of financial constraints, including both
margin/leverage constraints and equity constraints.
Literature on leverage/margin constraints study constraints on arbitrageurs’ ability
to level up by raising debt. Geanakoplos (2003) and Geanakoplos (2010) focus on the
mechanics of collateral in the repo market and introduce the idea of equilibrium leverage.
Geanakoplos (2003) shows that the price of collateralizable asset doesn’t equal its payoff
and finds that increased margin can cause increasing volatility and disagreement and thus
the leverage cycle. Geanakoplos (2010) further decomposes the pricing lemma of asset
price into payoff value and collateral value by constructing a general equilibrium model
with incomplete markets, heterogenous agents and adverse selection. Their results suggest
that leverage cycles can lead to contagion, flight to collateral, and issuance rationing in
an anxious economy (a frequently recurring phase).
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) develop a multi-period model where arbitrageurs exploit
the discrepancies between the price of two identical risky assets traded in different markets
by collateralizing their positions in each asset separately. Although arbitrage benefits all
investors by supplying liquidity to the market, competitive arbitrageurs with insufficient
wealth fail to eliminate price differences between the risky assets in segmented markets.
Their results imply that, with market segmentation and financial constraints, liquidity
increases in arbitrageurs’ capital and arbitrageurs can amplify exogenous shocks due to
their leverage constraints. Extending the analysis to multiple assets, Gromb and Vayanos
(2010b) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that leverage constraints also gen-
erate the contagion across markets and liquidity dry-ups follow periods of low returns of
arbitrageurs’s risky investment opportunities.
Literature on equity constraints study the asset dynamics when investors face con-
straints in raising equity. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that since arbitrage requires
capital and is typically risky, only a small group of specialists can conduct professional
arbitrage by using other unspecialized investors’ capital and these investors use arbi-
trageurs’ performance to ascertain their ability to invest profitably. They show that,
due to agency problems, arbitrageurs cannot fully bring asset prices to fundamental val-
ues, particularly in extreme circumstances. Specifically, a negatively fundamental shock
to the asset lower its prices and triggers investors’ withdrawals, suggesting that equity
constraints induce amplification as well. Xiong (2001) studies the effect of arbitrageurs’
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capital on asset prices by modeling convergence traders with logarithm utility in a dy-
namic setting.8 With ample wealth, convergence traders take risky positions against noise
trading, thereby providing liquidity to the market and reducing asset price volatility. As
their capital decreases due to unfavorable shocks, convergence traders’ risk-taking capac-
ity erodes, leading to asset liquidations and the amplification of original shocks. This
wealth effect causes convergence traders to destabilize asset prices.
More recent literature explicitly model equity constraints which limit the flow of
funds from households to specialists and relate constraints to past performance of finan-
cial intermediaries in a dynamic setting. Vayanos (2004) assumes that marginal investors
are fund managers subject to withdrawals when fund performance falls below a threshold.
During volatile times, the probability of withdrawals become more likely, which reduces
managers’ willingness to hold illiquid assets and raises the liquidity premia. In He and
Krishnamurthy (2012b) and He and Krishnamurthy (2013), the intermediary’s outside
funding cannot exceed a fixed multiple of managers’ wealth, indicating that lower inter-
mediary capital erodes the risk-bearing capacity of the marginal investor. When equity
constraint binds during financial crises, managers under-perform and the volatility and
risk premium of assets spike.
He and Krishnamurthy (2012a) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) are two
macroeconomic models with a financial intermediation sector. Due to moral hazard prob-
lems, financial experts can issue some outside equity to households but can only sell off
a fraction of the total risk. The model in He and Krishnamurthy (2012a) can be used
to evaluate and quantify the systematic risk, which is defined as the risk of a disruption
in financial intermediation with adverse effects for the real economy. The model can be
applied to study the transition from normal states to the states of systematic risks and to
compute the conditional probabilities of arriving at a systematic risk state (stress test).
Similarly, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) illustrate the non-linearities in the economy:
the economy is kept near the stable steady state given small shocks; the economy falls in
the unstable crisis regime with the feature of liquidity spirals given large shocks. They
also uncover the volatility paradox: systematic risk (endogenous risks) driven by market
illiquidity occurs even in the environment of low exogenous risks. Due to this paradox,
equilibrium leverage also rises with diversification and thus financial tools designed for
risk management may also raise systematic risks.
More broadly, our paper links to the work on the optimal contract in the dynamic
setting. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Sannikov (2008) provide a continuous-time
version of the principal-agent problem between a risk-neutral investor and a risk-neutral
agent. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) provides a diversion model in which an agent with
outside financial support manages a project that generates cash flow and is able to divert
8Due to the logarithmic utility, the total wealth of all convergence traders can be aggregated to represent
their aggregate risk-bearing capacity. (Xiong 2001)
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cash flows for private benefits. Given the concern that a low cash flow is a result of the
agent’s hidden actions, the investors would provide the agent with appropriate incentives
by controlling the agent’s wage, withdrawing the fund and firing the agent. They develop
an optimal contract in which the agent holds the inside equity and the outside investors
hold the remaining equity, debt and credit line. The firm’s leverage is negatively related
with its past profitability as the credit line is drawn off to cover losses and is paid off
given the realization of a profit. Sannikov (2008) assume that the output is affected by the
agent’s unobserved effort. A new method using a differential equation is adopted to derive
the optimal contract based on the agent’s continuation value as the state variable. They
identify the contracting factors, including the agent’s promotion and outside opportunities
and the cost of replacing the agent, can help determine the dynamics of the agent’s effort
and wage, as well as the optimal combination of short-term and long-term incentives.
Schaettler and Sung (1993), Ou-Yang (2003), He (2009) examine the optimal exec-
utive compensation by analyzing a continuous-time moral hazard problem. Schaettler
and Sung (1993) use a first-order approach to solve the principal-agent problem with
exponential utility. At the end of the long-term contract, the agent is rewarded by the
compensation fee and the principal obtains the profit net of the fee. The principal has to
satisfy an incentive compatibility condition which is relaxed to the first-order conditions
for optimality in the agent’s problem. Then the optimal structure of the compensation
S can be represented as ‘S=the agent’s opportunity cost + exact compensation for the
agent’s actual cost for his effort + compensation error due to the fact that the compensa-
tion is based on the realized outcome rather than the agent’s effort + risk premium due
to compensation error’. Based on Schaettler and Sung (1993), Ou-Yang (2003) is the first
paper to study the contracting problem between an individual investor and a professional
portfolio manager. The delegated portfolio management problem is almost equivalent
to a standard principal-agent problem in which the portfolio’s wealth process denotes
the output process for a project. They extend Schaettler and Sung (1993) by adding a
benchmark portfolio in the manager’s compensation scheme. Their closed-form solutions
suggest that a portfolio manager should be compensated by a fixed fee, a fraction of the
total assets under management plus a bonus or a penalty depending on the portfolio’s
excess return relative to a benchmark portfolio. By using Sannikov (2008)’s method, He
(2009) examines the impact of firm size on the agency problem. In their model, the agent
hired by investors for business operation controls firm size growth through unobserved
effort. Given the concern that implementing high effort requires appropriate incentives,
the time-varying firm growth generates partial incentives, analogous to the case that the
agent is granted a number of shares according to his current continuation payoff. Ad-
ditional incentives are provided by future performance-based stock grants. The agent’s
good performance characterized by growing firm size increases the agent’s inside stakes,
alleviating the agency problem.
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Empirically, the evidence for the role of financial institutions comes in two forms.
First, executive compensation is one of key organizational factors contributing to the
crises. Based on the data for the largest US financial institutions during 2000-2008, Be-
bchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) and Bhagat and Bolton (2011) argue that incentives
generated by executive compensation programs lead to excessive risk-taking by banks,
resulting in the 2008 financial crisis. Both of them find that executives focus on the short-
term payoff rather than the shareholders’ long-term value, requiring to design a better
performance- or equity-based compensation which to link the payoffs of executives with
long-term results. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) provide the evidence that lack of align-
ment of bank CEO incentives with shareholder interests are not blamed for the crisis and
summarizing that option compensation induce CEOs to take more risks than that would
optimal for equity holders.
The second form of evidence studies the effect of intermediation capital. The capital-
related crises have been noted by the arbitrage in the merging market in the 1987 stock-
market crash (Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007)), the large movement in MBS prices
followed by the collapse of Askins Capital Management MBS fund in 1993/1994 and the
fall of LTCM in 1998/1999 (Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007)), the fall of
US corporate debt market in 2002/2003 (Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, Ferguson, and Schranz
(2004)), the capital redemptions in convertible bond market in 2005 (Mitchell, Pedersen,
and Pulvino (2007)) and the subprime crisis in 2007/2008 (He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy
(2010)) and etc. In these events, the capital of financial intermediaries, including hedge
funds, mutual funds, trading desks in the banks, etc., is hit by negative shocks, leading
to decreasing corresponding asset prices and weakening intermediary balance sheets.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Assets
We consider an infinite-horizon continuous-time economy along the lines of Lucas (1978).9
There is a single perishable consumption good which is used as the numeraire. Investment
opportunities involve two assets, a riskless bond in zero net supply and a risky asset that
pays a risky dividend. The supply of the risky asset is normalized to be one unit. The




9The infinite horizon setting is used because we adopt a short-term intermediation contract and it is
closer to the common models in the asset pricing literature. The two examples for the infinite horizon
setting are He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) and Vayanos and Woolley (2013).
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where rt is an endogenously continuously compounded return. The risky asset pays a
dividend of Dt which follows a geometric Brownian motion,
dDt
Dt
= µDdt+ σDdZt, (3.2)
where µD > 0 and σD > 0 are constants. The only uncertainty is represented by a filtered
probability space (Ω, {Ft},P), which is defined on the Brownian motion Zt. Denote the
progressively measurable process Pt as the risky asset price. Then the total return on the




= µRdt+ σRdZt, (3.3)
where µR and σR are the risky asset’s expected return and volatility, respectively. The






There are two classes of agents: institutional investors and retail investors. Institutional
investors are taken to be professional portfolio managers/decision-makers who have a
mandate to manage a portfolio of assets for a financial institution such as a hedge fund,
a mutual fund, a pension fund, an asset management team in a bank and etc. Retail
investors can be grouped into fund investors and active investors: (1) fund investors
delegate a fraction of their wealth to portfolio managers; (2) active investors will manage
their own portfolios. Thus, we assume that the economy is populated by three types of
agents: fund managers i = m, fund investors i = f and active investors i = a. Without
loss of generality, we set the measure of each agent class to be one and denote Wit as each
agent’s wealth.10
Based on He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) (HK hereafter), the focus of our model is
an intermediation relationship between a fund manager and a fund investor. Following
Ou-Yang (2003), we explain that the delegation is due to the following reasons: (1) the
manager’s lower transaction costs on stocks, (2) the inexperienced investor’s desire for a
10In Basak and Pavlova (2013a), there are also two types of agents: institutional investors and retail
investors; but the delegation of fund investors is not explicitly modeled. Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) adopt
the assumption of three agents like us but the fund manager has no private wealth in the fund. Kaniel
and Kondor (2013) complicate the model by assuming that new-born investors can decide to be either
fund investors or active investors.
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diversified portfolio, and (3) the investor’s lack of time for the active investment.11 The
intermediation relationship is affected by a moral hazard problem, which is alleviated
via a financial contract written by fund managers as described later. For simplicity, we
assume the active investor faces a standard consumption-investment problem.
We also assume that all agents are infinitely lived and have log utilities. Their




e−ρit ln citdt], (3.5)
where ρi > 0 is the agent i’s time preference and and cit is the consumption rate of the
agent i at date t.
3.3.3 Intermediation Contract
Following HK, we assume that there exists a short-term intermediation contract between
the fund investor and the fund manager for tractability reasons. The short-term contract
is analogous to the standard contracting problem in a one-period principal-agent prob-
lem, e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Consider the manager with wealth Wmt and the
investor with wealth Wft. These wealth levels evolve endogenously in equilibrium. At
every t, a financial contract is written to determine how much each party is paid accord-
ing to their wealth contributions and how much the manager is compensated for wealth
delegation. Specifically, the manager will contribute a fixed fraction of her wealth into the
fund, i.e., Tmt = γWmt;
12 the fund investor contributes a fraction of his wealth into the
fund, i.e., Tft = αftWft, where αft is endogenously determined. We focus on the case in
which both of them invest the remaining wealth (Wmt−Tmt and Wft−Tft) in the riskless
11We will not model these features, since the focus of our model is how financial frictions arising from an
intermediation relationship between a fund manager and a fund investor lead to financial fragility. Ou-Yang
(2003) explain that ‘Though the belief that a manager may possess superior information is an important
reason for her employment, the finding that actively managed mutual funds, on average, underperform
passive index funds may raise questions on the validity of this belief. In addition, a manager’s information
about a limited number of individual stocks will not play a major role if an investor is only interested in
asset allocations among a money market fund, a diversified domestic index portfolio and diversified index
portfolios of foreign countries.’ Differently, He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) and He and Krishnamurthy
(2013) assume that investors delegate their money because they don’t have the knowledge in investing
in the risky asset with the payoff comprising a set of complex investment strategies. (informational
transaction costs) This will lead to another important assumption in He and Krishnamurthy (2012b), i.e.,
the fund investor cannot observe the investment strategy. However, the observability will not affect their
key results in a large extent. Without considering the possibility of observability, we are able to highlight
the pure effect of relative performance evaluation on alleviating agency frictions.
12In order to model the fact that the institutional investors always take leverage, we assume that the
fund manager only invest a fraction of her wealth in the fund Tmt = γWmt where γ ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise,
when there are no financial frictions, the fund carries no leverage and is counterfactual. He and Krish-
namurthy (2012b) mention in their footnote 13 that the specialist is indifferent between contributing and
not contributing all of her wealth into the intermediary. Given moral hazard issues, the specialist must
be disallowed from hedging the risk in her contract payoff, implying that he cannot purchase the risk
exposure in her personal account.
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bond and neither of them is allowed to borrow to invest in the fund (i.e., γ, αft ∈ [0, 1]).13
Based on the contract, the manager chooses an optimal portfolio strategy αmt ≥ 0 for the
fund which leads to an observable portfolio return.14 Since the intermediation relation
is short-term, the relationship only lasts from t to t + dt. At t + dt, the portfolio return
realizes; then the fund investor and the fund manager get paid according to the contract.
3.3.3.1 Moral Hazard Problem
We assume that the financial contract is implemented in terms of equity contributions
by fund managers and investors.15 Specifically, the fund manager owns the share of
fund capital βt =
Tmt
TIt
∈ [0, 1] , while the fund investor holds 1 − βt = TftTIt . Hence the
fund manager and the investor share the fund’s risk exposure and profit according to the
distribution of their equity contribution to the fund. Given the manager’s investment
decision αmt, the risk exposure shared by the manager and the investor are given as
follows.
Amt = αmtβtTIt = βtAIt,
Aft = αmt(1− βt)TIt = (1− βt)AIt,
(3.6)
where AIt is the fund’s total risk exposure determined by the manager, and Amt and
Aft are the effective risk exposures of the manager and the investor, respectively. When
αmt > 1, the manager borrows to buy the risky asset and the short position in the bond
is assumed to be collateralized by the holdings of the risky asset. This will ensure that
borrowing is not subject to the diversion friction described later.16
The investment returns of both the fund manager and the fund investor are affected by
the moral hazard problem between them. Specifically, we allow the manager to divert cash
flows for her own private benefit. The manager receives a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1] of the cash
flows she diverts; if φ < 1, there are dead-weight costs of concealing and diverting funds.
Given the fund manager’s investment decision αmt, the intermediary’s fund performance
is
dRt(αmt, st) = αmt(dRt − rtdt) + rtdt− stdt, (3.7)
13This is the weak assumption for no private savings in the literature on the optimal contract. But if
both of agents can short the bond, the result will be different. Therefore, we make this assumption for
future extensions.
14Since the manager has her private wealth in the fund, the manager’s portfolio choice is same as the
fund’s portfolio choice. This makes the model to be easily solved.
15We do not consider debt constraints by assuming that the short position in the bond is collateralized
by the holdings of the risky asset. According to He and Krishnamurthy (2012b), with the possibility of
diversion, debt-borrowing will be constrained. Thus they would have to study a model with constraints on
both equity and debt. However, the assumption we adopt can allow us to use the diversion model without
involving debt constraints Thus, the fund’s borrowing is not affected by agency issues, but we can leave
this for future research.
16He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) provides a model in terms of shirking decisions, which reconciles our
formulation.
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where st is the cash that the manager can divert per unit wealth. This implies the
intermediary’s dollar return is
dRt(αmt, st)TIt = αmt(dRt − rtdt)TIt + rtTItdt− stTItdt. (3.8)
Given the reasons for delegation explained by Ou-Yang (2003), we assume that there
is no asymmetric information about the risky asset return between the manager and the
investor and thus the investor can observe the manager’s portfolio choice αmt.
17 Given the
observability of the portfolio choice αmt and the risky asset return dRt, the fund investor
can infer the fund’s return dRt(αmt)TIt. Comparing the inferred return with the observed
return dRt(αmt, st)TIt, the investor can detect whether the investor diverts the cash or
not.
3.3.3.2 Incentive Compatibility
Though the diversion is detectable, there are no courts that can punish this action. In
order to eliminate the manager’s incentive to divert, at time t, we assume that the investor
provides the manager with the contract (βt, Ft), which ensures that the manager’s payment
is sufficiently sensitive to the fund’s performance. Here βt is not only the manager’s share
of equity capital but also her profit sharing rule; Ft is the fee paid for wealth delegation.
In HK, the compensation fee is in terms of a risk exposure fee: in order to obtain the
risk exposure of Aft, the investor in the fund have to pay ktAft to the fund manager. In
addition to a risk exposure fee, we also include a performance fee relative to the market
return. Since there is only one risky asset in our model, the market return is just the risky
asset return dRt. This implies that the only way for the manager to beat the benchmark
is to raise leverage. We specify the following assumption for the intermediation contract
(βt, Ft); and find that the diversion decision st affects not only the manager’s sharing-profit
but also the relative performance fee paid to manage the fund.
Assumption 1. At time t+dt, the manager will receive a compensation fee which consists
of a fee paid for delegation, including the risk exposure fee and the performance fee relative
to the aggregate market benchmark, i.e.,
Ft = ktαmtTIt + gt[dRt(αmt, st)TIt − dRt]TIt, (3.9)
17We only involve one moral hazard problem. This is different from He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) who
assume that the manager’s portfolio decision is unobserved. Since our focus relies on diversion, we do not
involve the moral hazard problem in terms of unobserved portfolio choice decision. He and Krishnamurthy
(2012b) proves that the observability of the portfolio choice alleviates the moral hazard problem but it
doesn’t affect the key asset price implication. Please see the Appendix A.7 in He and Krishnamurthy
(2012b) for reference.
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and a share of the fund’s total return net of the compensation fee,
βt[dRt(αmt, st)TIt − Ft] = βtTIt[(1− gt)dRt(αmt, st)− ktαmt − gtdRt], (3.10)
where kt, gt ≥ 0 is the per-unit-wealth fee.
The manager’s stake in a fund (or other financial institutions) aligns the manager’s
interests to outside investors’. If the fund loses money, the manager receives a lower profit
as well. This offers the manager the incentive not to divert cash flows. In most of the
literature on delegated portfolio management, the manager is usually assumed to have no
private wealth in the fund. (e.g., Ou-Yang (2003), Arora, Ju, and Ou-Yang (2013), Cuoco
and Kaniel (2011), Kaniel and Kondor (2013), and etc). However, in practice, decision-
makers usually own the equity shares of their institutions. For example, Holderness,
Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) provide the evidence that officers and directors of listed
firms, including finance, insurance and real estate, owned around 20 percent of the equity
shares of their firms in 1995. Aragon and Nanda (2012) find that hedge fund managers
invest personal capital equivalent to approximately 17% percentage stake in the fund over
the period 1995-2007.18 In the mutual fund industry, managerial ownership is relatively
much lower, equaling to 0.81% assets under management in 2010, based on the empirical
results given by Ma and Tang (2012).
The inclusion of relative performance fee provides the manager additional incentive
not to divert cash flows. As explained by Basak and Pavlova (2013a), the benchmark
matters due to either implicit or explicit incentives. For the implicit incentives, the fund
always seeks to perform better than the peer group to attract more flows. This is because
the majority of funds are compensated through a fixed fraction of managed assets. A
positive and convex flow-performance relation is documented by Chevalier and Ellison
(1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) for mutual funds; and
a positive and concave relation is documented by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003),
Chen (2011) and Getmansky (2012) for hedge funds. These implicit incentives explain
the tournament behavior in both mutual funds and hedge funds. For the explicit incen-
tives, fund managers are paid based on their performance to passive benchmarks. The
investment Advisers Act of 1940 was amended in 1970 to allow contracts with registered
investment companies to include a ‘fulcrum’ type of performance fee relative to a chosen
benchmark. In 1985, the use of performance-based fee was approved by the SEC and
the department of Labor (for pension funds) in 1985 and 1986 respectively. Despite the
fact that 35% of US pension funds and 9% of US mutual funds adopt the performance
fee, the use is concentrated only in larger funds (Cuoco and Kaniel (2011)). And hedge
18Aragon and Nanda (2012) also mention that ‘a one-standard-deviation increase in the manager’s
personal stake has roughly the same effect (93%) on risk shifting as tying the manager’s compensation to
the fund’s HWM benchmark’.
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funds always adopt an asymmetric performance fee, which causes disproportionately high
risk-taking.
It also worths mentioning that the performance fee in our model is symmetric or
‘fulcrum’, which captures the incentive fee structure allowed by the Amendment for the
investment Advisers Act of 1940. This means that the manager will obtain a high reward
if the fund does well but pay a penalty if it does badly. Some of literature has examined
the effect of the form of performance fee on portfolio choices and asset prices. For example,
Ou-Yang (2003) provides an optimal contract involving a bonus or penalty depending on
the portfolio excess returns relative to an active benchmark portfolio. Cuoco and Kaniel
(2011) examines the impact of a compensation contract that is of either a symmetric
form or an asymmetric form, and find symmetric and asymmetric fees can generate the
opposite effects on asset pricing.
Given the fund manager’s investment decision αmt and diversion action st, the dy-
namic budget constraints for the fund manager and the fund investor are
dWmt = βt[dRt(αmt, st)TIt − Ft]dt+ Ftdt+ rt(Wmt − Tmt)dt− cmtdt+ φstTItdt,
dWft = (1− βt)[dRt(αmt, st)TIt − Ft]dt+ rt(Wft − Tft)dt− cftdt.
(3.11)
This implies that the contract term βt affects the sharing profits of both the manager
and the investor. The manager’s dynamic budget constraint suggests that (1−βt)Ft is the
compensation fee paid by the investor to the manager.19 The last term in the manager’s
constraint φstTItdt is the cash flow the manager diverts at time t. With the dynamic
budget constraint for the manager in hand, we analyse how the manager’s profit sharing
rule βt is optimally chosen given the moral hazard problem.
Lemma 1. To eliminate the manager’s incentive to divert, we must satisfy the incentive-
compatibility constraint as follows,
βt ≥ φ− gt
1− gt , (3.12)
where βt ≥ 0 and gt ∈ [0, φ].
Proof. When the manager diverts cash, equation (3.11) implies that the manager’s budget
dynamics is
dWmt = [(1− gt)βt + gt]dRt(αmt)TIt + kt(1− βt)αmtTItdt
− (1− βt)gtTItdt+ stTIt[φ− βt(1− gt)− gt]dt.
19Since the manager also contributes the wealth to the fund, he needs to pay a fee to himself but this
fee is canceled out when he receives the compensation fee for managing the total fund of the intermediary.
Thus the manager only receives the compensation fee from the fund investor, i.e., (1− βt)Ft.
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The first term corresponds to the share of the net-of-the-fee return plus the symmetric
performance fee, the second term is the risk exposure fee, and the third term is the
adjustment corresponding to the aggregate market risk. The last term is affected by the
manager’s diversion action. If she diverts, she suffers the loss of stTIt[βt(1 − gt) + gt]
(giving the sharing rule and the relative performance fee rate) but enjoys the private
benefit φstTt. The incentive to divert is eliminated if the manager’s loss is greater than
benefit, i.e., φ − βt(1 − gt) − gt < 0. Hence, the manager’s profit sharing rule has to be
bigger than a threshold, i.e., βt ≥ φ−gt1−gt . We assume that βt ∈ [0, 1], which suggest that
gt ∈ [0, φ].
We call equation (3.12) the incentive compatibility constraint: the investor will adopt
at least a minimum incentive βt =
φ−gt
1−gt to motivate the manager. In other words, the
fund investor requires the manager to hold a minimum inside stake (the-skin-in-the-game)
to eliminate the incentive to divert cash flows. If gt = 0, the sharing rule βt is greater
than a constant, φ ∈ [0, 1]. If gt ∈ (0, φ] increases, the minimum inside stake is reduced
given the parameter restriction that φ ∈ (0, 1]. This suggests that with the non-negative
performance fee, the manager’s minimum profit sharing rule βt is reduced, compared with
the case without the relative performance fee.20
Recall that we assume the contract is implemented in terms of equity contributions.
Thus the profit sharing rules for two agents are proportional to their equity shares. For
any βt (the manager’s profit sharing rule), the fund investor’s wealth contribution relative








Given equations (3.12) and (3.13), the investor’s maximum wealth contribution to the
fund is achieved when βt is being set to the minimum level
φ−gt
1−gt







Since the incentive compatibility places a lower bound for βt, the investor faces a maximum
amount of wealth contribution to the fund. In other words, due to the agency friction,
the outside equity capital is capped by a maximum level, 1−φφ−gt times the manager’s inside
equity capital Tmt = γWmt.
Since the investor’s investment in the fund is based on the manager’s equity capital,







1−gt . Given φ ∈ [0, 1], βt decreases as gt increases.
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limits the flow of funds between the manager and the investor. (Brunnermeier and San-
nikov (2012)) The lower the manager’s inside stake γWmt, the less amount of capital can
be invested in the fund by the outside investor, and thus the more severe the financial
friction is. However, varying gt can adjust the severity of financial friction. The higher
the performance fee gt, the lower the investor’s required inside stake, and thus the higher
the fund investor’s wealth contribution to the fund β = 1−φφ−gt is. This leads to a higher
upper boundary for the outside equity, indicating a reduced agency friction. Then we
provide the following assumption for the investor’s wealth contribution to the fund in the
optimal contract.
Assumption 2. In the optimal contract, the investor adopts a minimum profit sharing
rule for the manager βt =
φ−gt
1−gt (equivalent to β =
1−φ
φ−gt for the investor). Combined this
binding incentive constraint with the fund investor’s leverage constraint Tft = [0,Wft], we




which can be regarded as the manager’s delegation supply capped by the investor’s to-
tal wealth. The investor’s demand for delegation is defined as TDft = αftWft, which is
optimally chosen by the investor.
3.3.4 Intermediation and Market Equilibrium
Next we provide the definition of intermediation equilibrium and market equilibrium, and
also describe the agents’ problems.
3.3.4.1 Intermediation Equilibrium
Following HK, we model the intermediation market to operate in a Walrasian Fashion.
At time t, fund investors offer intermediation contracts (βt, Ft) to fund managers and
managers can accept the offer or opt out of the intermediation market; additionally, any
number of fund investors are free to form coalitions with some fund managers. The
contract ends and the intermediation market repeats itself at time t + dt. The fund
investor will pay the fund manager a compensation fee Ft that ensures the supply of
delegation from the fund manager to be equal to the demand of delegation from the fund
investor TSft = T
D




ft). We adopt the definition and lemma for the
intermediation equilibrium in HK.
Definition 2. He and Krishnamurthy (2012b): ‘In the intermediation market at time t,
fund investors make offers (βt, Ft) to fund managers and fund managers can accept/reject
the offers. A contract equilibrium in the intermediation market at time t satisfies the
following two conditions:
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1. βt is incentive compatible for each fund manager in light of (3.12)
2. There is no coalition of fund managers and investors with some other contracts such
that in that coalition fund investors are strictly better off while fund managers are
weakly better off.’
Condition 2 in Definition 2 gives the following lemma:
Lemma 2. He and Krishnamurthy (2012b): ‘Suppose that at time t, fund managers (or
fund investors) are symmetric. Then the resulting equilibria in the intermediation market
is symmetric, i.e., every fund manager receives fee Ft and every fund investor obtains an
exposure A∗ft and pays a total fee Ft.’
21
3.3.4.2 Agents’ Problems
With definition 2 and lemma 2 in hand, we have the following relatively standard problems
for fund managers and investors in the economy.














Problem 2. Given the manager’s optimal portfolio choice α∗mt, the fund investor will






e−ρf t ln cftdt],
s.t.
dWft = (1− βt)TIt[(1− gt)dRt(αmt)− ktαmt − gtdRt] + rt(Wft − Tft)dt− cftdt.
where Tft = (1 − βt)TIt = αftWft and thus choosing an optimal profit sharing rule βt
is equivalent to determining the wealth allocation between the fund and the riskless asset
αft.
21Please see Appendix A.2 in He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) for the proof of this lemma.
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dWat = rtWatdt+ αat(dRt − rtdt)− catdt.
3.3.4.3 Market Equilibrium
Definition 3. An equilibrium for the economy is a set of progressively measurable price
processes {Pt}, {rt}, {kt, gt}, the fund manager’s decisions {c∗mt, α∗mt}, the fund investor’s
decisions {c∗ft, α∗ft, β∗t }, and the active investor’s decisions {c∗at, α∗at}.
1. Given the price process, decisions solve all agents’ problems as shown in Problem
1-3;










atWat = Pt; (3.17)





at = Dt. (3.18)
3.4 Optimal Consumption-Investment Strategies
The agents will make optimal consumption-investment decisions given the equilibrium
investment opportunity set. The agents’ continuation value J(Wit) are functions of their
wealth levels.22 Throughout the paper, these functions are assumed to be strictly in-
creasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable in their wealth. Recall that the wealth
contribution of the manager and the investor can be represented by Tmt = βtTIt = γWmt
and Tft = (1 − βt)TIt = αftWft, respectively. Given these relations and equation (3.7),
22The value functions also depend on the aggregate state. The aggregate state can be summarized
by the dividend Dt, the wealth distribution between fund managers and retail investors and the wealth
distribution between fund investors and active investors, which will be described later. However, the
aggregate state is not necessary for solving the optimal decisions.
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we can rewrite the agents’ budget constraints as
dWmt = [rWmt − cmt + αmt(1 + βgt)θtσRγWmt + αmtktβγWmt − gtθtσRβγWmt]dt
+ [αmt(1 + βgt)− βgt]σRγWmtdZt;
dWft = [rtWft − cft + αft((αmt(1− gt) + gt)θtσR − αmtkt)Wft]dt
+ αft[αmt(1− gt) + gt]σRWftdZt;
dWat = (rWat − cat + αatθtσRWat)dt+ αatσRWatdZt.
(3.19)
3.4.1 Fund Investors
Proposition 3.1. Given the fund manager’s optimal portfolio choice α∗mt, the fund in-
vestor’s optimal consumption rule is
c∗ft = ρfWft, (3.20)
and the optimal investment decision in the fund is
α∗ft =
1




where gt is endogenously determined in general equilibrium. The intermediation market













t is a function of the aggregate state.
Since the fund investor has the log utility, her consumption rule is proportional to
her wealth. Given the investment opportunity set and the manager’s portfolio choice
α∗mt, equation (3.21) suggests that the investor’s fraction of wealth invested in the fund
is only affected by the performance fee gt. The risk exposure fee is unnecessary when
the performance fee is involved. When the manager takes leverage, i.e., α∗mt > 1, the
increasing performance fee raises the investor’s wealth contribution in the fund; when
α∗mt ∈ [0, 1], the opposite is true.23 If the benchmark is not included, the investor’s





, which suggests that αft is also
linearly increasing in the performance fee gt as long as the fund does not short sell (i.e.,
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This is same as the result for the hidden effort model in HK. The investor’s wealth
contribution in the fund is linearly decreasing in the risk exposure fee kt. The plausible
explanation for the positive relation between gt and α
∗
ft is that we consider a symmetric
performance fee, implying that the manager will pay penalty if she loses or is unable to
outdo the benchmark; and thus the fund investor can obtain a higher return without
facing a higher risk via the penalty fee as insurance. For this reason, the increasing
performance fee benefits the fund investor, while the higher risk exposure fee does not.
This may explain why the risk exposure fee is not necessary when the performance fee is
included.
3.4.2 Fund Managers
Given the fund investor’s profit sharing rule β in proposition 3.1, the fund manager’s
profit sharing rule is written as βt =
1
1+β
. Thus we can have the following proposition for
the fund manager’s optimal decisions.
Proposition 3.2. Given the contract (βt, Ft), the fund manager’s optimal consumption
rule is
c∗mt = ρmWmt, (3.24)


















t is a function of the aggregate state.
Equation (3.25) implies that the manager’s optimal portfolio choice consists of two






is an adjusted myopia investment concern; and (2)
the second term βgt
1+βgt
corresponds to a hedging motive to catch the relative performance
fee. Compared with the standard mean-variance portfolio choice θtσR , the symmetric fund
performance fee induces the manager to be more risk-averse given 1
1+βgt
≤ 1; however,
since the manager only invests a fraction of her wealth in the fund, the manager become
less risk-averse given γ ∈ [0, 1]. This is intuitive: the fund manager may worry about
paying a high penalty if she takes a large exposure, while her low equity contribution to
the fund induces her to earn a higher return with a smaller investment. The trade-off
between these two concerns affects the adjusted myopia decision. On the other hand,
the inclusion of the benchmark always makes the manager take additional risk. This is
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consistent with Basak and Pavlova (2013a): a hedging motive to outdo the benchmark
always induces the institutional investor to have a higher effective risk appetite.
If the manager is only compensated by the risk exposure fee, the manager’s investment











This is also same as the result for hidden-effort model if the investor can observe the
manager’s investment decisions in HK. The manager’s portfolio choice in this case is
linearly increasing in the risk exposure fee kt, while the portfolio choice in the case with
the performance fee is a non-linear function of gt.
3.4.3 Active Investors
The solutions for the active investor’s problem are standard, given as follows.
Proposition 3.3. The active investor’s optimal consumption rule is
c∗at = ρaWat, (3.27)













t is a function of the aggregate state.
3.5 General Equilibrium with Two Agents
Firstly, we consider a two-agent economy rather than a three-agent economy to compare
our results with those in HK. Specifically, we assume that there are no active investors





cmt + cft = Dt.
(3.29)
We look for a stationary Markov equilibrium where the state variable is the fund
manager’s dividend scaled wealth ωmt =
Wmt
Dt
, which involves the information of both the
risky dividend Dt and the manager’s wealth Wmt. The dividend process is included as it
is the fundamental driving force in the economy. The use of the manager’s wealth Wmt is
to emphasize the role of managerial capital on asset prices. Given the definition of ωmt,
we are able to derive the conditions for the capital constraint as well as the functions for
the equilibrium price dividend ratio, the Sharpe ratio, the risk premium, the volatility
and the interest rate.
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3.5.1 Constrained and Unconstrained Regions
Given Assumption 2, we derive the next proposition which shows that there are two
regions in the economy.
Proposition 3.4. At any time t, the economy is in one of two equilibria:
1. The fund manager’s capital constraint slacks when 1−φφ−gt >
Wft
γWmt
. In this case, the
fund investor contributes all of her wealth into the fund, i.e., α∗ft = 1 and thus the











2. The fund manager’s capital constraint binds when 1−φφ−gt ≤
Wft
γWmt
. In this case, the





∈ [0, 1) and the sharing rules of the fund manager and the investor are




= 1−φφ−gt , respectively.
Since βt >
φ−gt
1−gt in the unconstrained region, the incentive-compatibility (3.12) is
slack, and the fund investor’ profit sharing rule is determined by the wealth distribution
between two agents. The manager’s maximum delegation supply 1−φφ−gtγWmt is bigger
than the investor’s maximum delegation demand Wft. This corresponds to the situation
in which the manager’s dividend scaled wealth is relatively high. As discussed before, the
fund investor’s optimal investment decision α∗ft is increasing in the performance fee (when
α∗mt ≥ 1 that will be described later), and thus the performance fee must be high enough
to attract all of wealth Wft from the investor. Therefore, we assume that the abundance
of delegation supply results in the highest performance fee which is allowed to reach, i.e.,
gt = φ.
24
On the other hand, when β
∗
= 1−φφ−gt in the constrained region, the incentive-compatibility
(3.12) is always binding, and the fund investor’ profit sharing rule is affected by the vary-
ing performance fee. This corresponds to the situation in which the manager’s dividend
scaled wealth is relatively low. Since the investor’s maximum delegation demand is higher
than the maximum delegation supply Wft ≥ 1−φφ−gtγWmt, the performance fee has to adjust






Given the agents’ optimal consumption policy in (3.20) and (3.24) as well as the good
clearing condition in (3.29), we can represent the fund investor’s dividend scaled wealth










24We assume that in order to attract Wft from the investor, the performance is set as the upper
boundary,i.e., gt = φ. This assumption is in spirit similar to He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) who assume
that the abundance of intermediation supply results in free risk exposure fee. This is because the fund
investor’s optimal investment decision is linearly decreasing in the risk exposure fee kt. Since our focus is
on the agency friction, this assumption will not affect our key results.
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Combining equation (3.30) and proposition 3.4, we can determine the critical level







where gc represents the performance fee at the critical level which will be determined in
equilibrium. When ω > ωc, the equity constraint doesn’t bind; and ω ≤ ωc, the equity
constraint binds.
3.5.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
Next we start by characterizing equilibrium parameters (i.e., PtDt , σR, θt, pit, rt) by taking
the performance fee gt as given.
3.5.2.1 Equilibrium Price-Dividend Ratio
Given log preferences for both agents, the equilibrium risky asset price Pt is allowed to
be derived in closed form. Since the risky asset is in unit supply and the riskless bond is
in zero net supply, the market value of the risky asset is equal to the aggregate wealth in
the economy
Pt = Wmt +Wft. (3.32)
Given equation (3.30), we can represent the equilibrium price of the risky asset price

















Equation (3.34) is the same as the price dividend ratio in HK. When the economy
consists of only fund investors (ωmt → 0), the price dividend ratio approaches 1ρf . When
the economy consists of only fund managers (ωft → 0), the price-dividend ratio equals
1
ρm
. Following HK, we assume that ρf ≥ ρm throughout the paper, and thus the slope
of the price-dividend ratio is always non-negative. This implies that the price-dividend
ratio increases in the fund manager’s dividend-scaled wealth. The lowest price-dividend
ratio captures the liquidation value of the risky asset as ωmt = 0, which corresponds to
the disintermediation.25
25The equilibrium after liquidation is out of the scope in our paper.
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3.5.2.2 Fund Manager’s Equilibrium Portfolio Share








1 + (ρf − ρm)ωmt
γρf (1 + β)ωmt
. (3.35)
This suggests that the manager’s portfolio holding is affected not only by her own
wealth ωmt but also by the fund investor’s profit sharing rule β. Moreover, the higher
β, the lower the manager’s equilibrium portfolio choice αemt. Given the manager’s inside
stake Tmt = γωmt, the fund with higher β has a higher fraction of equity financing from
the fund investor, leading to less binding financial frictions. Therefore, the manager can
take a decreased portfolio share to clear the risky asset market as β increases.
Since γ, αft ∈ [0, 1], we have Pt = Wmt+Wft ≥ γWmt+α∗ftWft. Then the manager’s
portfolio holding in the risky asset is always at least 100% whether the economy falls in
the constrained or unconstrained region. If γ < 1, the manager has to borrow to clear the
market and the risk exposure allocation is always tilted towards the manager. If γ = 1
in the unconstrained equilibrium, the fund manager contributes all of her wealth Wmt
to the fund, which indicates that the manager and the investor share the aggregate risk
exposure in proportion to their wealth. In order to clear the market, asset prices has to
adjust to make the manager’s risk exposure optimal, which will be analysed later.
3.5.2.3 Risky Asset Volatility
Differentiating the risky asset expression (3.33) and matching the diffusion terms on both
sides, we can write the diffusion term for the risky asset price as 26





)γ[α∗mt(1 + βgt)− βgt]σRWmt. (3.36)
Since the risky asset return can be represented as dRt =
dPt+Dt
Pt
= (µP+Dt)dt+σP dZtPt =





Combining equations (3.36) and (3.37) as well as α∗mt = αemt in equilibrium, the risky











[ρf − (ρf − ρm) (1+βgt)(1+β) ] + γ(ρf − ρm)βgtωmt
.
(3.38)
26We assume the risky asset follows the dynamics as dPt = µP dt + σP dZt, where µP and σP are
endogenously determined in equilibrium.
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Therefore, the falling price-dividend ratio PtDt pushes up the risky asset volatility if
ρf − (ρf − ρm) (1+βgt)(1+β) > 0; the opposite is true if ρf − (ρf − ρm)
(1+βgt)
(1+β)
< 0. The falling
price is related to the fire-sale discount of the risky asset, and its effect depends on β and
gt. Recall that the manager has the additional incentive to take risk if the benchmark is
involved in the contract (See equation (3.25)). Without this benchmark, equation (3.36)
can be written as σP =
DtσD
ρf
+ (1 − ρmρf )γ[α∗mt(1 + βgt)]σRWmt. Then the risky asset





[ρf − (ρf − ρm) (1+βgt)(1+β) ]
.
(3.39)
Comparing equations (3.38) with (3.39), we find that the volatility will increase in both
regions without the benchmark involved in the contract.
3.5.2.4 Sharpe Ratio and Risk Premium
Since the fund manager is the only direct investor in the risky asset, asset prices have to
adjust to ensure the the manager’s portfolio holding to equal the market-clearing amount
of risk exposure, i.e., α∗mt = αemt. Given the manager’s optimal strategy in (3.25), the
equilibrium portfolio in (3.35), and the risky asset volatility in (3.38), the Sharpe ratio
can be derived as follows
θt = γσR[α
e











[ρf − (ρf − ρm) (1+βgt)(1+β) ] + γ(ρf − ρm)βgtωmt
.
(3.40)










[ PtDt [ρf − (ρf − ρm)
(1+βgt)
(1+β)
] + γ(ρf − ρm)βgtωmt]2
. (3.41)

























and both of these two equilibrium parameters increase. This is intuitive: when a manager
is rewarded relative to a benchmark, she would like to take more risk to beat the market
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whether the state is good or not. Given the manager’s additional incentive to take risk,
the risk premium does not need to be as high as that in the case without the benchmark
to induce the manager to clear the market.
3.5.2.5 Interest Rate
To determine the interest rate, we substitute the agents’ optimal consumptions into the
good market clearing condition (3.29), apply Ito’s Lemma to both sides, and recover the
equilibrium parameters in terms of the state variable ωmt by matching the drift terms.







+ µD − α∗mtpit[γ
cmt
Dt
(1 + βgt) +
cft
Dt







= ρf − ρm(ρf − ρm)ωmt + µD − α∗mtpit[γρm(1 + βgt)ωmt + (1− ρmωmt)α∗ft(1− gt)]
− gtpit[(1− ρmωmt)α∗ft − γρmωmt],
(3.43)
where α∗ft = β
∗ γWmt
Wft
in equilibrium. In the second line of the above equation, the first
two terms represent the aggregate subjective time preference weighted by the manager’s
dividend scaled wealth, the third term is the aggregate consumption growth equivalent to
the dividend growth, and the fourth term corresponds to the endogenous risk affected by
the agency friction in the economy. The final term is the adjustment due to the benchmark
involved in the contract. As ωmt rises, the aggregate time preference represented by the
first two terms decreases. The precautionary motive represented by the fourth term rises
with increasing αmt and pit. Without the benchmark, the interest rate rises in both
regions, and is represented as
rNBt = ρf−ρm(ρf−ρm)ωmt+µD−α∗mtpit[γρm(1+βgt)ωmt+(1−ρmωmt)α∗ft(1−gt)]. (3.44)
3.5.3 Analysis of Equilibrium
Since all the equilibrium parameters are based on the compensation fee, we need find
the optimal performance fee gt to equilibrate the supply and demand of delegation, i.e.,
TSft = T
D
ft . This is a non-linear function of gt. Therefore, we would adopt the numerical
solutions to illustrate all equilibrium parameters.27
Table 3.1 provides the parameter choices we use in this paper. Following He and
Krishnamurthy (2012b), we use the aggregate stock market to reflect the risky asset in our
model, and set µD = 1.84% and σD = 12%; we also set ρm = 0.01 and ρf = ρa = 0.0167 to
match a riskless interest rate around 1% in the equity unconstrained region. The fraction
of the diverted cash flows that could be received by the manager φ parameterizes the
incentive constraint in our model. Given the fund manager’s sharing rule βt ≥ φ−gt1−gt , the
27See numerical methods in Appendix.B.2.
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Table 3.1: Standard Parameters (Chapter 3)
Dividend growth µD 0.0184
Dividend volatility σD 0.12
Time discount rate of fund managers ρm 0.01
Time discount rate of investors ρf = ρa 0.0167
Fund manager’s wealth diversion rate φ 0.2
Fund manager’s fraction of wealth contributed to the fund γ 0.5
Fund manager’s dividend scaled wealth ωmt [0,100]
The wealth distribution between two retail investors λt [0,1]
equilibrium performance fee gt is restricted to gt ∈ [0, φ]. Since a hedge fund typically
pays the manager 20% of the fund’s return in excess of benchmark, we set φ = 0.2,
which produces the fund manager’s inside stake between 0 and 20%. Without available
information, we arbitrarily assume that the fraction of wealth contributed to the fund by
the manager is γ = 0.5. Finally, the two state variables, the fund manager’s dividend-
scaled wealth and the wealth distribution among retail investors, are set within [0, 100]
and [0, 1], respectively.28
3.5.3.1 The Case with the Relative Performance Fee
The results for the case with the relative performance fee can be summarized as the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. If there exists an equilibrium in the economy with one fund investor
and one fund manager being paid a relative performance fee, the equilibrium price-dividend
ratio, risky asset volatility, risk premium and interest rate are given in terms of the fund
























[ PtDt [ρf − (ρf − ρm)
(1+βgt)
(1+β)
] + γ(ρf − ρm)βgtωmt]2
,
rt = ρf + µD − ρm(ρf − ρm)ωmt − α∗mtpit[γρm(1 + βgt)ωmt + (1− ρmωmt)α∗ft(1− gt)]
− gtpit[(1− ρmωmt)α∗ft − γρmωmt],
28Since the fund manager’s consumption share xt ∈ [0, 1], the dividend scaled wealth can be easily
derived from xt = ρmωmt.
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Figure 3.1 presents the equilibrium parameters PtDt ,gt,αmt,αftagainst the fund manager’s
dividend scaled wealth ωmt. The constrained/unconstrained region is on the left/right
of the critical level ωc. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1.





1 + (ρf − ρm)ωmt
γρf (1 + β)ωmt
,










Figure 3.1 and 3.2 represent the equilibrium parameters with the relative performance
fee. Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 shows that the price-dividend ratio is increasing in ωmt. As
ωmt = 0, the price-dividend ratio is around 60, which captures the liquidation value of
the asset. As suggested in He and Krishnamurthy (2012b), this ratio is in line with
the 40% loss of the LTCM’s assets in 1998. Our numerical solutions suggest that the
critical level for the capital constraint is ωmt = 18. When the price-dividend ratio falls to
approximately 70, the capital constraint starts to bind.
As shown in Panel (b) of Figure 3.1, the equilibrium performance fee is nonlinear
against ωmt. In the capital unconstrained region, the equilibrium performance fee is
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always fixed at the upper boundary gt = φ = 20%, which is assumed to be necessarily
high to attract the investor’s total wealth Wft. In the capital constrained region, the
performance fee is zero as the constraint just binds, and increases as ωmt further declines.
The fund investor’s profit sharing rule in the capital constraint region is β = 1−φφ−gt , which
captures the maximum amount of capital that the investor can contribute to the fund given
per manager’s inside equity capital. As suggested by He and Krishnamurthy (2012b),
the inverse of 1−φφ−gt measures the severity of the agency friction. The agency friction is
tightened with lower ωmt as gt = 0, while an increasing performance fee leads to a higher
β, thus alleviating the agency friction even if ωmt continues declining.
Given the equilibrium performance fee, the investor’s portfolio holding αft is also
a nonlinear function of ωmt, as presented in panel (d) of Figure 3.1. When the capital
constraint is slack, the investor always contributes all of her wealth to the fund. When
the constraint starts binding, the tightened agency friction reduces the investor’s equity
contribution; as ωmt falls further, the increasing performance fee depresses the manager’s
inside stake required by the fund investor, and increases the flow from the investor to the
fund again. This situation corresponds to the impact of symmetric fee: the higher the
performance fee, the more penalty fee is paid by the manager to the investor if the fund
portfolio do not beat the benchmark. Thus, the investor is happy to increase the fraction
of wealth invested in the fund even if the manager’s inside stake is lower.
The manager’s portfolio choice for the fund αmt is plotted in panel (c) of Figure 3.1.
Given the fund’s total equity capital (1 + β)γWmt, the fund manager’s portfolio share is
always greater than 1, and is highest during the period of the most severe agency friction
(gt = 0 as the constraint just binds). In our model, institutional leverage varies with
the fund’s total risk bearing capacity, which is equal to the fund’s total equity capital.
With low equity capital, the fund manager has to increase leverage to clear the market,
since she is in charge of the investment decisions in the risky asset. In the constrained
region, the amount of total equity capital corresponds to the severity of agency frictions:
institutional leverage increases as the friction becomes severer and declines as the friction
is being further alleviated. In the capital unconstrained region, although the investor
contributes all of her wealth to the fund, the total equity capital in the fund is declining
with increasing ωmt, and thereby results in higher institutional leverage. This is because
the fund manager only invests a fraction of her wealth (i.e.γ ∈ [0, 1]) in the fund, and
the increasing ωmt indicates that more wealth of fund managers is restricted to the fund,
leading to lower fund equity capital γWmt +Wft.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 displays the pattern for the risk premium. The higher risk
premium is necessary to induce the fund manager with lower fund equity capital and
thus with lower risk-bearing capacity to buy the market-clearing amount of risk exposure.
As the agency friction binds, the amount of fund equity capital decreases first, and then
increases due to the increasing performance fee. Hence, as ωmt declines, the risk premium
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Parameters with the Symmetric Relative Performance Fee:
pit,θt,σR,rt
Figure 3.2 presents the equilibrium parameters pit,θt,σR,rt against the fund manager’s
dividend scaled wealth ωmt. The constrained/unconstrained region is on the left/right
of the critical level ωc. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1.
firstly increases significantly, and then becomes constant due to the combined effects of
lower Tmt = γWmt and higher Tft = αftWft. When the agency friction is slack, the risk
premium gradually increases to induce the manager to clear the market as ωmt rises (ωft
decreases). This pattern also prevails for the Sharpe ratio in panel (b) of Figure 3.2.
The risky asset volatility has a slightly different pattern as illustrated in panel (c) of
Figure 3.2: it is highest and constant as the manager has low wealth; it is depressed as ωt
increases, and becomes lowest as the size of the manager’s wealth is close to that of the
investor’s. The price-dividend ratio plays an essential role of determining the U-Shaped
pattern for the volatility in the capital unconstrained region. As discussed before, the
risky asset volatility can be pushed up by the falling PtDt if ρf − (ρf −ρm)
(1+βgt)
(1+β)
> 0 or by
the increasing PtDt if ρf − (ρf − ρm)
(1+βgt)
(1+β)
< 0. Intuitively, the volatility rises either when
the investor is induced to indirectly clear the risky asset market in the capital constraint
region or when the manager is induced to directly clear the market. Therefore, the risk
asset volatility is lowest when the risk exposure is relatively equally shared by the two
investors when the size of two agents is close.29
29We note that the magnitudes of both volatility and interest rate are fairly small, which is consistent
with Basak and Pavlova (2013a) who explain this is probably because we employ logarithmic preferences.
With a higher level of risk aversion, we might have higher magnitudes.
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Finally, we find that the interest rate in panel (d) of Figure 3.2 is also a non-linear
function of ωmt. As the capital constraint starts binding, the interest rate is decreasing
with a falling ωmt due to the two effects. Firstly, the fund manager bears disproportion-
ately higher risk, and thus the volatility of the manager’s consumption growth rises, which
induces the precautionary saving motives to increase the demand for the bond. Secondly,
the fund investor withdraws the equity from the fund into the bond market as the agency
friction binds further. (He and Krishnamurthy (2012b)) However, as the manager’s wealth
decreases further, the rising performance fee alleviates the agency friction, and then the
interest rate starts rising again. In the capital unconstrained region, the interest rate
declines in ωmt, reflecting the dominating effect of the precautionary saving motives due
to an increasing risk premium.
Without Benchmark Considerations: Now we consider the case in which the
manager is paid an absolute performance fee. Figure 3.3 shows the equilibrium parameters
for the case in which there is no benchmark involved in the compensation fee. The price-
dividend ratio in panel (a) of Figure 3.3(a) does not change as the consumption ratio is
not affected by the benchmark. However, without the benchmark, the fund manager’s
portfolio holding decreases by βgt
1+βgt
. The numerical solutions suggest that the critical
level increases to ωmt = 22, implying that the capital constraint region enlarges by a little
extent.
Given panel (b) of Figure 3.3(a), we find that the pattern for performance fee is
different from the case with a relative performance fee in the capital constrained region.
As ωmt falls, it quickly declines to zero except a slight increase at around the level of
14. Thus the severity of agency frictions is higher with the decreasing performance fee in
general, except a trial to reduce the friction at ωmt = 14. The plausible explanation is
that the performance fee rate is determined by a trade-off between two concerns: one is
that the increasing performance fee can reduce the financial friction; the other is that the
higher performance fee leads to a higher penalty. Specifically, without the benchmark, the
fund manager will pay penalty as long as the fund loses in the state of adversity. With the
same performance fee rate, the amount of paid penalty is higher when the fee is based on
the fund’s absolute performance instead of relative performance fee; and thus the lower
performance fee rate results in a lower penalty. In this case, the later concern dominates
in most of states in the capital constrained region.
As discussed before, Figure 3.3(b) illustrates that the risk premium (Sharpe Ratio)
and volatility are higher, and the interest rate is lower in general, as compared to the case
with benchmark. The patterns in the unconstrained region are quite similar in both of
cases. However, we find that the exclusion of the benchmark induces the risk premium and
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(a) Pt
Dt
, gt, αmt, αft
(b) pit, θt, σR, rt




Figure 3.3 presents the equilibrium parameters against the fund manager’s dividend
scaled wealth ωmt. The constrained/unconstrained region is on the left/right of the
critical level ωc. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1. The solid line represents the case
with an absolute performance fee and the dotted line represents the case with a relative
performance fee.
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volatility to be disproportionately higher and the interest rate to be disproportionately
lower as ωmt falls in the capital constraint region.
30
3.5.3.2 The Case with the Risk Exposure Fee: Comparison to the Results in
HK
As a comparison, we replicate He and Krishnamurthy (2012b)’s results in a diversion
model with the observability of the manager’s portfolio choice. He and Krishnamurthy
(2012b) provide a hidden effort model in which the fund manager makes an unobserved
due-diligence decision (i.e., st = {0, 1}) of ‘working’ (i.e., st = 0) or ‘shirking’ (i.e., st = 1).
The manager could get a private pecuniary benefit of Btdt if choosing ‘shirk’, but would
suffer a fall of Xtdt in the intermediary return, where Xt > Bt > 0. In order to induce the
manager to ‘work’, they assume that the manager’s wealth contribution to the fund must
satisfy βt ≥ BtXt . This is analogous to our incentive compatibility in (3.12) when gt = 0
(i.e., βt ≥ φ). The following proposition summarizes the results for the diversion model
with a risky exposure fee.
Proposition 3.6. If there exists an equilibrium in the economy with one fund investor
and one fund manager being paid a risk exposure fee, the manager’s and investor’s optimal




















And the equilibrium risk exposure price, risky asset volatility, risk premium and in-







1 + (ρf − ρm)ωmt )
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(ρm + βρf )2
)(
1
1 + (ρf − ρm)ωmt )− ktβ,
rt = ρf + µD − ρm(ρf − ρm)ωmt − α∗mtpit[γρmωmt + (1− ρmωmt)α∗ft]
− ktα∗mt[γβρmωmt − (1− ρmωmt)α∗ft],
(3.45)
30As ωmt falls in constrained region, the fund investor’s portfolio share in the fund first keeps at 1 and
then varies with performance fee. This is because αft is also affected by αmt and investment opportunities.
Given the fund investor’s equity contribution, the equity capital in the fund slightly increases first due
to the increasing size of fund investors and then dramatically declines due to the more severe agency
friction. Therefore, the manger first slightly decreases the leverage and then increases the leverage to buy
the clearing-amount of risk exposure.
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Given the same standard parameters in Table 3.1, Figure 3.4 plots the equilibrium
parameters for the model with the risk exposure fee. The price dividend ratio in panel (a)
of Figure 3.4(a) is not affected by the compensation fee. However, the numerical solutions
suggest that the critical level is just above 24 and thus the capital constrained region
enlarges compared with the case with relative performance fee. Panel (b) of Figure 3.4(a)
shows that the intermediation fee is zero in the capital unconstrained region as the risk
exposure supply is larger than the demand; the intermediation fee is increasing to clear
the intermediation market as ωmt falls. The risk exposure fee ranges between 0 and 0.04,
which leads to an average of 0.02. This is similar to the management fee in practice.
Panel (c) and (d) of Figure 3.4(a) give the portfolio choices of agents. In the capital
unconstrained region, the agents’ optimal portfolio shares are almost the same as those
in the model with a relative performance fee. In the capital constrained region, the fund
investor’s wealth contribution to the fund always decreases in this case due to the man-
ager’s constant minimum inside stake β = 1−φφ . Hence the investor’s optimal delegation
level is only affected by the manager’s inside equity capital γWmt, implying that the lower
manager’s wealth results in the severer agency problem. With the severer friction on rais-
ing the equity capital, the manager has to borrow more to buy the clearing amount of
risk exposure. This suggests that the fund manager always increases leverage as ωmt falls.
This is different from the case with the relative performance fee where the increasing fee
can decrease institutional leverage.
Therefore, as shown in panel (a)/(b) of Figure 3.4(b), the risk premium/Sharpe ratio
must be higher to induce the manager who has lower wealth, and thus the lower risk
capacity to buy risk exposure in the capital constrained region, in comparison with the
case with a relative performance fee. This corresponds to the higher risk asset volatility
and the lower interest rate, illustrated in panel (c) and (d) of Figure 3.4(b). In the
capital unconstrained region, the risk premium and the volatility are slightly lower and
the interest rate is slightly higher in this case due to the fact that the investor does not
pay an intermediation fee.
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(a) Pt
Dt
, gt, αmt, αft
(b) pit, θt, σR, rt




Figure 3.4 presents the equilibrium parameters against the fund manager’s dividend
scaled wealth ωmt. The constrained/unconstrained region is on the left/right of the
critical level ωc. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1. The solid line represents the
case with a risk exposure fee and the dotted line represents the case with a relative
performance fee.
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The results in this diversion model are almost identical to those in the hidden effort
model in He and Krishnamurthy (2012b).31 Both models can explain the observed rise
in risk premia and volatilities as well as the fall in interest rates that accompany periods
of financial crises. These stylized facts result from those financial frictions that arise
due to agency problems between managers and investors. Low managerial wealth induces
financial frictions to be binding, which attracts low delegated capital, and thereby leads to
low intermediary risk-bearing capacities. This wealth effect is also emphasized by Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) and Xiong (2001): specialized investors’ risk-taking capacities erode
as their capital declines due to unfavorable shocks, which destabilizes asset prices.
Comparing the solid line that represents the risk exposure price model and the dot-
ted line that represents the relative performance fee model, we find that the inclusion of
relative performance fee reduces managerial risk-taking, loosening the capital constraint.
Thus asset prices become less sensitive to adverse shocks, reducing risk premia and volatil-
ities. However, in the case with the absolute performance fee, the equilibrium parameters
behave similar to those in the case with the risk exposure fee. Moreover, the agency
friction is exacerbated in the case with the absolute performance fee. (See the comparison
of three cases in Figure C.3 of Appendix.C) In a nutshell, the manager’s concern to beat
the benchmark plays an essential role in increasing financial stability.
This finding contributes to the literature on the role of benchmark considerations
on asset prices. By adopting a simple one-period model, Brennan (1993) and Kapur
and Timmermann (2005) suggest that relative performance evaluation can lower risk
premium, while both of them rule out the wealth effect, and are not able to to analyse
other equilibrium parameters such as volatilities and interest rates. Basak and Pavlova
(2013a) and Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) construct the multi-period model but still assume
that the interest rate is exogenously given. Basak and Pavlova (2013a) take a reduced-
form approach to indirectly model the relative performance contract, and find that the
increased size of institutions relative to retail investors can depress Sharpe ratios but
push up volatilities. This is different from our result that equilibrium parameters are
nonlinear functions of managerial capital. Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) explicitly model
the compensation contract and find the similar results to Basak and Pavlova (2013a).
However, in their model, the contract parameters are exogenously given instead of being
endogenously determined in equilibrium.
31He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) assume that γ = 1. Given the standard parameters, the equilibrium
risk exposure fee in our model become negative in some states of low intermediary capital and we set these
negative values to be zero. This leads to a kink in the capital constrained region, while this does not affect
the key implications of asset pricing.
Chapter 3. Financial Fragility and Incentives 101
3.6 General Equilibrium with Three Agents
In this subsection, we introduce active investors to the economy, and examine how asset
prices change with the share of delegated capital. Since there are three agents in this
economy, we characterize the equilibrium by using the fund manager’s consumption share
xt










3.6.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
In order to easily characterize the equilibrium parameters, we derive the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. The agent’s wealth can be represented in terms of the state variables xt ∈ [0, 1]














and thus the fund investor’s equilibrium fund contribution α∗ft can be represented as
α∗ft = β
∗ ρf + λρa
ρm
xt
1− xt , (3.49)




3.6.1.1 Sharpe Ratio and Interest Rate
To determine the Sharpe Ratio and the interest rate, we substitute the optimal consump-
tions into the good market clearing conditions, apply Ito’s Lemma to both sides, and
recover the equilibrium parameters in terms of the state variable xt and λt by matching
the drift and volatility terms.34 The following proposition summarizes our results.
32The manager’s consumption share is equivalent to the manager’s dividend scaled wealth, since the
manager’s consumption is proportional to her wealth, i.e., xt = ρmωmt. We use xt instead of ωmt for easy
notations in this more complicated model.
33xt and λt follows the dynamics dxt = µxdt+ σxdZt and dλt = µλdt+ σλdZt, respectively. Given the
specific expression for the agents’ portfolio policy, we don’t need solve the drift and volatility terms for
these two dynamics in our paper.
34This approach is similar to Basak and Croitoru (2000), Basak (2005), He and Krishnamurthy (2013)
and Chabakauri (2010).
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Proposition 3.7. If there exists an equilibrium, the Sharpe ratio and the interest rate













rt = ρ+ µD − θtσD, (3.51)
where λ = 1−λtλt is the fund investor’s wealth relative to the active investor’s; β =
1−βt
βt
is the fund investor’s equity contribution relative to the fund manager’s; and ρ is the
aggregate subjective time preference, which is defined as






Equation (3.50) can be represented in terms of the agents’ consumption share
θt =
















which decomposes the Sharpe ratio into three terms: the first term σD is the exogenous







gt captures the effect of the perfor-










represents the adjusted aggregate







. This is because, different from fund managers and active investors who can
freely enter the market, the fund investor’s participation is affected by the agency friction
that relies on the performance fee.














∈ (0, 1). This implies that the second term and third term
have the opposite effects on the Sharpe ratio: the existence of the second term reduces
the Sharpe ratio, while that of the third term amplifies the Sharpe ratio. Without the





gt, and is smaller than the original term,
leading to a higher Sharpe ratio. This confirms the effect of benchmark in the two-agent
economy.
The interest rate given in (3.51) is similar to the one in a standard Lucas Tree Econ-
omy with homogenous investors: the first term is the weighted subjective time preference,
the second term and the third term correspond to the aggregate consumption growth and
the risk of the aggregate consumption adjusted by the manager’s financial friction, respec-
tively. Since the consumption growth is constant, the interest rate varies with the first
term and the third term. If we assume that ρm > ρa = ρf , the weighted time preference
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increases as xt falls. However, in the face of the risky future consumption, the third term
rises due to a precautionary motive. Hence the interest rate must decline to counteract
this tendency to clear the markets. The riskier future consumption always corresponds to
lower intermediary wealth, implying that the increasing third term depress the interest
rate as xt falls. Therefore, the interest rate is determined by the interplay of these two
effects.
3.6.1.2 Price-dividend Ratio and Volatility
In this economy, the market value of the risky asset is equal to the aggregate wealth of
three agents, i.e.,
Pt = Wmt +Wft +Wat. (3.54)
With Lemma 3 in hand, we can solve the equilibrium price of the risk asset with easy




market clearing condition can be rewritten as
α∗mtγWmt(1 + β) + α
∗
atWat = Pt. (3.55)
Substitute the optimal portfolio choices of the fund manager and the active investor
and the price-dividend ratio into the above two equations, we can have the following
expressions for the price-dividend ratio and the volatility.
Proposition 3.8. The equilibrium price-dividend ratio and the risky asset volatility are













































the fund investor’s equity contribution relative to the fund manager’s.
We assume throughout the paper that ρf , ρa ≥ ρm, and hence the slope of the price
dividend ratio is always non-negative, i.e., 1ρm − 1+λρf+λρa ≥ 0. This implies that the price-
dividend ratio is also linearly increasing with the size of the fund manager (represented by
xt). Additionally, the slope and liquidation value of the asset (i.e.,
1+λ
ρf+λρa
) is also affected
by the fraction of fund investors in retail investors (i.e., λt). If ρf > ρa, the increasing λt
will depress the liquidation value and increase the slope; if ρf > ρa, the opposite is true.
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Equation (3.57) implies that the volatility can be represented in terms of the agents’
consumption shares:
σR = σD[




























This suggests that the volatility increases as the price-dividend ratio falls. The declining
risk asset price is related to the decreasing fraction of the fund managers in the econ-
omy (i.e., xt), which is consistent with the fire-sale discount of the risky asset and the
disintermediation during the crises. Since the volatility is also affected by the equilib-
rium performance fee, we will describe its pattern via the numerical solutions in the later
subsection. Without the benchmark, the second term in the square bracket in equation
(3.57) disappears, which pushes up the risky asset volatility. This is consistent with the
result for volatility in the two-agent economy.
3.6.2 Analysis of Equilibrium
Next we provide the numerical solutions for the economy in which there are three agents.
Additionally, we also consider the case in which the fund investor is not allowed to delegate
their wealth to others, and thus is strictly restricted to the risky asset market.
3.6.2.1 Delegation
By using the same method adopted in the two-agent economy, we solve for the equilibrium
performance fee gt, and illustrate the results in Figure 3.5. We find that, for each λt, the
pattern of the equilibrium relative performance fee in the two agent economy also prevails
for the fee in the three-agent economy. As λt increases, the capital constrained region
enlarges. This is intuitive: if fund investors occupy a higher fraction of wealth relative
to active investors, the more fund will be limited to the risky asset market as the capital
constraint binds. Additionally, in the capital constrained region, the positive performance
fee rises with the increasing λt for each fixed ωmt. This indicates that a higher performance
fee is required to alleviate the agency friction as λt increases.
Figure 3.6 represents the agents’ portfolio choices and risk premium. Firstly, we fix
λt, and find that the patterns of portfolio choices for the fund manager and the fund
investor are also similar to those in the two-agent model for each λt, as shown in panel
(a) and (b) in Figure 3.6 respectively. Comparing panel (a) and (c) of Figure 3.6, we find
that the manager is always more risk-taking than the active investor due to the manager’s
incentive to beat the benchmark. Since the active investor is also the direct investor in the
risky asset market, she contributes all of her wealth to clear the market when the size of
fund managers is small. Additionally, the active investor’s portfolio choice has a pattern
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium Relative Performance Fee in the Three-agent Model: gt
Figure 3.5 plots the equilibrium performance fee gt against the fund manager’s dividend
scaled wealth ωmt and the fund investor’s wealth relative to the aggregate wealth of
retail investors λt. Here the size of fund manager is represented by ωmt rather than by
xt for easy comparisons between the two-agent model and the three-agent model. The
parameters are seen in Table 3.1.
which is very similar to that of the risk premium in panel (d) as the active investor’s
portfolio strategy purely depends on the market conditions.
Then, we fix ωmt and Figure 3.6 (combined with Figure C.4 from a different angle
in Appendix C.2) shows that the effects of λt on the agents’ portfolio shares and risk
premium are varying with the value of ωmt. When the financial friction is slack with
relatively high ωmt, the fund investor always contributes all of her wealth to the fund but
the fund manager’s choice declines with an increasing λt. The larger size of fund investors
λt induces the fund to have higher outside equity capital, and thus the fund manager
can decrease her leverage to clear the market. When the financial friction starts binding
and gt = 0, the increasing λt depresses the fund investor’s portfolio choice; when the
financial friction is being alleviated with a positive performance fee gt > 0, the increasing
λt pushes up the the fund investor’s portfolio choice. This indicates that the effect of λt
is positively related to the severity of financial frictions in the constrained region.35 The
opposite is true for the fund manager’s investment decision. Therefore, when the economy
falls in the unconstrained region or when the financial friction is being alleviated by the
increasing performance fee, the more capital flows into the fund, and thus institutional
leverage declines as λt increases. However, when the financial friction binds and gt = 0,
the increasing λt will make more capital from the fund investor being restricted to the
35When gt = 0 in the capital constrained region, the higher λt, the more fund will be restricted to the
risky asset market, implying a more severe financial friction.
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium Parameters in the Three-agent Model:
αmt,αft,αat,pit
Figure 3.6 plots the portfolio choice of agents, αm,f,a and risk premium pit against the
fund manager’s dividend scaled wealth ωmt and the fund investor’s wealth relative to
the aggregate wealth of retail investors λt. Here the size of fund manager is represented
by ωmt rather than by xt for easy comparisons between the two-agent model and the
three-agent model. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1.
fund, and thus institutional leverage has to rise. Panel (d) shows that, the risk premium
increases with the increased λt, and the region for constant risk premium is enlarged in
the constrained region; the risk premium is depressed in the unconstrained region. This
is also true for the portfolio choice of active investors in panel (c).
Figure 3.7 provides the remaining equilibrium parameters. Since ρf = ρa, the price-
dividend ratio in panel (a) is not affected by the varying λt. The pattern for risk premium
also prevails for the Sharpe ratio in panel (c). Panel (b) and (d) show that show that
the increased λt pushes up the market volatility and depresses the interest rate when the
financial friction binds; and the opposite is true when the friction slacks. The reason
is that when the financial friction binds, the market becomes less liquid as more money
of fund investors is restricted to the fund; when the financial friction is slack, the fund
investor contributes all of her wealth to the fund, and thus the market is more liquid.
Additionally, we find that the effect of precautionary motives always dominates over the
effect of aggregate time preferences. Thus the interest rate is always negatively related to
the Sharpe ratio.
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Figure 3.7 plots the price dividend ratio PtDt , volatility σR, Sharpe ratio θt and interest rate
rt against the fund manager’s dividend scaled wealth ωmt and the fund investor’s wealth
relative to the aggregate wealth of retail investors λt. Here the size of fund manager is
represented by ωmt rather than by xt for easy comparisons between the two-agent model
and the three-agent model. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1.
It is worth noting that λt is analogous to the size of available delegated capital.
36
Given the above analysis, the effect of the increased share of available delegated capital
depends on the severity of financial frictions. Kaniel and Kondor (2013) also investigate
the impact of the increased size of delegated capital on the Sharpe ratio. They assume
that the decision to delegate or not is endogenously determined, and flow-performance
incentive functions are exogenously given. In our model, although the size of available
delegated decision is exogenously given, the flow of capital is determined by financial
frictions in our model. Their results show that there exists an inverse U-shaped relation
between the Sharpe ratio and the size of delegated capital, which is different from our
results. We find that the binding friction corresponds to a positive relation between
Sharpe ratio and the share of available delegated capital, while the alleviated or even
slack financial friction corresponds to a negative relation . Moreover, the Sharpe ratio is
capped if the performance increases to alleviate the friction further as ωmt falls.
36In the capital unconstrained region, λt is equal to the size of delegated capital as the fund investor
contributes all of her wealth to the fund.
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3.6.2.2 No delegation
Now we consider an extreme case in which the fund investor is not allowed to delegate
capital, and can only invest in the riskless asset. Without outside equity and compensation





. In addition, the difference
between fund managers and active investors falls in the subjective time preference and the
manager’s wealth contribution represented by γ. The following proposition summarizes
the equilibrium parameters for the case without delegation.
Proposition 3.9. If there exists an equilibrium in the economy in which delegation is not












Then the equilibrium price-dividend ratio, risky asset volatility, risk premium and interest














































In this case, the risk exposure is only shared between fund managers and active











This suggests the fund investor’s delegation restriction will raise the Sharpe ratio/risk
premium and the volatility, but depress the interest rate, as illustrated in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8 presents the results for the case of no delegation and the results for the
case of delegation is also given as comparison. For the purpose of comparison, we provide
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Figure 3.8: Equilibrium Parameters for the Case of No Delegation
in the Three-agent Economy: PtDt ,pit,σR,rt
Figure 3.8 plots the price dividend ratio PtDt , risk premium pit, volatility σR, and interest
rate rt against the fund manager’s dividend scaled wealth ωmt as λt = 0.5. Here the size
of fund manager is represented by ωmt rather than by xt for easy comparisons between
the two-agent model and the three-agent model. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1.
The solid line represents the case of no delegation and the dotted line represents the case
of delegation.
the results by fixing λt = 0.5. (See Figure C.6 for the complete results.) The price-
dividend ratio is identical for both cases as shown in panel (a). The risky asset market
becomes less liquid without the fund investor’s money, and thus the risk premium must
be higher in general to induce these two investors to clear the market, as illustrated in
panel (b). The lower risk premium in the case of delegation as compared to the case
of no delegation is consistent with Kapur and Timmermann (2005): delegation induces
managers to have greater willingness to hold risky assets and thus lower the risk premium,
which is supported by empirical evidence of declined risk premium in recent years. (e.g.,
Welch (2000) and Claus and Thomas (2001)) Additionally, in the case of no delegation,
the lower the manager’s wealth in the economy, the higher the risk premium is required
to induce active investors to buy the clearing-amount of risk exposure.
In panel (c), the volatility displays an inverse U-shaped pattern. Since we assume
that ρm < ρa, the combined effect of a decreasing price-dividend and an increasing sharpe
ratio always leads to a higher volatility as ωmt falls, as suggested by Equation (3.61).
But, as ωmt approaches zeros, the economy is dominated by more patient active investors,
which pushes down the volatility. Therefore, we find that the volatility starts falling as
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ωmt is below around the level of 35. Finally, panel (d) shows that the interest rate is
always increasing in ωmt. This is because the manager’s precautionary motive plays a
more important role in determining the interest rate as the size of institutional investors
rises.
To further understand the underlying economic mechanisms operating in the model,
we also look at the agents’ portfolios in equilibrium in terms of the number of shares in














This can help us identify the nature of wealth effects in the economy: who buys the
most of the risky asset. In Figure 3.9(a), we find that the fund manager also holds a
higher fraction of the total asset under management in the risky asset than the active
investor in the case of no delegation. This is because the fund manager only invests a
fraction of her wealth in the fund and is less risk averse than the active investor. Since
the fund investor is restricted to the risky asset market, both of the fund manager and
the active investor level up to clear the market by borrowing from the fund investor in
equilibrium. We also see an decrease in the portfolio choices of the fund manager and
the active investor as the manager’s wealth size ωmt starts to increase. As the size of
fund managers becomes larger, the size of retail investors shrinks, and thus the lending
capacity of fund investors decreases. With less private wealth, the active investor becomes
more risk-averse and decreases the leverage. With more wealth that can be invested in
the fund, the fund manager is able to buy the clearing-amount of risk exposure by a lower
leverage.
In our model, all of agents have positive holdings of the risky asset, and thus the
positive shock to the dividend results in higher wealth for each agent. Figure 3.9(b) plots
the equilibrium portfolios in terms of the number of shares in the risky asset against the
fund manager’s dividend-scaled wealth. When delegation is not allowed, fund managers
buy more shares of the risky asset at a decreasing rate as they become wealthier. Since the
portfolio held by fund managers is overweighted in the risky asset relative to that of active
investors, the wealth distribution shifts in favor of fund managers. On the other hand, the
number of shares held by active investors decreases as fund manager become wealthier.
This effect is also highlighted by Xiong (2001) and Basak and Pavlova (2013a). Xiong
(2001) suggests that the demand of convergence traders for the risk exposure increases
in their wealth. Their risk-bearing capacity erodes when they suffer capital losses due to
an unfavorable shock. This induces traders to liquidate their positions, and the original
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(a) The fraction of wealth invested by the agents in the risky asset: αmt, αft
(b) The number of shares held by the agents: nm, nf ,na
Figure 3.9: The Agents’ Portfolio Holdings in the Three-agent Model
Figure 3.9 plots the agents’ portfolio holdings in the risky asset against the fund manager’s
dividend scaled wealth ωmt as λt = 0.5. Here the size of fund manager is represented
by ωmt rather than by xt for easy comparisons between the two-agent model and the
three-agent model. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1. The solid lines represent the
fund manager’s portfolio holding, the dashed lines represent the active investor’s, and
the dotted line represents the fund investor’s.
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shock is amplified. Basak and Pavlova (2013a) focus on the role of institutional investors
who have an incentive to outdo the benchmark. As institutions continues doing well, they
want to increase the riskiness of their portfolio by buying more shares of the risky asset.
When delegation is allowed, both of fund managers and active investors hold a smaller
share of the risky asset as the fund investor now can indirectly hold the risky asset. Given
λt = 0.5, the fund investor has the same wealth as the active investor, while the fund
investor holds more shares of the risky asset. This is because the fund investor’s portfolio
holding is determined by the fund manager who has the additional incentive to take
risk. Therefore, delegation allows the fund investor to share the risk exposure with other
investors and benefits the fund investor to be able to earn a higher return. Additionally,
the relative performance fee plays a role to smooth the aggregate market volatility and
depress the risk premium. This reduces the risk of holding the risky asset, which also
benefits fund managers and active investors.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined whether it is possible to increase financial stability by
changing the incentives of managers within institutions acting as financial intermediaries.
This is in contrast to undertaking ex-post policy interventions, which are essentially mop-
ping up operations that change neither incentives nor future behavior.
Our analysis is framed within a model of intermediary asset pricing based on He and
Krishnamurthy (2012b), where the agency problem between institutions and individual
investors leads to an incentive compatibility constraint. The constraint creates an en-
dogenous financial friction. Its severity rises as intermediary capital falls, driving up risk
premia, volatilities, and demands for precautionary savings. We show that introducing a
relative performance fee into the manager’s contract, stabilize asset prices by decreasing
the risk premium, the volatility and the demand for precautionary savings.
There are several interesting directions for further research. First, there is only one
single risky asset in our model, which suggests that we are unable to capture the risk
shifting incentives of fund managers receiving a relative performance fee. Specifically,
when the relative performance fee is involved in the management contract, the compen-
sation of portfolio managers is affected by the portfolio’s tracking error volatility which
can be adjusted by the composition of the portfolio (see Cuoco and Kaniel (2011)). In
the single risky asset model, the manager can only beat the benchmark by levering up.
Thus, we can introduce an additional risky asset to disentangle idiosyncratic risk from
systematic risk. A second avenue of research is to extend the model to include production
(see for example He and Krishnamurthy (2012a) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012))
to understand the effect of relative performance fees on the macroeconomy.
Chapter 4
Banks’ Leverage and Liquidity
The recent financial crises accompanied by liquidity dry-ups have called for a better un-
derstanding of financial intermediaries in the financial system. Although the past decades
have witnessed the growing role of market-based intermediaries in the supply of credit,
traditional banks still play an essential role of a buffer for their borrowers especially during
market downturns. Like market-based financial institutions, commercial banks actively
manage their balance sheets, while their balance sheet leverage rises rather than declining
during the most severe periods of crises. We provide evidence that commercial banks
provide liquidity in the face of deteriorating financial and economic conditions, and this
liquidity can be understood as the growth rates of commercial banks’ balance sheets.
Additionally, this liquidity and leverage can be utilized to predict the subsequent market
variations in a large group of traditional assets.
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4.1 Introduction
The recent financial crises, such as the 1998 hedge fund crisis and the 2007 supprime
mortgage crisis, have shown that the performance of asset markets depends on the health
of financial intermediaries. The credit losses borne by intermediaries, the erosion of their
equity capital, and their sharp deleveraging lead to the failure of financial markets. More-
over, during these crisis periods, re-intermediation is observed: funds flow from market-
based intermediaries, such as hedge funds, broker dealers, and shadow banks, into bank-
based intermediaries.1 These observations have given renewed impetus to find better
factors determining market liquidity and hence asset prices.
Recent theoretical work has highlighted the effect of financial intermediaries on asset
markets. For example, the leverage-constraint theories (e.g., Geanakoplos (2010), Gromb
and Vayanos (2010b), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012)) consistent with the fall in
leverage and capital levels of market-based intermediaries, which rely primarily on repo
financing for their borrowing needs, during crises; the equity risk-capital theories (e.g.,
Xiong (2001), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012), and He and Krishnamurthy (2013)) fit
the facts surrounding bank-based intermediaries that have had access to ample liquidity
throughout the crisis.2 However, little empirical research has been done, mostly because
of the difficulty in obtaining data. Cochrane (2011) argue that, in order to analyse
institutional finance empirically, one should tie the stochastic discount rate to central
items in the model, such as the balance sheet of leveraged intermediaries. In today’s
financial system where balance sheets are continuously marked to market, changes in
asset prices appear immediately on financial intermediaries’ balance sheets and their net
worth, which induces financial intermediaries to adjust the size of their balance sheets.
In this paper, we analyse the balance sheet fluctuations of commercial banks and the
market-wide consequences of such fluctuations. The balance sheet adjustments of market-
based intermediaries have been empirically investigated by Adrian and Shin (2009) and
Adrian and Shin (2010c). In particular, broker-dealers exhibit a pro-cyclical leverage: they
choose to increase their leverage during booms, while delevering their financial portfolios
during bust periods. Since broker-dealers’ importance in supplying credit has increased
in step with securitization, broker-dealers are regarded as a barometer of overall funding
1He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) document the evidence that, in 2008 crisis, the contraction in
repo market financing hits market-based intermediaries, while traditional financial intermediaries backed
by the government are able to raise cheaper financing from the retail despoisted market. Their evidence
mainly suggests that securitized assets, including mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed se-
curities, have shifted from the hedge fund and broker-dealer sector to the commercial banking sector. In
addition to the highly intermediated asset markets, investors also withdraw money directly or indirectly
from the traditional risky asset markets and seek banks as a safe heaven for their wealth.
2The leverage-constraint theories emphasize the amount of debt financing available to intermediaries
is subject to a maximum leverage ratio; the equity risk capital theories impose no limit on the amount of
debt financing, and link the amount of equity capital to the effective risk-aversion of the intermediary.
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conditions in a market-based financial system.3 However, less attention is paid to banks’
leverage. Though banks’ role of supplying credit has been increasingly supplanted by
market-based intermediaries, banks’ traditional activities such as deposits ensure them
to have a relatively stronger balance sheet during crises, resulting in an expansion of
liquidity and credit availability.4 Motivated by He and Krishnamurthy (2013), we de-
duce that commercial banks play a role in determining asset returns. Their theoretical
model assumes that a marginal investor is a financial intermediary who only faces equity
constraints. When equity constraints do not bind, this intermediary has relatively low
leverage and requires low risk premia; when equity constraints bind, the intermediary can
increase the leverage to clear the market and provide liquidity to the market. This implies
that commercial banks are marginal buyers and liquid providers in downturn markets; and
their balance sheet changes may have good predictive powers in asset markets.5
Our paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to document the connec-
tion between leverage and balance sheet size for commercial banks over time. Leverage is
defined as the the ratio of total assets to total equities, based on the traditional balance
sheet concept. We show that commercial banks actively manage their balance sheets (in-
dicated by a positive relation between changes in leverage and changes in total assets),6
and the margin of adjustment on the balance sheet is mainly through retail funding (i.e.,
deposits). We also find that commercial banks’ equity is sticky: banks’ equity is not
significantly related to total asset, which indicates that the asset size of banks fluctu-
ates mainly through changing the degree of leverage determined by market conditions.
Furthermore, motivated by the preliminary results that commercial banks’ leverage rises
rather than declining during the most severe periods of crises, but shows some persis-
tence during normal periods, we examine how banks’ balance sheets react to the varying
financial conditions. Our results suggest that banks’ leverage and total assets grow faster
during crisis periods than in normal times, and this accelerated growth also occurs in
3Adrian and Shin (2009) suggest that understanding the current nature of liquidity requires examining
the growing role of capital markets in the supply of credit, and the deleveraging of the market-based
intermediaries mainly funded from capital markets will be related to the contraction of credit to the
economy.
4Banks have become more dependent on short-term funding since 1990s. They are able to fund a
growing share of long-term assets with short-term liabilities in capital markets through Special Investment
Vehicles and conduits which are off the balance sheet, and also hold structured credit products on their
balance sheets. In the capital-related financial crises, banks sought to mainly deleverage their off-the-
balance sheet positions and the high degree of interconnection among banks transmitted the malfunctions
of banks to the rest of financial system and finally to to real economy. (Papanikolaou and Wolff (2010))
5Their calibration results match the stylized facts given by He, Khang and Krishnamurthy (2010) who
show that commercial banks with stable funding resources increase both leverage and asset holdings during
the 2008 crisis.
6Adrian and Shin (2010c) explain that ‘The net worth of financial intermediaries are especially sensitive
to fluctuations in asset prices given the highly leveraged nature of such intermediaries’ balance sheets. If
financial intermediaries are passive and did not adjust their balance sheets to changes in net worth, then
leverage would fall when total assets rise. Changes in leverage and change in balance sheet size would
then be negatively related. However, a strong positive relation between changes in leverage and changes
in balance sheet size suggests that financial intermediaries adjust their balance sheets actively, and do so
in such a way that leverage is high during booms and low during busts. That is, leverage is pro-cyclical.’
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banks’ particular assets and liabilities. Consistent with Adrian and Shin (2010c), these
findings suggest that financial market liquidity can be understood as the rate of growth of
aggregate balance sheets. This is because increased assets represent banks’ stronger risk
appetite and credit supply that are related to ‘liquidity’ used in common discourse about
financial market conditions. Hence our results indicate that banks play an important role
in providing liquidity during recessions. More interestingly, we find that banks’ balance
sheet size is more affected by the funding risk in financial markets than non-financial mar-
ket liquidity risks suggested in Gatev and Strahan (2006);7 and investors would regain
confidence in risky asset markets as soon as the funding risk declines.
Our second objective is to purse aggregate asset pricing consequences of the expansion
and contraction of banks’ balance sheets. In particular, we show that three commercial
banks’ weekly balance sheet variables, leverage, loans to commercial banks, and treasury
and agency securities, have robust incremental explanatory powers in predicting subse-
quent market variations in three groups of traditional assets: stocks, corporate bonds, and
treasury bonds, even when we control for a host of traditional return predictors and take
a short-sample test excluding the recent financial crisis period. Banks’ leverage growth
can be seen as a good proxy for the tightness of banks’ funding constraints as it is closely
related to banks’ debt funding changes. Banks’ leverage growth is positively associated
with the growth of banks’ total assets which is a proxy for the effective risk aversion of
commercial banks. The higher the leverage of commercial banks, the looser the banks’
funding constraints and the greater their risk appetite. The growth rate of loans to com-
mercial banks is a good proxy for liquidity. Since banks are subject to regulations such as
reserve requirements, they may face liquidity shortages at the end of the day. Interbank
loans are important for a well-functioning and efficient banking system, and the interbank
market allows banks to smooth through such temporary liquidity shortages and reduce
‘funding liquidity risk’. Low transaction volume in this market was a major contributing
factor to the financial crisis of 2007. Increased loans to commercial banks are associated
with higher loan demands from commercial banks, contributing to the expansion of banks’
balance sheets and therefore indicating lower liquidity risk.
Our empirical results suggest that (i) the increased banks’ leverage is followed by
lower stock excess returns, decreased NYSE market values and increased market volatil-
ities; (ii) increased excess returns on corporate bonds are predicted by increased trea-
sury and agency securities and decreased loans to commercial banks; and (iii) increased
treasury and agency securities are also associated with increased treasury bond excess re-
turns and decreased treasury constant maturity rates. The negative relationship between
7It worth noting that commercial banks’ ‘hidden’ leverage are much higher than traditional balance
sheet leverage due to the considerable size of the structured investment vehicles that banks had sponsored,
documented by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010). Because of the hard access to data,
we only focus on the balance sheet activities of banks in this paper.
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banking growth rates and excess returns on equity and bond indicates that a faster ex-
pansion/contraction of banks’ balance sheets predicts lower/higher equity and bond risk
premia in the next week. This is consistent with the quarterly results for broker dealers
from Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010a). It is also interesting to note that the sign of the
relations between the growth of treasury and agency securities and bond excess returns
are positive. This also confirms banks’ timing to expand balance sheets.
Our cumulative findings suggest that commercial banks provide liquidity in the face
of deteriorating financial conditions; and commercial banks’ balance sheets convey infor-
mation on the fluctuations of asset markets. Our empirical evidence contributes to the
literature on the role of intermediaries in asset pricing. Due to the limited available data
for the balance sheets of leveraged intermediaries, there are few empirical work on this
topic. Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010a) and Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2011) provide
empirical evidence that active balance sheet adjustments of market-based intermediaries,
including broker-dealers and shadow banks, contain strong predictive values in asset prices
in both time-series and cross-section dimensions. Chava, Park, and Gallmeyer (2010) anal-
yse the predictability of US stock returns using a measure of credit standard derived from
Banks’ loan report. However, all of these papers utilize quarterly data, which would run
the risk of missing interesting variations in asset returns. By using weekly data from
Federal Reserve’s Z.1 statistical release, we are able to find the predictive value of banks’
balance sheet information in higher frequency.
The outline of the remainder of our paper is as follows: Section 4.2 provides related
literature. Section 4.3 describes data and methods in details. Section 4.4 begins the anal-
ysis by examining the leverage evolution of bank-based and market-based intermediaries.
In section 4.5, we will explore the relation between banks’ leverage and liquidity and their
reactions to the fluctuations of financial conditions. Section 4.6 examines how banks affect
different asset markets by analyzing the dynamic relation between banks’ balance sheet
variables and market variables. Section 4.7 summarizes the main findings of the paper.
4.2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to a series of research by Adrian and Shin who focus on investigating
the risk appetite behavior of financial intermediaries. Adrian and Shin (2009) empha-
size market-based intermediaries heavily relying on repos, commercial papers and other
collateralize borrowings. They argue that if financial institutions hold illiquid assets fi-
nanced with short-term debt, they will easily face a liquidity crisis when the short-term
funding dries up. Due to the growing role of capital markets in supply of credits, short-
term liabilities are regarded as better indicators of credit conditions that influence the
economy. Hence, market-based intermediaries’ balance sheet dynamics imply a role for
monetary policy in ensuring financial stability. Adrian and Shin (2010b) reconsider the
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role of financial intermediaries in monetary economics. They conduct a simple equilibrium
model in which financial intermediaries are the main engine for determining the price of
risk in the economy. Also their empirical evidence documents that the balance sheets
of broker-dealers and shadow banks reflect the transmission of monetary policy through
capital market conditions, and that short-term interest rates are important for affecting
the size of these intermediaries’ balance sheets.
Adrian and Shin (2010c) suggest, in a financial system where balance sheets are con-
tinuously marked to market, the net worth of market-based intermediaries are sensitive
to fluctuations in asset prices given the highly procyclical leverage of such intermediaries.
Moreover, it is argued that aggregate liquidity can be seen as the rate of change of the
aggregate balance sheet of financial intermediaries. Adrian and Shin (2011) document
that the size of both bank-based and market-based intermediaries is determined by the
degree of leverage that is permitted by market conditions, and that equity is sticky over
the financial cycle. Additionally, they emphasize that, during credit booms, banks look
for non-deposit funding to finance its lending, and thus securitization create a way for
banks to create new funding. However, securitization served to concentrate credit risk in
the banking sector rather than dispersing credit risk. Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010b)
propose that the intermediaries’ risk appetite are determined by the tightness of interme-
diaries’ balance sheet constraints, and hence fluctuations in supply of credit are influenced
by intermediary balance sheet capacity. They conclude that monetary policy which has
the impact on the intermediary balance sheet behavior can affect the supply of credit,
risk premia and ultimately the real economy. Adrian and Shin (2013) conduct a stan-
dard contract the model to explain the procyclicality of the financial sector and indicates
that financial intermediaries’ leverage is determined by a Value-at-Risk contraint with a
constant probability of an intermediary’s failure.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on equilibrium asset pricing models
that emphasize frictions.8 There has been extensive theoretical models that always focus
on the problem of specialists or leveraged intermediaries. Specifically, risk premia are
measured by tieing the discount variation to central items in these model, such as the
balance sheets of leveraged intermediaries. There are two broad classes of literature on
this friction: equity constraints and margin constraints.
The papers on equity constraints include Xiong (2001), Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2012) and He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and etc. As summarized by He, Khang, and
Krishnamurthy (2010), Xiong (2001) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2009)’s models
mainly describe the sell side of investors, which can be applied to the market based
intermediaries such as hedge funds, shadow banks and broker-dealers. During crises when
the intermediary’s capital is low, the intermediary becomes more risk averse and thus
8Cochrane (2011) categorize the frictions into three parts: segmented markets, intermediated markets
and liquidity.
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sell assets to the ultimate investor, which leads to high risk premia. Differently, He and
Krishnamurthy (2012) examines the dynamics of risk premia in asset markets where the
marginal buyer is a representative levered financial intermediary. This model can be well
applied to the behavior of banks. When its equity is low, the intermediary substitutes
equity capital by rasing debt and causes its leverage to increase, which also results in
higher risk premia.
Literature on margin constraints studies constraints on arbitrageurs’ ability to level
up by raising debt. These paper focuse on the mechanics of collateral in the repo market
and conclude that liquidity can suddenly deteriorate if the collateral levels increase. Thus
the models in these papers apply to market-based intermediaries. Gromb and Vayanos
(2010b),Gromb and Vayanos (2010a) model the role of intermediary capital for financial
market liquidity and suggests that leverage constraints limit the arbitrageurs’ ability to
provide market liquidity. Another notable examples for leverage constraints is Brunner-
meier and Pedersen (2009). They provide a model for intermediaries mainly relying on
short-term financing and predict that their capital is the state variable affecting market
liquidity and thus risk premium. They show that the increasing tightness of traders’
funding will lower market liquidity and thus increase market volatility; meanwhile, low
future market liquidity will increase the margin set by financiers.
Despite the bulk of the theoretical literature, there are relatively few empirical works
on intermediary asset pricing since the data on those who are the deep pockets in the
intermediated markets are hard to find. (Cochrane (2011)) Some recent papers docu-
ment the evidence that the balance sheet information of financial intermediaries contains
the forecasting power on asset pricing. Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010a) point to the
important role of financial intermediaries in setting risk premia and tieing risk premia
to macroeconomic aggregates. They use a subset selection method to identify the best
predictors of risk premia from a set of variables that capture intermediary balance sheet
behaviors from the U.S. Flow of funds and find the two best variables, annual broker-
dealer leverage growth and quarterly shadow bank asset growth, to be able to predict
future equity, corporate bond and treasury returns well. Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2011)
argue that financial intermediaries’ marginal value of wealth should provide a more in-
formative stochastic discount factor than that of a traditional household and thus they
measure the stochastic discount factor of a representative intermediary by using shocks to
the aggregate leverage of broker-dealers. Their results show that the aggregate leverage
growth of broker-dealers as the single risk factor has a well or even better performance
than the traditional risk factors to explain the cross-section of size and momentum equity
portfolios and bond portfolios.
Some related papers also highlight the role of banks’ credit supply shock for as-
set markets. Gatev and Strahan (2006)provide evidence that banks, supported by the
government, experience funding inflows and thus have a unique ability to hedge against
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market-wide liquidity shocks during crises when non-financial commercial paper spreads
widen. Chava, Park, and Gallmeyer (2010) use a measure of credit standards, derived from
the Federal Reserve Board’s senior loan officer opinion survey on bank lending practices,
to examine the predictability of US stock returns. They find that a tightening credit
standard predicts lower future stock returns at horizons up to one year. He, Khang,
and Krishnamurthy (2010) also emphasize the role of banks in the 2007-2008 subprime
mortgage crisis. They find that securitized assets are shifted from the market-based inter-
mediaries relying on repo financing to banks which have the government guarantee. This
is because during the crisis, the contraction in repo and other short-term collateralized
financing hit the non-bank sector, which leads to the fire-sale; differently, supported by
the government, the banking sector gets more stable retail funding and thus is able to
absorb troubled assets.
More broadly, our paper is related to the predictability of asset returns. Fama and
French (1988a) argue that high dividend price ratios forecast higher subsequent stock and
bond returns and the predictability increases with the return horizon; additionally, Fama
and French (1988b) find that a string of good past returns forecasts bad future returns.
Lamont (1998) complements that the correlation of earnings with business conditions
provide them with the predictive power for returns and high earnings forecast low returns.
In addition to dividends and earnings, many other variables also forecast excess returns,
including the term spread, the default spread, the treasury bill rate, investment/capital
ratio and the consumption/wealth ratio and etc. Fama and French (1989) suggest that the
implied variation in expected returns is largely common across stocks and bonds, and is
negatively related to long- (default spread) and short-term (term spread and treasury bill
rate) variation in business conditions. In Cochrane (1991), the investment return and stock
returns are tested to be same and thus the investment/captial ratios which strongly links to
investment returns can forecast stock returns as well. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) study
the role of fluctuations in the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio for predicting both real
stock price and excess stock returns, and find that this variable is a better forecaster
of future returns at short and intermediate horizon than traditional popular forecasting
variables. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2006) find a single tent-shaped linear combination of
forwards rates can predict excess returns on one- to five- year maturity bonds with R2 up
to 0.44.
4.3 Data and Methods
4.3.1 Data
We use a broad range of data over the sample period of 1993-2012. Our first data set
comprises aggregate balance sheet data for various U.S. intermediaries, which are from
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the Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release (Data for Assets and Liabilities of Commercial
banks in the U.S.)9 and the Federal Reserve’s Z.1 Statistical Release (Financial Accounts
of the United States).10 The H.8 Statistical Release provides weekly and monthly data,
while the Z.1 Statistical Release only provides quarterly data.
The second data set comprises observations on financial and economic conditions
which can be downloaded from the FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.11 For the proxies of financial conditions, we download the Chicago Fed National
Financial Conditions Index (nfci) and its subindexes. The Chicago Fed National Financial
Conditions Index measures financial conditions in equity, debt, and money markets as well
as traditional and shadow banking systems. The subindexes include the leverage subindex
(fcilev) which is composed of debt and equity measures; the risk subindex (fcirsk) which
captures volatility and funding risk in the financial sector; and the credit subindexes (fci-
crd) which consists of measures of credit conditions. These data are weekly and measured
as of Friday. For the proxies of economic conditions, we adopt the variables including
fed fund effective rate (fed), the 3-month treasury bill/fed fund spread (tfsp), the term
spread (tmsp) (i.e.,the 10-year treasury/3-month treasury bill spread), the TED spread
(ted) (i.e.,the 3-month LIBOR/three-month Treasury bill spread) ,and the default spread
(cbsp) (i.e.,Moody’s Baa/Aaa spread). The data for these variables are daily available.
The third data set consists of a broad range of asset variables, which are catego-
rized into three groups. The first group is composed of stock market data, involving
equity indexes, total market values, and implied volatilities. The equity indexes include
the S&P500 composite index (sp), CRSP value-weighted index build on the NYSE stock
(crspvw), CRSP stock file capitalization decile indexes (cap1-10), and CRSP stock file risk-
based indexes (beta1-10).12 CRSP Stock File Capitalization Decile Indexes are calculated
for daily NYSE/AMEX stocks for each of the 10 Stock File Index market groups. The
largest market capitalization securities are placed in portfolio 10 and the smallest in port-
folio 1. CRSP Stock File Risk-Based Decile Indexes are created for daily NYSE/AMEX
stocks for two risk-based criteria, Scholes-Williams Beta and standard deviations. Portfo-
lio 1 contains the securities with the highest beta, and portfolio 10 contains the securities
with the lowest beta. The total market value data (sptv and crsptv) contains the total
market value for S&P500 Composite Index and the NYSE/AMEX stock market index.
Also included are the implied stock market volatilities, CBOE S&P500 Volatility Index
(vix) and CBOE S&P100 Volatility Index (vxo). These data are daily available, and




12CRSP stock file standard deviation based indexes are not reported in this paper since the results for
these data are almost identical to the results beta-based indexes
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The second group consists of corporate bond variables. We download Bank of Amer-
ica Merril Lynch total bond return index values available on FRED database. Corporate
Master Total Return Value index (cbig) and High Yield Master II index (cbhy) track
the performance of investment grade rated and below investment grate rated corporate
debt denominated in US dollars, respectively. There are rating-specific subindexes for
investment grade ‘Master’ index, involving Corp AAA/AA/A/BBB total value index
(cb3a/cb2a/cb1a/cb3b);13 there are also maturity-specific subindexes for the Master in-
dex, involving Corporate 1-3/3-5/5-7/7-10/10-15/15+ year total return (cb13/cb35/cb57/cb710/
cb1015/cbg15). All these data are originally daily.
The third group covers treasury bond variables, including daily holding period re-
turns for CRSP Treasury fixed-term indices and Federal Reserve Bank’s daily Treasury
constant maturity rates. The former set of data is from CRSP US treasury database, and
the latter set is from Federal Reserves’ H.15 Release (Selected Interest rates). Specifi-
cally, these rates are CRSP Treasury fixed-term indices built for 1/2/5/7/10/20/30 years
(tbret1/tbret2/tbret5/tbret7/tbret10/tbret20/tbret30) and 1/2/5/7/10/20/30 year con-
stant maturity rates (tcm1/tcm2/tcm5/tcm7/tcm10/tcm20/tcm30), respectively.
4.3.2 Empirical Methods
Our first objective is to examine the relation between banks’ leverage and balance sheet
size as well as how banks adjust their balance sheets over the financial and economic cycle.
Banks’ aggregate leverage, based on the traditional balance sheet concept, is computed
as the ratio of total assets to the book value of total equity capital.
Leveraget =
Total Assetst
Total Assetst − Total Liabilitiest . (4.1)
In this paper, leverage growth is calculated as the percent change of its level; all the other
banking growth rates are computed as the changes in balance sheet items, and each of
these changes is normalized by the beginning-of-period total assets.
To analyse the relation between leverage and balance sheet size, we run time series
regressions of weekly leverage growth on its own lagged level and on growth rates of main
balance sheet items, including total assets (ta), total loans (loan), and liquid assets (liq)
on the asset side as well as total equities (teq), deposits (dep), and borrowings (bor) on
the liability side. We estimate multivariate regressions of the form.
Leveraget = αi + βiLeveraget−1 + γ′iBankt + 
i
t, (4.2)
13High-yield bond ‘Master II’ indices for BB/B/CCC are only available from Dec 1996. Thus I do not
involve these data in my paper
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where αi is a constant and Bankt is a set of banking growth rates. Because of the feature
of volatile financial markets, we think it is important to use the high-frequency data for
banks’ balance sheets. The banking data with highest frequency are weekly data measured
as of Wednesday close, available from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release.
To examine how banks’ balance sheets vary with financial and economic conditions,
we estimate a series of vector autoregressions (VARs), each including two variables, one
reflecting banking growth rates and the other representing measures of financial and eco-
nomic conditions. Each VAR is estimated with one-month lag (fortnightly lags). A
bivariate VAR(n) is shown as
yt = φ0 +
n∑
i=1
φiyt−n + t, (4.3)
where φ0 is a vector of constant, φi is a 2×2 matrix, and t is the vector of innovations in
yt relative to its past history. In this case, we let n = 2 and report the Granger Causality
Wald test statistics (χ2) testing the null that all the coefficients are equal to zero.14
For each VAR, we also report a corresponding impulse response function to quantify the
impact of a standard deviation innovation in the financial or economic condition on the
banks’ balance sheet growth. Gatev and Strahan (2006) have adopted this approach to
examine the impact of paper-bill spread on banking system growth rates.
We adopt various variables to proxy the fluctuations in financial and economic con-
ditions. Firstly, we use Chicago Fed National Financial Condition index to proxy the
overall U.S. financial conditions. We also include its subindex, Leverage, Credit and
Risk subindex to capture fluctuations of debt and equity market, credit conditions, and
volatility and funding risk in the financial sector, respectively. Theses indexes are each
constructed to have an average value of zero and a standard deviation of one over a sample
period extending back to 1973. In order to make it compatible with the banking growth
rates shown in percent changes, we divide the change of these financial condition indices
by 100, which will not affect the VAR results. Positive values of these indexes suggest
that the corresponding financial condition is tighter than on average, while negative val-
ues indicate the opposite. Thus the increased change of index values suggest that the
financial condition becomes worse and vice versa.
Secondly, since GDP that directly shows the economic status is only available quar-
terly and annually, we use the following variables to represent the fluctuations in the
real economy activities: Fed funds rate, the 3-month treasury bill/Fed funds spread, the
term spread, the TED spread, and the default spread. Due to the fact that monetary
policy can be applied to influence economic growth, the Fed funds rate and the 3-month
treasury bill/Fed funds spread that proxy for current and future monetary policy can be
14Granger Causality Wald test statistics are computed using as Wald tests where the parameter covari-
ance matrix is estimated under the assumptions about heteroscedasticity and correlation of the residuals.
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employed to predict future economic growth. Specifically, the yield on 3-month treasury
bill is always lower than the federal fund effective rate, and thus the spread is always neg-
ative; the negative gap is small during normal times and widened during crises as market
expectations rise for the Fed to cut rates and also on heavy flight to quality. A tighter
(looser) monetary policy would be associated with a slower (faster) economic growth. Al-
ternatively, as argued by Estrella and Mishkin (1996) and Wheelock and Wohar (2008),
the term spread is able to forecast the output growth at the short-term horizon, i.e., 6 to
12 months, and an increase in the change of the term spread indicates a faster growing
real economic activity. It is seen as a more reliable predictor of recession than that of real
output growth. Since credit supply affects real economic activities, we also involve two
variables that proxy for credit risk, the TED spread and default spread, indicating eco-
nomic conditions. The TED spread (the difference between the three-month LIBOR and
three-month treasury bill) is a good representative for the aggregate cost of short-term
borrowing for large financial intermediaries. Since treasury bills are regarded as risk-free,
and LIBOR represents the risk of lending to commercial banks. A rise in the TED spread
indicates that lenders believe the counterparty risk is increasing. The default spread (the
difference between Moody’s Baa and Aaa spread) is one of the most popular indicators
of financial distresses. Both of these two spreads widen during crises and vice versa.
Chicago Financial Conditional index and its subindexes are weekly measured as of
Friday, while banks’ data are measured as of Wednesday. In order to match these two
groups of data, we download fortnightly commercial banks’ data, and all the aforemen-
tioned data measured as of fortnightly Wednesday from FRED. With the exception of the
3-month treasury bill/fed fund rate, all the other variables that proxy for financial and
economic conditions are differenced to remove a high degree of persistence.
Our second objective is to purse the aggregate consequences of commercial banks’
balance sheet adjustments on asset markets. Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010) provide
empirical evidence that market-based intermediaries, such as security broker-dealers and
shadow banks, have the strongest predictive power for a broad range of traditional finan-
cial assets among all categories of financial institutions. However, with quarterly data,
they might miss some of the interesting variations in the asset markets. We therefore
explore how weekly market data respond to the commercial banking system growth rates.
One way to examine the predictability of excess returns is to estimate VARs. For exam-
ple, Kandel and Stambaugh (1988) and Campbell (1991) adopt VAR methods to analyse
long-horizon stock returns; Bekaert and Hodrick (1992) employ the technique to charac-
terize predictable components in excess returns on equity and foreign exchange markets;
Thorbecke (1997) also use the VaR methodology to examine the relation between mon-
etary policy and stock returns; and LEE (1992) conduct an investigation based on VAR
analysis of causal relations and dynamic interactions among stock returns, interest rates,
real economy, and inflation. In this paper, we also run Granger Causality Wald tests
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to examine if banking growth rates have incremental explanatory powers in predicting
asset variables; and utilize the corresponding impulse responses to analyse the dynamic
variations in asset returns.
We estimate a series of VARs, each include two variables, one representing the asset
market variation and the other reflecting growth in the banking system. Each VAR
is estimated with one-month lag (i.e., 4 weekly lags). A bivariate VAR(4) is written as
equation (4.3) where n = 4. The banking system growth rates that we include in each VAR
system are the weekly growth rates of leverage and the change of particular bank assets
and liabilities normalized by beginning-of-period total assets. In particular, we involve the
growth rates of leverage (lev), total assets (ta), total liabilities (tl), total equities (teq),
loans (loan) , consumer loans (coloan), commercial and industry loans (ciloan), loans
to commercial banks (cbloan), interbank loans (ibloan), real estate loans (rloan), liquid
assets (liq), securities (sec), treasury and agency securities (tas), cash (cash), deposits
(dep), large time deposits (ltdep) and borrowings (bor).
Like Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010), we cover three traditional asset markets, U.S.
equities, corporate bonds and treasury bonds. The stock market variables include the
excess returns on S&P500 index (sp) and CRSP value-weighted index for NYSE (cr-
spvw), the growth rates of the total market value for S&P500 index (spmv) and CRSP
value-weighted index (crspmv) as well as the growth rates of the implied volatility on
S&P500 (vix) and S&P100 (vxo). Also included are the excess returns on CRSP stock
file Capitalization 1st-/5th-/10th-decile index (cap1/cap5/cap10) and CRSP stock file
beta-based 1st-/5th-/10th-decile index (beta1/beta5/beta10),15 which provides a conve-
nient way to examine the behavior of stock returns as a function of firm size and risk.
These two dimensions are known to be important in describing the variation through
both time and cross-section dimensions of expected stock returns. (e.g., Fama and French
(1988), Amihud and Mendelson (1989), Malkiel, Burton and Xu (1997), Downs and In-
gram (2000)). With regard to corporate bond market variables, we employ the excess
returns on BofA Merril Lynch total bond return index values which track the perfor-
mance of US dollar denominated corporate bonds, including Corp Master Index (cbig),
High Yield Master II (cbhy), Corp AAA (cb3a), Corp AA (cb2b), Corp A (cb1a), Corp
BBB (cb3b), Corp 1-3year (cb13), Corp 3-5 year (cb35), Corp 5-7 year (cb57), Corp 7-10
year (cb710), Corp 10-15 year (cb1015) and Corp 15+ year (cbg15). All the rating- and
maturity-specific subindices are for investment grade corporate bonds. The US treasury
bond variables involves the excess return in CRSP treasuries fixed term indexes built for
1/2/5/7/10/20/30 years (tbret1/tbret2/rebret5/tbret7/tbret10/tbret20/tbret30) and the
change of 1/2/5/7/10/20/30- year treasury constant maturity rates (tcm1/tcm2/tcm5/tcm7/
tcm10/tcm20/tcm30). All of asset market data are daily, and thus we compute excess
15We run the VARs for all capitalization decile index and beta-based decile index but we only report
one middle and two corner index levels.
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returns measured as of Wednesday relative to the weekly 3-month treasury bill rate over
the window of one week.
4.4 Leverage Evolution: A First Look at the Evidence
To begin with the analysis, we first examine the fluctuations in the balance sheets of
various financial institutions over time. Leverage is viewed as one of the main underlying
features of the balance sheets of both market-based intermediaries and bank-based inter-
mediaries. The market-based intermediaries involve hedge funds, broker-dealers, shadow
banks and etc., which fund most of their liabilities in capital markets. The bank-based
intermediaries are mainly funded in the retail markets (deposits), and a relatively small
fraction of liabilities are funded through short-term wholesale markets, such as markets
of commercial papers, repurchase agreements and other collateralized borrowings.
Furthermore, due to the rapidly growing financial innovations since 1990s, banks
transfer a large part of their leverage off their balance sheets. Papanikolaou and Wolff
(2010) distinguish between on- and off-the-balance sheet leverage, and argue that off-the-
balance sheet leverage is achieved through the structuring of the financial instruments
by SIVs and conduits. Their empirical evidence documents that both on- and off-the-
balance sheet leverage contribute to the total bank risk, which is understood as one of
the root causes of the current crisis. Due to the hard access to the high frequency data
for banks’ off-the-balance sheet information, we only consider the on-the-balance sheet
leverage, which is lower/higher than the total leverage born by banks during normal/crisis
periods.16
To proxy overall traditional banking activities, we sum over U.S. charted saving in-
stitutions (involving commercial banks and saving institutions) and credit unions. The
market-based intermediaries are represented by broker-dealers and shadow banks.17 For
the category of shadow banks which run bank-like business but are not charted and regu-
lated as banks, we sum over the data for issuers of asset-backed securities, finance compa-
nies, and funding corporations. All the data are quarterly and from Financial Accounts
of United States.18 According to equation (4.1), the size of a financial intermediary’s
balance sheet is the product of its leverage and total equity, i.e.,
Total Assetst = Leveraget × Total Equitiest. (4.4)
16During crises, the bank’s off-the-balance sheet leverage may dramatically decrease as these off-the-
balance sheet financial instruments are funded mainly through the short-term debt from the capital mar-
kets.
17Although hedge funds are also a large group of market-based intermediaries, we just utilize broker
dealers and shadow banks due to the unavailable hedge fund information.
18It used to be called as ’U.S. Flow of funds’. Following Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010a), we proxy
overall traditional banking activity by summing over US saving institutions and shadow banking activity
by summing over issuers of asset-backed securities, finance companies and funding corporations by using
data from U.S. Flow of Funds.
Chapter 4. Banks’ Leverage and Liquidity 127
Figure 4.1: Total Asset Growth of Financial Intermediaries
Figure 4.1 plots the total asset growth of traditional banks, broker dealers and shadow
banks over the sample period of 1993Q1-2012Q4. The labels indicate the time points
associated with several financial crises.
It is common knowledge that that financial institutions’ asset values fluctuate over
the financial cycle. For example, as shown in Figure 4.1, we plot the total asset growth
of traditional banks, shadow banks, and broker-dealers in the U.S. over the period from
1993Q1 to 2012Q4. The total asset growths of financial intermediaries are very volatile
over time, and the magnitudes for both traditional and shadow banks are relatively small
as compared to that for broker dealers. There are several obvious bottoms in the evolution
of broker-dealers’ asset growth, 1994Q4,1998Q4, 2002Q4, 2008Q4, and 2011Q3, which
suggest several financial crises, Mexico economic crisis, 1997/8 Asian Financial Crisis,
1998 Russian Financial Crisis, 2002 South American Economic Crisis, 2008 Sub-prime
Mortgage Crisis, and European sovereign-debt crisis, respectively.
Next we focus on the changes in leverage and other balance sheet variables of com-
mercial banks and broker dealers, which are the main sub-sectors of bank-based inter-
mediaries and market-based intermediaries, respectively. Because Financial Accounts of
United States have been not providing pure commercial banks data since 2011, we com-
pute the quarterly balance sheet data of commercial banks based on monthly data from
Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release.19 The identity in (4.4) suggests that the fluctua-
tion in total asset relates to the change of leverage and equity capital. It is worth noting
that, as emphasized by Breuer (2002), leverage is not risk but the link between the risk of
19In some of years in the historical data, the total financial assets are lower than total liabilities in the
sector of US saving institutions and finance companies. Hence, in order to examine the leverage evolution
of financial intermediaries, we use commercial banks and broker dealers to proxy bank-based intermediaries
and market-based intermediaries respectively.
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asset positions and the corresponding risk of an equity stake. The leverage ratio in (4.1)
suggests that the rate of return on equity is equal to the product of the leverage ratio and
the rate of return on assets, i.e.,
R(Total Equity) = Leverage×R(Total Asset). (4.5)
Thus, the leverage ratio increases the risk of equity returns disproportionately as shown
in the following equation,
V ar(Total Equity) = Leverage2 × V ar(Total Asset). (4.6)
This implies that a more leveraged investor’s equity diminishes more quickly and faces
higher risk than a less leveraged investor. Therefore, the degree of leverage may determine
the possibility of financial market turbulence: the higher the degree of leverage, the more
likely it is for market participants facing a adverse price movement to unwind leveraged
positions, which results in major disruptions in financial markets. That is why it is of
important to analyse the leverage of financial incendiaries.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Commercial Banks and Broker Dealers
Summary Statistics for Commerical Banks and Broker Dealers
Panel A: Standard Deviations
Growth Rates GDP Commerical Secuirty
Banks Broker Dealers
0.0069
Total Assets 0.0184 0.0604
Total Liabilities 0.0202 0.0633
Total Equities 0.0161 0.1641
Leverage 0.0217 0.1712
Panel B: Correlations
Leverage- Total Assets Correlation 0.7058 0.4815
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Total Equities- Total Assets Correlation 0.1811 -0.3805
p-value 0.1074 0.0005
Leverage- Total Equitilies Correlation -0.5686 -0.8952
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Leverage-GDP Correlation -0.0647 0.1973
p-value 0.5683 0.0794
Total Assets-GDP Correlation -0.0883 0.4148
p-value 0.4363 0.0001
Table 4.1 provides quarterly statistics for commercial banks and broker dealers. The data
for financial intermediaries are from Federal Reserves’ H.8 and Z.1 release and the GDP
series is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The sample period is 1993Q1-2012Q4.
Given the information in Table 4.1, several stylized facts are underlined:
1. Leverage is comparatively more volatile than equity capital for both commercial
banks and broker-dealers as shown by standard deviations in Table 4.1. Although
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the leverage ratio of commercial banks is much less volatile than that of broker-
dealers, its standard deviation is still almost three times of that of GDP. This
means that financial institutions’ leverage is fairly volatile over time, and leverage
has contributed more to fluctuations in total assets than equity. This is consistent
with Nun˜o and Thomas (2013) who use GDP-deflated leverage, equity and asset.20
2. Leverage and total equity are negatively correlated, indicating that equity increases
in deleveraging periods and vice versa. As explained by Nun˜o and Thomas (2013),
this can be understood by taking into account that
V ar(Total Assets) = V ar(Leverage) + V ar(Total Equities)
+2Cov(Total Assets, Total Equities).
(4.7)
Since the leverage is most volatile as summarized before, it must be negatively
related to equity to ensure this identity equate. The negative correlation is relatively
large for broker dealers -0.89, in comparsion with commercial banks -0.57.21
3. Leverage and total assets are positively correlated. Over the sample period 1993Q1-
2012Q2, this pattern is particulary strong for commercial banks than for broker-
dealers as shown by the correlations between leverage and total assets, i.e., 0.71 for
commercial banks and 0.48 for broker dealers.
4. Total equity is not significantly correlated with total assets for commercial banks,
while it is significantly and negatively related to total assets for broker-dealers. This
implies that equity is sticky for commercial banks, and they expand and contract
the size of balance sheets mainly through actively managing leverage. However, the
negative relation for broker-dealers suggest that they need always raise a further
higher leverage to avoid their total asset decrease as their total equities declines.
This is different from the results given by Adrian and Shin (2011) who argue that
both commercial banks and market-based intermediaries have sticky equity during
the business cycle.22
5. The leverage/total assets of broker-dealers are cyclical with regard to GDP but
commercial banks are not, as shown by the correlations between GDP and lever-
age/total assets for both types of institutions. This is different from Nuno and
20Nuno and Thomas (2013) divided total assets by the GDP deflator and leverage and real total assets
are logged and detrended with a band-pass filter that preserves cycles of 6 to 32 quarters and a lag length
of 12.
21in Nun˜o and Thomas (2013), the negative correlation is -0.76 for commercial banks and -0.54 for
broker dealers.
22Nun˜o and Thomas (2013) and Adrian and Shin (2011) obtain these summary statistics with a different
treatment of data and a sample period. Adrian and Shin (2011) emphasize on the relation between growth
rates of leverage and nominal total assets. Both of them use commercial banks data from US flows of
funds and a longer sample period since 1963Q1.
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Figure 4.2: Leverage Growth of Commercial Banks and Broker Dealers
Figure 4.2 plots the leverage growth of commercial banks and broker dealers over the
sample period of 1993Q1-2012Q4. The labels indicate the time points associated with
several financial crises.
Thomas (2013) who observe that the leverage and total assets of both commercial
banks and broker dealers are significantly positively related to GDP. The possible
reason is that Nun˜o and Thomas (2013) apply a linear trend-cycle filter on balance
sheet items and adopt a longer sample period.
As a graphical illustration, Figure 4.2 shows the leverage growth of commercial banks
and broker-dealers over time, which helps understand how two largest leveraged financial
subsectors in the United states manage leverage. The magnitude of banks’ balance-sheet
changes is much smaller relative to that of broker-dealers’. The line for broker-dealers
matches the empirical evidence given by Adrian and Shin (2010): leverage is high during
booms and low during downturns. The recessions in 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2008 witnessed
a sharp decline in the leverage ratio of broker-dealers, while commercial banks behave
differently. Banks’ leverage rises rather than declining during the most severe periods
of crises and shows relatively persistent during normal periods. This explains their low
cyclicity with respect to GDP. One plausible explanation is that bank-based intermediaries
and market-based intermediaries employ different main funding methods. During crises,
most of market-based intermediaries suffer margin calls and thus ’fire-sell’ the financial
assets; however, bank-based intermediaries experience funding inflows as investors’ funds
flow toward safe investments, such as bank deposits and treasury securities (Gatev and
Strahan 2006).
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Figure 4.3: Leverage Growth and Asset Growth
(a) US Commercial Banks
(b) US Broker Dealers
Figure 4.3 plots asset growth against leverage growth for both commercial banks and
broker dealers over the sample period of 1993Q1-2012Q4.
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Figure 4.3 provides the scatter chart for the leverage-asset relation in banks and
broker-dealers. Both chart (a) and (b) suggest a clear upward-sloping relation between
asset growth and leverage growth, which graphically confirms the active management of
balance sheets by banks and broker-dealers over the sample period of 1993Q1-2012Q4.
Adrian and Shin (2010c) refer this positive relation to procyclical leverage. Specifically,
leverage would vary with total assets if financial institutions were active in the face of
fluctuating asset prices; rising securities price will entail institutions to adjust leverage up-
ward by purchasing more securities, and the opposite is true when securities prices decline.
Moreover, the feedback effect will lead the adjustment of leverage and price changes to
reinforce each other in an amplification or contraction of financial cycle. Nevertheless, it
is important to note that the timing of adjusting balance sheets is different for commercial
banks and broker-dealers, especially during crises.
It worths noting that the points in chart (a) closely corresponds to a 45-degree line,
which indicates that equity is increasing at a constant rate, and thus the size of total asset
is mainly determined by leverage change based on market conditions. This confirms that
banks’ equity is sticky as suggested before. One plausible explanation is that the existing
bank owners in control foresee that new equity issuance would dilute the value of their
stakes and non-pecuniary benefits, and hence they would be reluctant to raise new equity,
as explained by Adrian and Shin (2011).
4.5 Empirical Evidence: Commercial Banks’ Leverage and
Balance Sheet Size
The adjustments of balance sheets for market-based intermediaries have been examined by
Adrian and Shin (2009) and Adrian and Shin (2010c). Adrian and Shin (2009) argue that
broker-dealers could be seen as a barometer of overall market-based funding conditions
due to their deep step with securitization. Adrian and Shin (2010c) use five major US
investment banks which hold large broker-dealer operations to represent market-based
financial institutions due to the fact that these investment banks were not part of banking
holding companies so as to proxy for the pure behavior with regard to capital markets.23
Their results of panel regressions for leverage growth suggest that (1) leverage is mean-
reverting and procyclical; (2) leverage is adjusted through the change in repos and other
collateralized borrowing and lending; (3) leverage is also negatively related to lagged
Value-at-Risk (VaR). As suggested by Adrian and Shin (2009), procyclical leverage offers
a window on the aggregate liquidity of a financial system, which can be seen as the rate of
23The five US investment banks include Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch
and Morgan Stanley. Investment banks played an increasing role in the financial system until the 2007
financial crisis led to the demise of these large investment banks.
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change of financial institutions’ aggregate balance sheet.24 Additionally, it is important
to note that leverage is understood in terms of the implicit maximum leverage permitted
by creditors in repos, and thus shifts in funding conditions result in the fluctuations
in leverage. In this sense, fluctuations in leverage are therefore essential to understand
financial market distresses.
However, less attention has paid to the adjustments of balance sheets for bank-based
intermediaries since banks’ role as the dominant suppliers of credit has been supplanted
by market-based intermediaries in the recent years. Adrian and Shin (2009) point out
that the assets of market-based intermediaries were substantially larger than bank assets
by 2007. Nevertheless, during the 2008 financial crisis when market-based institutions
deleverage, banks played their traditional role of a liquidity buffer in the financial system.
The reason is that, given the government support, commercial banks are still capable of
raising cheaper funding from the retail markets, although they also face the dry-ups of
credit in the capital markets. Thus, in order to understand the nature of liquidity in an
overall financial system, it is also of importance to pay attention to commercial banks
which have advantage in providing liquidity especially during market downturns.25 In
this subsection, our focus is on the leverage and balance sheet fluctuations of commercial
banks over the financial and economic cycle. We firstly study how banks adjust their
balance sheets and then analyse how banks’ balance sheets fluctuate over the financial
and economic cycle.
4.5.1 Leverage and Balance Sheet Size
Next we examine how banks expand and contract their balance sheets in higher frequency.
These banking data with the highest frequency are weekly data measured as of Wednes-
day from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 Statistic Release. Summary statistics for banking
system growth rates appear in Table 4.2. Among all the banking system growth rates,
leverage fluctuates most, and equity capital has the smallest change, as shown by stan-
dard deviations (around 0.94% for leverage and 0.06% for total equity). Additionally, the
negative mean of leverage growth implies that banks’ leverage has decreased since 1993,
while excessive leverage by banks is widely believed to have contributed to the current
global financial crises. One plausible explanation for the decreased leverage is that the
24Adrian and Shin (2009) explains that ‘During normal times, liquidity is understood in terms of a stock
of available funding in the financial system which is redistributed as needed; however, when repo haircuts
rise, all balance sheets shrink, resulting in a generalized decline in the willingness to lend; and in this
sense, liquidity should be understood in terms of the growth of balance sheets rather than as a stock.’
25Empirical evidence provided by Gatev and Strahan (2006) document that, when liquidity dries up in
terms of widened commercial paper spreads, banks experience funding inflows which allow them to meet
loan demand without running down their liquid assets holdings. In their paper, liquidity refers to the
supply of short-term credit for nonfinancial Commercial Paper issuers.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Weekly U.S. Banking System Growth Rates
mean std max median min
lev -0.0355% 0.9430% 6.5674% -0.0237% -4.4539%
ta 0.1303% 0.7424% 6.5708% 0.1257% -4.2113%
tl 0.1145% 0.7441% 6.5690% 0.0820% -4.2333%
teq 0.0158% 0.0576% 0.4166% 0.0160% -0.4954%
loan 0.0741% 0.2826% 3.7684% 0.0656% -1.3099%
ciloan 0.0135% 0.0712% 0.2998% 0.0055% -0.1862%
coloan 0.0102% 0.1053% 3.0118% 0.0064% -0.2846%
cbloan 0.0006% 0.0594% 0.6086% 0.0003% -0.5407%
ibloan 0.0019% 0.2031% 2.0742% 0.0007% -1.4723%
rloan 0.0383% 0.1454% 1.7527% 0.0427% -0.8685%
liq 0.0379% 0.4244% 1.7508% 0.0302% -1.4640%
sec 0.0245% 0.1645% 1.3400% 0.0127% -0.9498%
tas 0.0142% 0.1408% 1.0367% 0.0069% -0.9768%
ots 0.0103% 0.0800% 1.2159% 0.0072% -0.4808%
cash 0.0134% 0.3758% 1.7312% 0.0163% -1.4568%
dep 0.0819% 0.6870% 3.6724% 0.0357% -3.4116%
ltdep 0.0192% 0.1232% 0.4453% 0.0168% -0.5835%
bor 0.0216% 0.3329% 2.3339% -0.0013% -1.4139%
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for weekly growth rates in banks’ leverage and
other balance sheet items (including its sub-items). Leverage growth is calculated as
the percent change of its level. All the other banking growth rates are computed as the
changes in balance sheet items and each of these change is normalized by the beginning-
of-period assets. The sample is based on the aggregation of all U.S. commercial banks
that report weekly from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release, over 1993-2012 (1403
observations). All the growth rates are stationary according to the results of Augmented
Dickey Fuller tests.
current leverage is traditional balance sheet leverage that does not involve banks’ off-the-
balance sheet activities, and thus the leverage computed based on the sum of on- and
off-the-balance sheet activities might show an increasing growth rate on average.
The weekly observations in this subsection are consistent with the quarterly observa-
tions in Table 4.1. Table 4.3 displays the correlation among banks’ leverage growth and
the growth rates of their particular assets and liabilities. The results confirm the weekly
co-movements of leverage with total asset and total equities. Leverage is positively and
negatively related to total assets and total equities respectively. The observation that
total assets are not significantly related to total equity confirms that equity is sticky for
commercial banks with weekly data.26
In Table 4.3, we also find the following relations between leverage and other balance
sheet sub-items. First, leverage tends to closely co-move with liquid assets and deposits,
as shown by the sizeable correlations of 0.65 and 0.66, respectively. This suggests that
26In order to assess the stability of relations over time, we also conduct a rolling correlation analysis
of leverage growth with total asset/liability growth. We compute the correlation estimates over a rolling
window of 52/104 weeks through the sample period 1993-2012. We observe the strong correlation between
leverage and total assets/total equities at the beginning of the sample has weakened by a fairly amount
over time; and the correlation between leverage and total equity is not statistically significant before 1996.
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Table 4.3: Correlations among Weekly Growth Rates of Leverage and Balance Sheet
Items
correlation lev ta tl loan liq
lev 1.0000
ta 0.7812 1.0000
tl 0.8269 0.9970 1.0000
teq -0.6145 0.0083* -0.0691
loan 0.4997 0.6213 0.6216 0.1999
ciloan 0.3270 0.3959 0.3970 0.5199 0.2162
cbloan 0.0284* 0.1133 0.1053 0.0421* 0.0155*
coloan 0.1048 0.1053 0.1079 0.4543 -0.0434*
ibloan 0.4922 0.6143 0.6139 0.3013 0.3127
rloan 0.2502 0.3358 0.3334 0.5122 0.1053
liq 0.6489 0.8041 0.8040 0.1999 1.0000
sec 0.2800 0.3520 0.3515 0.0593 0.4727
tas 0.2401 0.3053 0.3047 0.0242* 0.4719
ots 0.1533 0.1865 0.1865 0.0793 0.2359
cash 0.6102 0.7541 0.7542 0.1998 0.9226
dep 0.6663 0.7830 0.7877 0.4785 0.6326
ltdep 0.1092 0.1764 0.1717 0.1921 0.0595
bor 0.3632 0.4685 0.4669 0.4607 0.2803
ol 0.1015 0.1851 0.1788 0.0659 0.1552
Table 4.3 provides the correlation between banks’ leverage growth and the growth rates
of their particular assets and liabilities on the aggregate level. The sample is based on the
aggregation of all U.S. commercial banks that report weekly from the Federal Reserve’s
H.8 statistical release, over 1993-2012 (1403 observations). * indicates that the coefficient
is not statistically significantly. All the other correlations are statistically significantly at
the 1 percent level.
commercial banks expand and contract their balance sheets mainly through the adjust-
ments of liquid assets and deposits. Second, loans and liquid assets are significantly
and positively correlated with deposits and borrowings; and are more related to deposits
than borrowings, which confirms the main funding role of deposits in commercial banks.
Thirdly, the positive correlation between loans and liquid assets consistent with Gatev
and Strahan (2006)’s argument that banks would not fund the increased demand for loans
by running down their holdings of liquid assets.
Table 4.4 shows the results of times series regressions for the growth rate of lever-
age. In all the regression results, the significantly negative constant confirms that banks’
leverage has decreased since 1993; the coefficients on lagged leverage (one week lag) is neg-
ative, implying that leverage is mean reverting. The positive relation between the change
in leverage and the change in total asset is confirmed in column (2), and the change in
total asset explains 61.40% of leverage change. Column (3) shows that banks’ leverage
is very sensitive to the change of total equity: 1% change in total equity results in 9.7%
decline in leverage. The stickiness of equity suggest that banks adjust their balance sheets
mainly through debt funding rather than equity funding. Column (4)-(7) indicate that
the margin of adjustment in the fluctuations of balance sheet is mainly through retail
funding (i.e., deposits) rather than borrowing from banks and others.
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Table 4.4: Time Series Regressions of Weekly Leverage Growth
Leverage Regression (Weekly: 1993-2012)
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant Coef -0.0005 -0.0016 0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0016
p-value 0.0667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000 0.0000
Leverage (one lag) Coef -0.2689 -0.0692 -0.2116 -0.2041 -0.1150 -0.1320 -0.2101 -0.0615 -0.0558
p-value 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0079
Total Asset Coef 0.9694 0.7052
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Total Equity Coef -9.7335
p-value 0.0000
Loan Coef 1.5743 0.5794
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Liquid Asset Coef 1.3783 0.7144
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Deposit Coef 0.8758 0.2970 0.4991
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Borrowing Coef 0.9212 0.2455 0.4930
p-value 0.0000 0.0043 0.0000
Adj R-squared 0.0714 0.6140 0.4208 0.2892 0.4324 0.4596 0.1730 0.6244 0.6140
Observation 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043
Table 4.4 reports the results for time series regressions of weekly leverage growth rates
on the growth rates of main balance sheet items. Each column provides the coefficient
estimates and the corresponding p-values from each multivariate regression. All standard
errors are Newey-West adjusted with a maximum lag length of one month (4 weeks). The
sample period is 1993-2012.
Adrian and Shin (2013) have suggested that both leverage and balance sheet size are
driven by the underlying riskiness of the environment. Their empirical evidence documents
that the leverage of market-based intermediaries is constrained by risks in the form of
VaRs, which motives institutions to actively adjust their balance sheets. Similarly, greater
attentions have focused on the trading risks faced by commercial banks. In the US, large
banks under the Basel Accord are eligible to rely their required regulatory capital for the
market risk on an internal Value-at-risk approach. (Pe´rignon and Smith (2010)) With the
aggregate data, we are not able to include the VaR information in the regression to test its
effect on leverage. Nevertheless, commercial banks’ leverage must be also subject to their
risk. Banks can expand balance sheets when VaR constraints are looser. Furthermore,
Basel III has been scheduled to be introduced from 2013 to 2015 and was supposed to
strengthen bank capital requirements by decreasing bank leverage. Specifically, Basel
III introduced a minimum leverage ratio that would be 6% for systematically important
financial banks and 5% for their banking holding companies.27
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics for Fortnightly U.S. Banking System Growth Rates and
Variables for Financial and Economic Conditions
mean std max median min
Banking System Growth Rates
∆lev/levt−1 -0.0769% 0.9760% 5.8638% -0.1553% -3.6721%
∆ta/tat−1 0.2570% 0.7035% 5.0482% 0.2097% -3.5123%
∆tl/tat−1 0.2252% 0.7063% 5.0216% 0.1788% -3.5270%
∆teq/tat−1 0.0318% 0.0672% 0.4185% 0.0330% -0.4425%
∆loan/tat−1 0.1478% 0.3416% 3.6751% 0.1397% -1.5506%
∆liq/tat−1 0.0742% 0.3879% 1.9912% 0.0777% -1.4451%
∆dep/tat−1 0.1612% 0.6131% 2.7650% 0.1426% -2.2102%
∆bor/tat−1 0.0424% 0.3613% 2.5215% 0.0218% -1.2183%
Financial and Economic Indicators
∆nfci 0.0002% 0.0776% 0.7700% 0.0000% -0.3600%
∆fcilev 0.0003% 0.0924% 0.6300% 0.0000% -0.3200%
∆fcicrd 0.0002% 0.0639% 0.4700% 0.0000% -0.3000%
∆fcirsk 0.0000% 0.0800% 0.8200% -0.0050% -0.3200%
∆fed -0.0053% 0.1289% 0.6300% 0.0000% -0.7500%
tfsp -0.2334% 0.2928% 0.3600% -0.1300% -1.5100%
∆tmsp -0.0035% 0.1667% 0.7500% -0.0250% -0.5900%
∆ted -0.0002% 0.1377% 1.1798% -0.0007% -1.1628%
∆cbsp 0.0002% 0.0710% 0.7000% 0.0000% -0.4100%
Table 4.5 reports summary statistics for fortnightly growth rates in bank leverage and
its balance sheet items. The sample is based on the aggregation of all U.S. com-
mercial banks that report fortnightly from FRED (originally from the Federal Re-
serve’s H.8 statistical release, 1993-2012 (522 observations). Also reported is the
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (nfci) and its three subindex (lever-
age,risk,credit)(fcilev,fcirsk,fcicrd), Federal fund rate (fed), three-month/fed funds spread
(tfsp), term spread (tmsp), default spread (cbsp). Except three-month/fed funds spread,
all the financial conditions index and spreads are differenced because each has a very high
degree of persistence. All the rates are stationary according to the results of Augmented
Dickey Fuller tests.
4.5.2 Banks’ Reactions to the Fluctuations of Financial and Economic
Conditions
We have observed that, with quarterly data, commercial banks’ leverage and total assets
are not significantly cyclical to GDP; and the timing of banks to increase leverage is
different from that of broker-dealers especially during crises. However, the analysis with
low frequency data might ignore some important information. As suggested by Adrian and
Shin (2009), broker-dealers’ leverage and total assets are closely associated with market-
based funding conditions that can approximate the overall financial conditions due to the
growing role of capital market in supply of credit. In that sense, banks’ different balance-
sheet adjustments can be analysed by examining the relation between financial conditions
and banks’ balance-sheet growth rates. In absence of weekly data for broker-dealers and
GDP, we adopt various variables to proxy for financial and economic conditions. We will
27In 1997, the US Securities and Exchange Commission rule that public corporations must disclose
quantitative information about their derivatives activities. Major banks and dealers chose to implement
the rule by including VaR information in the notes to their financial statements. Source: Wikipedia
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therefore examine how commercial banks’ leverage and balance sheets fluctuate over the
financial and economic cycle. Summary statistics for fortnightly banking variables as well
as fortnightly financial and economic variables appear in Table 4.5.
Concurrent relationships: Table 4.6 provides the concurrent relationships between
banks’ balance sheet variables and financial and economic indicators. The results show
that, with the exception of equity capital, banks’ leverage and other main balance sheet
items are significantly and positively related to Chicago Fed National Financial Condition
Index and its subindex. Since the increased change of financial condition index indicates
tighter financial conditions, these positive relations suggest that commercial banks expand
their balance sheets faster; and meanwhile their capacity to lend increases further when
the financial market worsens and vice versa. The magnitudes of all correlations range
from 10% and 31%. On the asset side, loans are more closely related to fluctuations in
financial conditions than liquid assets; on the liability side, borrowings are more closely
correlated with change of financial conditions than deposits. It is interesting to find
that deposits change has the lowest correlation with financial condition changes. This
is probably because nowadays the main funding of financial institutions is through the
capital markets, of which the status is reflected in these financial conditions.
Table 4.6: Correlation between Fortnightly U.S. Banking System Growth Rates and
Variables for Financial and Economic Conditions
Correlation
Banking Growth Rates Financial and Economic Indicators
∆nfci ∆fcilev ∆fcicrd ∆fcirsk ∆fed tfsp ∆tmsp ∆ted ∆cbsp
∆lev/levt−1 Corr 0.2322 0.1662 0.2328 0.2296 -0.1144 -0.0546 0.0757 0.1891 0.1690
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0089 0.2133 0.0839 0.0000 0.0001
∆ta/tat−1 Corr 0.3171 0.2148 0.3174 0.3033 -0.1177 -0.1239 0.0021 0.2680 0.1707
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0071 0.0046 0.9619 0.0000 0.0001
∆tl/tat−1 Corr 0.3158 0.2150 0.3159 0.3032 -0.1211 -0.1194 0.0124 0.2659 0.1762
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 0.0063 0.7782 0.0000 0.0001
∆teq/tat−1 Corr 0.0015 -0.0104 0.0023 -0.0109 0.0397 -0.0424 -0.1079 0.0101 -0.0647
p-value 0.9731 0.8121 0.9577 0.8041 0.3658 0.3342 0.0136 0.8177 0.1398
∆loan/tat−1 Corr 0.2740 0.2095 0.2280 0.2756 -0.0501 -0.1509 0.0568 0.2774 0.0981
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2528 0.0005 0.1955 0.0000 0.0249
∆liq/tat−1 Corr 0.1512 0.0972 0.1901 0.1455 -0.1507 0.0082 0.0028 0.0821 0.1432
p-value 0.0005 0.0264 0.0000 0.0009 0.0005 0.8526 0.9488 0.0609 0.0010
∆dep/tat−1 Corr 0.0986 0.0326 0.0962 0.0955 -0.0688 -0.0520 0.0182 0.1460 0.0394
p-value 0.0242 0.4572 0.0280 0.0291 0.1166 0.2355 0.6781 0.0008 0.3693
∆bor/tat−1 Corr 0.2196 0.1293 0.1897 0.2350 -0.0911 -0.1153 0.1240 0.1990 0.0647
p-value 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0374 0.0084 0.0045 0.0000 0.1399
Table 4.6 provides the estimated correlation and corresponding p-values of banking sys-
tem growth with the fluctuations in financial and economic variables. All the significant
estimates are highlighted in bold font. The sample period is 1993-2012.
For economic variables, banks’ total assets (leverage)28 are negatively related to the
fluctuations in both current and future monetary policies, i.e., the change of federal fund
28The correlation between leverage and the three-month treasury bill/fed fund spread is not significant.
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rate and the 3-month treasury bill/fed fund spread. Since the short-term interest rates,
such as repo rates and interbank lending rates, are determined by the Fed funds target,
the fed funds rate is expected to play a pivotal role in setting short-term interests. As
a predictor of future monetary policy, the 3-month treasury bill/fed fund spread widens
during crises when market expectations rise for the Fed to cuts rates as well as on heavy
flight to quality. The increased fed funds rates and widened 3-month treasury bill/fed fund
spread therefore indicate tightened funding conditions and poorer market expectations.
Hence, the negative relations suggest that commercial banks contract their balance sheets
faster along with a tighter current and future monetary policy.
Additionally, there are positive correlations between banks’ leverage (and total assets)
and other economic indicators, including the term spread, the TED spread and the default
spread. The term spread is regarded as being able to forecast short-term output growth;
and the increased term spread implies a slower growing real economic growth. The TED
spread and default spread proxy for short-term and long-term credit risk respectively;
and the widened spreads indicates higher counterparty risks and possibility of financial
distress. Thus the positive correlations among banks’ leverage and these spreads suggest
that banks increase their size of balance sheets faster as investors expect that the credit
risk of financial markets rises, and thus real economic activity will grow slowly.29
Different from broker dealers, commercial banks expand their balance sheets faster
when both financial and economic condition tightens. The insignificant correlation be-
tween total equities and financial and economic indicators also confirms that the stickiness
of banks’ total equity. However, the simple correlation analysis is not be capable of ana-
lyzing the motivation of banks’ balance sheet adjustments or banks’ impact on financial
and economic conditions. Next we examine the dynamic relationships among banking
data and the variables that proxy for financial and economic conditions.
Dynamic relationships: Table 4.7 summarizes the VaR results of fluctuations
in financial and economic conditions on the banking system growth rates. By running
Granger causality Wald tests with one-month lag (2 bi-weeks), we find that there is a
substantial effect of fluctuations in financial and economic conditions on the subsequent
growth in the banking system. With the exception of the federal effective rate and the
term spread, all the other variables involved in our tests have incremental explanatory
power in predicting subsequent banking system growth rates.
For each VAR, we also provide the impulse response function for shocks to financial
and economic conditions in order to understand the economic magnitude and timing of
how banking system reacts to these shocks in Table 4.8. With the impulse response
29It worth noting that total equity is only significantly negatively correlated with the term spread.
For particular assets, both loans and liquid assets are significantly related to credit risks; for particular
liabilities, borrowings rather than deposits are significantly correlated with monetary policies and short-
term economic variables (i.e., the term spread and TED spread).
Chapter 4. Banks’ Leverage and Liquidity 140
Table 4.7: Vector Autoregression (VAR) of Fortnightly U.S. Banking System Growth
Rates on Financial and Economic Indicators
Granger Causality Wald Tests
Equation Banking System Growth Rates (Bank)
lev ta tl teq loan liq dep bor
∆nfci Bank Chi-Sq 4.0919 4.4303 4.7430 0.6554 1.1942 1.5707 5.0836 1.9536
p-value 0.1293 0.1091 0.0933 0.7206 0.5504 0.4560 0.0787 0.3765
Bank ∆nfci Chi-Sq 17.7377 16.1947 17.5562 3.0179 3.8545 8.4929 10.5833 11.3856
p-value 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.2211 0.1455 0.0143 0.0050 0.0034
∆fcilev Bank Chi-Sq 0.4268 0.4055 0.2531 3.0718 0.0012 0.1114 1.1200 0.8864
p-value 0.8078 0.8165 0.8811 0.2153 0.9994 0.9458 0.5712 0.6420
Bank ∆fcilev Chi-Sq 11.5383 9.8102 10.6878 3.9627 5.4811 2.2879 5.0465 5.3926
p-value 0.0031 0.0074 0.0048 0.1379 0.0645 0.3186 0.0802 0.0675
∆fcicrd Bank Chi-Sq 5.6384 3.9457 4.7436 1.2082 7.1140 0.0660 3.2597 3.9920
p-value 0.0597 0.1391 0.0933 0.5466 0.0285 0.9675 0.1960 0.1359
Bank ∆fcicrd Chi-Sq 14.7016 24.0458 24.4833 0.2744 3.3446 9.5599 11.0561 8.2031
p-value 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.8718 0.1878 0.0084 0.0040 0.0165
∆fcirsk Bank Chi-Sq 0.5021 1.6640 1.4936 0.3956 0.3044 0.2815 7.0565 0.1600
p-value 0.7780 0.4352 0.4739 0.8205 0.8588 0.8687 0.0294 0.9231
Bank ∆fcirsk Chi-Sq 20.6194 15.5707 17.2887 4.2247 6.2812 7.9283 8.9133 17.3987
p-value 0.0000 0.0004 0.0002 0.1210 0.0433 0.0190 0.0116 0.0002
∆fed Bank Chi-Sq 2.7359 7.3442 6.5884 5.8348 1.3128 5.6531 4.4109 2.8628
p-value 0.2546 0.0254 0.0371 0.0541 0.5187 0.0592 0.1102 0.2390
Bank ∆fed Chi-Sq 1.0529 2.2702 1.9214 4.6055 11.5105 1.8911 1.6154 3.9552
p-value 0.5907 0.3214 0.3826 0.1000 0.0032 0.3885 0.4459 0.1384
tfsp Bank Chi-Sq 0.2656 0.3050 0.2212 2.0519 0.1445 0.5051 0.6164 1.0249
p-value 0.8757 0.8586 0.8953 0.3585 0.9303 0.7768 0.7348 0.5990
Bank tfsp Chi-Sq 2.1745 5.5745 5.4005 3.5397 10.2553 0.1191 5.8191 6.9839
p-value 0.3371 0.0616 0.0672 0.1704 0.0059 0.9422 0.0545 0.0304
∆tmsp Bank Chi-Sq 4.7247 2.0167 2.1952 6.4370 0.6281 3.7689 9.2611 1.8231
p-value 0.0942 0.3648 0.3337 0.0400 0.7305 0.1519 0.0097 0.4019
Bank ∆tmsp Chi-Sq 1.3083 2.6718 2.5908 3.0192 4.2776 0.2044 3.8424 2.9505
p-value 0.8839 0.1148 0.1354 2.5196 0.0381 0.5103 0.9462 2.0519
∆ted Bank Chi-Sq 0.8839 0.1148 0.1354 2.5196 0.0381 0.5103 0.9462 2.0519
p-value 0.6428 0.9442 0.9345 0.2837 0.9811 0.7748 0.6231 0.3585
Bank ∆ted Chi-Sq 6.8594 4.9811 5.3335 2.4775 7.8342 6.5246 8.9173 14.6230
p-value 0.0324 0.0829 0.0695 0.2898 0.0199 0.0383 0.0116 0.0007
∆cbsp Bank Chi-Sq 3.7054 3.2793 3.2726 2.2848 3.7488 0.6733 0.5814 5.1837
p-value 0.1568 0.1940 0.1947 0.3190 0.1534 0.7142 0.7478 0.0749
Bank ∆cbsp Chi-Sq 21.1018 9.5444 12.1498 6.3923 0.7084 6.6254 2.1062 1.9822
p-value 0.0000 0.0085 0.0023 0.0409 0.7017 0.0364 0.3488 0.3712
Table 4.7 provides Granger causality Wald tests for VAR with two equations. There is
one equation for the bank’s balance sheet variable. The other is for the financial and
economic condition indicator. The indicators in this table involves the changes of Chicago
Fed National Financial Conditions Index (nfci) and its three subindex, leverage (fcilev),
credit (fcicrd) and risk (fcirsk); the 3-month treasury/fed fund spread (tfsp) the change
of federal fund effective rate (fed), the term spread (tmsp), the TED spread (ted) and
default spread (cbsp). Each VAR is estimated with one-month lag (2 lags). We report
the χ2 statistics testing the null that all the coefficients equal zero. All the significant
estimates are highlighted in bold font. The sample is based on fortnightly data over
1993-2012.
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Table 4.8: Impulse Responses of Fortnightly U.S. Banking System Growth Rates to
Financial and Economic Indicators
Banking Growth Rates
week lev ta tl loan liq dep bor
∆fci 1 0.0891% 0.0873% 0.0856% 0.0314% 0.0349% 0.0424%
Impulse 2 0.1385% 0.1147% 0.1182% 0.0479% 0.0061% 0.0374%
Responses 3 0.0827% 0.0485% 0.0513% 0.0358% -0.0182% 0.0172%
4 0.0279% 0.0033% 0.0056% 0.0156% -0.0246% -0.0028%
∆fcilev 1 0.0369% 0.0541% 0.0518% 0.0329% 0.0059% 0.0298%
Impulse 2 0.0717% 0.0737% 0.0737% 0.0342% 0.0175% 0.0240%
Responses 3 0.0742% 0.0592% 0.0603% 0.0245% -0.0038% 0.0171%
4 0.0716% 0.0478% 0.0501% 0.0155% -0.0046% 0.0091%
∆fcicrd 1 0.0875% 0.0822% 0.0805% 0.0339% 0.0597% 0.0297%
Impulse 2 0.1303% 0.1240% 0.1257% 0.0466% 0.0087% 0.0351%
Responses 3 0.0862% 0.0738% 0.0744% 0.0344% -0.0016% 0.0240%
4 0.0409% 0.0303% 0.0311% 0.0173% -0.0223% 0.0085%
∆fcirsk 1 0.0747% 0.0750% 0.0733% 0.0419% 0.0251% 0.0193% 0.0456%
Impulse 2 0.1352% 0.1131% 0.1163% 0.0393% 0.0426% 0.0164% 0.0411%
Responses 3 0.0956% 0.0604% 0.0634% 0.0173% 0.0373% -0.0147% 0.0219%
4 0.0480% 0.0189% 0.0218% -0.0013% 0.0215% -0.0188% 0.0001%
tfsp 1 -0.0765% -0.0718% -0.0511% -0.0458% -0.0300%
Impulse 2 -0.0091% -0.0099% -0.0105% 0.0123% -0.0096%
Responses 3 -0.0248% -0.0249% -0.0149% -0.0178% -0.0117%
4 -0.0115% -0.0121% -0.0094% -0.0001% -0.0100%
∆ted 1 0.1065% 0.0978% 0.0984% 0.0579% 0.0367% 0.0280% 0.0410%
Impulse 2 0.0816% 0.0416% 0.0456% 0.0181% 0.0473% -0.0366% 0.0412%
Responses 3 -0.0108% -0.0203% -0.0201% -0.0084% 0.0031% -0.0160% -0.0021%
4 -0.0212% -0.0149% -0.0154% -0.0075% -0.0099% -0.0010% -0.0146%
∆cbsp 1 0.1316% 0.0625% 0.0687% 0.0607% 0.0003%
Impulse 2 0.0733% 0.0367% 0.0407% -0.0008% 0.0219%
Responses 3 0.0377% 0.0176% 0.0196% 0.0097% 0.0071%
4 0.0195% 0.0094% 0.0106% 0.0004% 0.0038%
In Table 4.8, we report a corresponding response function to quantify the impact of a
standard deviation innovation in each of the financial indicators on the growth in bank
balance sheets for each VAR with the significant coefficients in Table 4.7. We omit the
impulse response results of the variables with insignificant statistics. The sample is based
on fortnightly data over 1993-2012. See Table 4.5 for summary statistics.
function results, we are able to capture the dynamic behavior of commercial banks over
the financial and economic cycle. Table 4.8 suggest that banks’ leverage and total assets
(total liabilities) grow faster, following the increased change of Financial Condition index
and its subindexes, TED spread, default spread, and the widened negative gap between
3-month treasury bill/fed fund spread.30 In particular, the impulse responses of leverage
and asset growth rates suggest that an increase of 0.08% (one standard deviation shown
in Table 4.5)31 in the change of Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (nfci)
would be associated with an increased leverage growth of 0.69% and an asset growth of
30The 3-month treasury and fed fund spread has not significant incrementally explanatory power in
leverage
31Actually, one standard deviation should be equal to 8% rather than 0.08% since we divide the change
of nfci index by 100 in order to match the percent change of banking variables.
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0.68% in the following week. These two growth rates are larger than the average growth
rates in leverage and total assets of −0.08% and 0.26%, respectively. All the financial
indicators, including nfci Index and its subindex, have positive responses on leverage and
total assets in the first 8 weeks, and the increased effect is strongest in the second bi-week
for all the regressions.
With regard to the economic indicators, the default spread (cbsp) has a very simi-
lar effect on leverage and total assets in both magnitude and timing, given its standard
deviation and impulse function results. It is easily understood that the default spread
represents default risk in the financial system that closely related to the long-term funding
conditions for the overall financial markets. In the TED spread (ted) equation, periods
after second bi-week have rapidly declining responses in leverage and total assets, indi-
cating that an increase in the TED spread only raises the growth rate of banks’ leverage
and total asset during the period of high credit risk; the banking growth rates revert back
to their average levels as soon as the spread declines. Additionally, a 0.29% decline in the
3-month treasury/fed fund spread is associated with an increase in the growth of total
assets of 2.23%, large relative to the total asset growth rate. But this response show little
persistence, as shown by the observation that the second bi-week response of total asset
growth is only about 0.26%.
Table 4.8 also provides the impulse responses of banking growth rates in particular
assets and liabilities, including loans, liquid assets, deposits and borrowings. Among all
the indicators in the table, there are two variables, the risk index (fcirsk) and the TED
spread (ted), that have consistent effects on all the tested balance sheet items. Since
fcirsk captures volatility and funding risk in the financial sector and the TED spread
proxies for the aggregate cost of short-term borrowings for large financial institutions, we
can summarize that commercial banks’ balance sheet behavior is closely related to the
funding conditions in the financial sector. The increased growth rates of loans, liquid
assets, deposits and borrowings in the first bi-week strongly imply that banks’ balance
sheets expand when market funding risk increases. This is consistent with the result
provided by Gatev and Stahan (2006). They use the non-financial commercial paper bill
rate to proxy for liquidity, and argue that the simultaneous increase in loans and liquid
assets suggest banks would not reduce liquid asset holdings to meet the increased demand
for loans.
As compared to Gatev and Strahan (2006), we find that banks’ balance sheet size is
more affected by financial market funding risks than non-financial market liquidity risks.
Specifically, in the VAR equation between liquid assets/loans and the fcirsk index, we
find that the impulse response effects are positive and persistent in the first 4/3 bi-weeks.
The impulses of liquid asset growth/loan growth to the change in funding risk ranges
between 0.17%/0.14% and 0.34%, larger than the average growth rate of liquid asset/loans,
0.07%/0.14%. However, Gatev and Strahan (2006) argue that banks’ attempt to bring
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the level of liquid assets and loans back to a target very quickly following an unexpected
increase or decrease due to a change in market liquidity. The TED spread has similar
impacts on banks in both magnitude and timing of shocks.
More interestingly, in the VAR equation between deposit growth and the growth of
both fcirsk index and the TED spread, the third- and fourth-bi-week response effects are
negative and large relative to the average level, with response of −0.12% and −0.15% to
the change of fcirsk subindex and TED spread, respectively. These declining responses
indicate that, once the innovation in funding risk returns to the normal level, deposits
grow more slowly (quickly) or even shrink (expanding) following an unexpected increase
(decrease) due to the change in funding risk. This suggest that investors towards safe
investments during crises will regain the confidence in the risky assets, and thus fund will
flow back to capital from banks as soon as the funding risk declines.
Taken as a whole, our VAR results so far suggest that banks actively adjust their
balance sheets in response to changing financial and economic variables, which will po-
tentially affect future real economy activities. Additionally, the impulse response function
results show that commercial banks’ leverage and total assets grow faster in the states of
adversity than normal states, and this accelerated growth occurs also in banks’ particular
assets and liabilities. This is consistent with Gatev and Strahan (2006)’s empirical evi-
dence that deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow decline in
market liquidity. This also matches He and Krishnamurthy (2012b)’s results that lever-
aged financial intermediaries with free debt funding (cheaper funding in the practice) have
increased leverage during crises but constant leverage during normal periods. Finally, our
results also confirm our previous results that banks behave differently from market-based
intermediaries whose balance sheets are cycle to financial and economic conditions. Adrian
and Shin (2010) have proved that market-based intermediaries increase leverage during
booms and decrease leverage due to the increasing margin rate during crises.
4.6 Empirical Evidence: Asset Pricing Consequences of Com-
mercial Banks’ Balance Sheet Adjustments
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As analysed before, financial intermediations, including both market- and bank-based
intermediaries, adjust their balance sheets actively in response to changing financial condi-
tions (especially funding risks) and economic conditions. As suggested by Adrian, Moench,
and Shin (2010a), higher leverage and larger balance sheets are related to a greater will-
ingness to take risk (loans and other asset exposures) and a higher supply of credit. Their
empirical evidence shows that asset prices provide a window on the relations between
market-based financial intermediaries and real activities that receive funding. Although
market-based credit supply has quickly overtaken bank-based credit supply since the early
1990s, traditional banks are still the dominant liquidity provider in the face of deteriorat-
ing market conditions. For that reason, it is also of importance to examine the relations
between bank-based intermediaries and asset prices.
Therefore, we test how asset markets respond to fluctuations in banks’ balance sheets
by conducting vector autoregressions (VARs) for each asset return. The assets involved
in this paper are traditional assets, including including equities, corporate bonds, and
treasury bonds. Summary statistics for weekly banking system growth rates are shown
in Table 4.2 already; summary statistics for weekly asset variables appear in Table 4.9.
Among all the banking system growth rates, our VAR results show that the following
variables have robust incremental explanatory powers in predicting subsequent market
variations: leverage (lev), loans to commercial banks (cbloan), and treasury and agency
securities (tas).
4.6.1 Results
4.6.1.1 Stock Excess Returns and Return Volatilities
We begin with the VAR results for the stock market. Panel A of Table 4.10 summarizes
the VAR results for stock excess returns (crspvw and sp) in CRSP value-weighted Index
and S&P 500 Index, the growth rates of corresponding market values (crsptv and sptv),
and the growth rates of the implied volatility on S&P 500 (vix) and S&P 100 (vxo).
Panel B of Table 4.10 provides the VAR results for excess returns on CRSP stock file
capitalization and beta-based risk indexes. Although we consider 10 subindexes for each
index, we report only a subset of results in detail (cap1/5/10 and beta1/5/10), but will
briefly discuss the commonalities among the results across different returns.
The results show that there are substantial effects of banks’ balance sheet variations,
including the growth rates of leverage (lev), total assets (ta), loans to commercial banks
(cbloan) and liquid assets (liq), on the subsequent growth in the stock market variables
mentioned above. Among these banking growth rates, leverage growth is the best variable
which can significantly predict excess returns as shown by changes in market values with
lowest p-values for χ2 statistics. Total asset growth has higher χ2 statistics than leverage
growth and the other balance sheet changes in predicting fluctuations in return volatilities.
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Table 4.10: Vector Autoregressions (VARs) of Stock Market Variables on Weekly U.S.
Banking System Growth Rates
Granger Causality Wald Tests
Equation Stock Market Variables
Panel A: crspvw sp crsptv sptv vix vxo
lev Market Chi-sq 7.5136 6.1233 7.9537 7.1441 9.3484 7.9261
p-value 0.1111 0.1901 0.0933 0.1285 0.0530 0.0943
Market lev Chi-sq 10.8749 10.6941 12.0590 12.4824 8.6104 11.8223
p-value 0.0280 0.0302 0.0169 0.0141 0.0716 0.0187
ta Market Chi-sq 7.8991 5.3511 9.5755 7.7630 7.9369 6.9287
p-value 0.0953 0.2531 0.0482 0.1007 0.0939 0.1397
Market ta Chi-sq 7.8517 7.1287 8.8920 8.3623 14.0182 17.7717
p-value 0.0972 0.1292 0.0639 0.0792 0.0072 0.0014
cbloan Market Chi-sq 1.4161 1.8114 1.1553 1.7856 3.3829 3.1256
p-value 0.8414 0.7704 0.8854 0.7751 0.4959 0.5370
Market cbloan Chi-sq 9.3534 8.0529 9.5037 8.6876 13.1770 11.8028
p-value 0.0528 0.0897 0.0497 0.0694 0.0104 0.0189
liq Market Chi-sq 2.1846 1.4808 2.7630 1.8325 3.9960 3.4037
p-value 0.7019 0.8300 0.5982 0.7665 0.4065 0.4927
Market liq Chi-sq 8.9558 7.8354 9.4336 8.6259 6.5991 8.5317
p-value 0.0622 0.0978 0.0511 0.0712 0.1587 0.0739
Panel B: cap1 cap5 cap10 beta1 beta4 beta10
lev Market Chi-sq 22.6534 13.4480 7.2450 6.0324 10.8581 31.1248
p-value 0.0001 0.0093 0.1235 0.1967 0.0282 0.0000
Market lev Chi-sq 11.3516 14.4719 10.6785 16.3964 15.0580 15.4839
p-value 0.0229 0.0059 0.0304 0.0025 0.0046 0.0038
ta Market Chi-sq 24.7334 17.7508 7.0731 8.5191 15.7668 29.6880
p-value 0.0001 0.0014 0.1321 0.0743 0.0033 0.0000
Market ta Chi-sq 10.5644 9.5037 7.4886 10.2268 11.1148 14.8232
p-value 0.0319 0.0497 0.1122 0.0368 0.0253 0.0051
cbloan Market Chi-sq 0.4537 0.6918 1.5640 2.0510 4.7315 0.8728
p-value 0.9779 0.9523 0.8153 0.7264 0.3160 0.9284
Market cbloan Chi-sq 11.4470 10.3607 8.9589 9.1428 10.0018 7.2784
p-value 0.0220 0.0348 0.0621 0.0576 0.0404 0.1219
liq Market Chi-sq 9.0745 6.1285 1.9355 2.3346 3.0168 4.8583
p-value 0.0593 0.1898 0.7476 0.6745 0.5550 0.3022
Market liq Chi-sq 11.9390 10.3445 8.6302 12.1020 12.7941 10.7288
p-value 0.0178 0.0350 0.0710 0.0166 0.0123 0.0298
Table 4.10 provides Granger causality Wald tests VARs with two equations. There is
one equation for the excess returns of S&P500 index (sp) and CRSP value-weighted
index (crspvw), the growth rates of the total market value for S&P500 index (spmv)
and CRSP value-weighted index (crspmv) as well as the growth rates of the implied
volatility on S&P500 (vix) and S&P100 (vxo); and the excess returns of CRSP stock
file Capitalization 1st-,5th-, 10th- decile index (cap1,cap5,cap10) and CRSP stock file
beta-based 1st-,5th-,10th- decile index. The other equation is for the banking growth
rate, including leverage (lev), total assets (ta), loans to commercial banks (cbloan) and
liquid assets (liq). Each VAR is estimated with one month lag (4 weeks). We report the
χ2 statistics testing the null that all the coefficients equal zero. The sample is based on
weekly data over 1993-2012.
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Table 4.11: Impulse Responses of Stock Market Variables to Weekly U.S. Banking
System Growth Rates
Impulse Response Functions
week Stock Market Variables
Panel A: crspvw sp alltv sptv vix vxo
Market 1 -0.0046% -0.0233% -0.0063% -0.0104% 0.5691% 0.4924%
lev 2 -0.1382% -0.1006% -0.1557% -0.1222% -0.1299% 0.0816%
3 0.1066% 0.1221% 0.1067% 0.1228% -0.5876% -0.8510%
4 -0.0681% -0.0778% -0.0715% -0.0859% 0.1305% 0.1424%
Market 1 -0.0846% -0.1027 % -0.0843% -0.0902% 0.8125% 0.8053%
ta 2 -0.1548% -0.1046 % -0.1708% -0.1343% -0.2041% 0.0041%
3 0.0753% 0.0966 % 0.0741% 0.0928% -0.5753% -0.8194%
4 -0.0311% -0.0302 % -0.0351% -0.0406% 0.2362% 0.2079%
Market 1 -0.0756% -0.0574% -0.0774% -0.0628% 0.3952% 0.4272%
cbloan 2 -0.0063% 0.0148% -0.0013% 0.0118% -0.4569% -0.4564%
3 0.1379% 0.1319% 0.1429% 0.1380% -0.5912% -0.6310%
4 0.0402% 0.0580% 0.0444% 0.0620% -0.3360% -0.2878%
Market 1 0.0024% -0.0180% -0.0070% -0.0222% 0.3996 % 0.3754%
liq 2 -0.1488% -0.1255% -0.1669% -0.1436% 0.0500 % 0.1833%
3 0.0884% 0.1000% 0.0790% 0.0927% -0.5209 % -0.6455%
4 0.0254% 0.0356% 0.0144% 0.0131% -0.0854 % -0.1374%
Panel B: cap1 cap5 cap10 be1 be2 be10
Market 1 0.0651% 0.0266% -0.0097% 0.0921% 0.0251% 0.0304%
lev 2 -0.0358% -0.1794% -0.1268% -0.2482% -0.1947% -0.0911%
3 0.1390% 0.0983% 0.1076% 0.1622% 0.0771% 0.0188%
4 0.0725% 0.0338% -0.0796% -0.0483% -0.0574% 0.0327%
Market 1 -0.0100% -0.0647% -0.0862 % -0.0774% -0.0978% -0.0013%
ta 2 -0.1232% -0.2050% -0.1407 % -0.2711% -0.2384% -0.1139%
3 0.0479% 0.0377% 0.0828 % 0.0489% 0.0274% 0.0190%
4 0.0140% -0.0063% -0.0341 % -0.0399% -0.0297% 0.0196%
Market 1 -0.0796% -0.1068% -0.0707% -0.1430% -0.0982% -0.0836 %
cbloan 2 -0.1303% -0.0670% 0.0030% -0.0708% -0.0482% -0.0647 %
3 0.0971% 0.1090% 0.1383% 0.1972% 0.0997% 0.0134 %
4 0.0412% 0.0211% 0.0463% 0.0604% 0.0290% 0.0137 %
Market 1 0.1468% 0.0485% -0.0068% 0.1226% 0.0523% 0.0722%
liq 2 0.0079% -0.1640% -0.1430% -0.2542% -0.1853% -0.0365%
3 0.1064% 0.0398% 0.0938% 0.1297% 0.0544% 0.0342%
4 0.0608% 0.0495% 0.0230% 0.0939% 0.0440% 0.0213%
In Table 4.11, we report a corresponding response function to quantify the impact of a
standard deviation innovation in the growth rates of bank balance sheets on stock market
variables for each VAR in Table 4.10. The sample is based on weekly data over 1993-2012.
See Table 4.9 for summary statistics.
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To understand the magnitude and timing of these effects, for each VAR, we also
report the corresponding impulse response functions in Table 4.11. The impulse responses
of leverage in Panel A indicate that an increases of 0.94% (one standard deviation shown
in Table 4.2) in the leverage would be associated with a decline in the excess return of
0.43% and 2.20% on CRSP valued-weighted index and on the S&P500 index, respectively.
These declines in excess returns are much larger than the median weekly excess returns
on CRSP valued-weighted index and S&P500 index, i.e., 0.27% and 0.21%.32 Both of
these two indexes decrease much further in the second week but grow rapidly in the third
week. Total assets growth has the similar timing and magnitude of these effects.
Panel B provides VAR results for CRSP subindexes built on capitalization and risk.
Combining unreported results with reported results, we find that, despite of the different
signs for responses in the first week, both changes in leverage and liquid assets negatively
affect particular portfolio returns in the second week. On the other hand, the growth
rates of total assets and its particular loan assets, such as loans to commercial banks,
still have negative responses in all portfolio returns in the first two weeks. The negative
sign of the predictive relation between banking growth rates and excess returns on stock
index indicates a faster expansion/contraction of commercial banks predicts lower/higher
equity returns in the following two weeks; but these excess returns start to revert quickly
back to the normal level in the third week after banks raise leverage.
Panel A also shows that the responses of total market value for CRSP valued-weighted
index and S&P500 index are similar to those of excess returns on CRSP valued-weighted
and S&P500 index in terms of both magnitude and timing. Additionally, leverage and
other banking growth rates are positively associated with the the innovations in implied
volatility on S&P100/500 in the first week. Since the decreased market value suggests
slower growing market or even market downturns, the increased leverage is regarded
as being followed by poorer stock market, which always corresponds to higher market
volatilities. This also confirms commercial banks’ different leverage and balance sheet
behavior from market-based financial intermediaries. As suggested by Adrian and Shin
(2010c), the VIX index represents the aggregate financial market volatility and the price
of risk of market volatility. In particular, when leverage that indicates banks’ funding
conditions increases, banks’ risk appetite and credit supply rise as well; then the expansion
of balance sheets (total assets) will be reflected in changes in asset prices and thus in future
volatility. Hence banks’ leverage and total assets can be used to forecast financial market
risk through innovations in the VIX/VXO index in the next week.
Overall, these results show that increased leverage and other balance sheet variables
would be followed by lower stock excess returns, lower market value growth, and higher
volatility innovations. Leverage growth is a proxy for the tightness of banks’ funding
constraints, and total asset growth is a proxy for the effective aversion of commercial banks
32The average returns in crspvw and sp are much lower than the corresponding median levels
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which varies with funding constraints. The looser the constraint that can be reflected in
a growing leverage, the higher the total asset growth, which implies stronger banks’ risk
appetite and credit supplies. Since the supply of credit is also closely associated with
market liquidity, increased banks’ balance sheet growth rates can indicate a higher degree
of liquidity, which leads to lower expected excess returns. However, since banks expand
balance sheets quickly during crises, but keep a low growing rate during normal times,
increased balance sheet growth rates are associated with lower market values and higher
market volatilities.
4.6.1.2 Corporate Bond Excess Returns
Next we turn to the vector autoregression (VAR) results for corporate bond returns. Table
4.12 provides the results that there are three banking variables which have predicting
explanatory powers in corporate bond excess return, i.e., the growth rates of loans to
commercial banks (cbloan), consumer loans (coloan), and treasury and agency securities
(tas). In particular, the change in loans to commercial banks can significantly predict all
the tested excess returns, including both investment grade and high yield returns as well
as rating-specific and maturity-specific returns; the growth rates of consumer loans and
treasury and agency securities have no incremental explanatory powers in predicting high
yield returns.
To understand the magnitude and timing of these effects, we report the corresponding
impulse response functions in Table 4.13. Panel A gives the responses of balance sheet
growth rates on investment grade and high yield returns as well as rating-specific returns;
Panel B gives the the responses of balance sheet growth rates on maturity-specific returns.
We find that the decreased excess returns on corporate bonds always follow the increased
growth rates of loans to commercial banks in the first two weeks. For example, an increase
of 0.06% in the growth rate of loans to commercial banks would be associated with an
decrease of approximately 0.17% in the excess return of Master Total Return Index,
which tracks the performance of US dollar denominated investment-rated corporate debt
publicly issued in the US domestic market. The response keeps negative in the second
week but becomes positive in the third and fourth week. Specifically, the second- and
third- response of Master Index excess return are −0.24% and 0.13%, respectively. This
suggests that the response of this excess return is strong in the second week and periods
after the second week have gradually declining responses.
Consumer loans also negatively affects all the involved excess returns in the first
week, but the signs of relationships change in the following three weeks. The increase in
the growth rate of consumer loans only depresses the Master Index excess return with
a magnitude of −0.14% in the first week, and the subsequent impulse-response effects
become positive but slightly larger, with a second- and third-week response of 0.19% and
Chapter 4. Banks’ Leverage and Liquidity 150
Table 4.12: Vector Autoregressions (VARs) of Corporate Bond Excess Returns on
Weekly U.S. Banking System Growth Rates
Granger Causality Wald Tests
Equation Corporate Bond Excess Returns
Panel A: cbig cbhy cb3a cb2a cb1a cb3b
cbloan Market Chi-sq 1.8087 0.8968 2.0276 1.5672 1.6884 1.9162
p-value 0.7709 0.9250 0.7307 0.8147 0.7928 0.7512
Market cbloan Chi-sq 10.0548 9.8567 9.4865 8.6515 10.1384 10.0703
p-value 0.0395 0.0429 0.0500 0.0704 0.0382 0.0393
coloan Market Chi-sq 2.8462 15.2552 7.5791 2.6300 2.3468 3.0792
p-value 0.5839 0.0042 0.1083 0.6215 0.6723 0.5447
Market coloan Chi-sq 8.2257 5.5645 5.7356 10.7306 8.1264 7.0106
p-value 0.0837 0.2341 0.2198 0.0298 0.0871 0.1353
tas Market Chi-sq 4.6277 1.3170 9.4904 6.7024 5.8807 3.0833
p-value 0.3277 0.8585 0.0499 0.1525 0.2082 0.5440
Market tas Chi-sq 10.0316 1.5122 11.6164 9.2092 10.3299 8.9812
p-value 0.0399 0.8245 0.0204 0.0561 0.0352 0.0616
Panel B: cb13 cb35 cb57 cb710 cb1015 cbg15
cbloan Market Chi-sq 2.8458 1.5249 1.6642 1.5841 1.9595 2.7190
p-value 0.5840 0.8222 0.7972 0.8117 0.7432 0.6059
Market cbloan Chi-sq 10.7499 9.1231 9.4506 10.0326 8.8858 10.1186
p-value 0.0295 0.0581 0.0508 0.0399 0.0640 0.0385
coloan Market Chi-sq 1.3356 2.1620 1.1369 3.1363 3.5468 4.9339
p-value 0.8553 0.7060 0.8884 0.5353 0.4708 0.2941
Market coloan Chi-sq 10.1474 13.2638 10.7226 6.5810 6.0402 8.8372
p-value 0.0380 0.0101 0.0299 0.1598 0.1962 0.0653
tas Market Chi-sq 4.2606 5.6566 4.5155 4.8580 4.6792 5.6322
p-value 0.3719 0.2263 0.3407 0.3022 0.3218 0.2284
Market tas Chi-sq 6.0628 8.3422 9.7029 8.5791 12.2088 13.1629
p-value 0.1945 0.0798 0.0457 0.0725 0.0159 0.0105
Table 4.12 provides Granger causality Wald tests for VARs with two equations. There is
one equation for the excess return of BofA Merril Lynch total bond return index values,
including Corp Total Master (cbig), High Yield Master II (cbhy), Corp 1-3year (cb13),
Corp 3-5 year (cb35), Corp 5-7 year (cb57), Corp 7-10 year (cb710), Corp 10-15 year
(cb1015) and Corp 15+ year (cbg15). The other equation is for the banking growth rate,
including loans to commercial banks (cbloan), consumer loans (coloan) and treasury and
agency securities (tas). Each VAR is estimated with one month lag (4 weeks). We report
the χ2 statistics testing the null that all the coefficients equal zero. The sample is based
on weekly data over 1993-2012.
0.16%, respectively. This suggests that once the growth rate of consumer loans declines,
excess returns on corporate bonds revert to the normal level and even higher. Differently,
in the equation of the growth rate of treasury and agency securities, the impulse responses
in the first 4 weeks are always positive, with a first-week response of about 0.74%. Periods
further out to the future have gradually declining responses.
For all the credit- and maturity-specific returns, their responses to the three banking
variables are similar to the results for the Master Index excess return in terms of both
timing and magnitudes. The first-week responses show that, with the exception of AAA
bonds, lower rated bonds tend to be associated with larger response magnitudes; and
longer maturity bonds are also related to larger response magnitudes. The former result
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Table 4.13: Impulse Responses of Corporate Bond Excess Returns to Weekly U.S.
Banking System Growth Rates
Impulse Response Functions
week Corporate Bond Excess Returns
Panel A: cbig cbhy cb3a cb2a cb1a cb3b
Market 1 -0.0292% -0.0286% -0.0278% -0.0186% -0.0289% -0.0332%
cbloan 2 -0.0404% -0.0307% -0.0425% -0.0330% -0.0421% -0.0414%
3 0.0211% 0.0193% 0.0185% 0.0238% 0.0185% 0.0219%
4 0.0085% -0.0038% 0.0099% 0.0122% 0.0114% 0.0037%
Market 1 -0.0132% -0.0179% -0.0096% -0.0115% -0.0134% -0.0145%
coloan 2 0.0179% 0.0005% 0.0167% 0.0186% 0.0190% 0.0161%
3 0.0148% 0.0227% 0.0097% 0.0163% 0.0140% 0.0151%
4 0.0111% 0.0045% 0.0176% 0.0104% 0.0070% 0.0147%
Market 1 0.0523% 0.0474% 0.0510% 0.0462% 0.0550% 0.0511%
tas 2 0.0137% 0.0281% 0.0224% 0.0069% 0.0145% 0.0142%
3 0.0390% 0.0079% 0.0277% 0.0270% 0.0422% 0.0416%
4 0.0325% -0.0208% 0.0452% 0.0233% 0.0317% 0.0351%
Panel B: cb13 cb35 cb57 cb710 cb1015 cbg15
Market 1 -0.0029% -0.0139% -0.0239% -0.0357% -0.0433% -0.0632%
cbloan 2 -0.0096% -0.0250% -0.0359% -0.0481% -0.0562% -0.0724%
3 0.0096% 0.0134% 0.0189% 0.0225% 0.0195% 0.0243%
4 0.0106% 0.0107% 0.0120% 0.0081% 0.0082% -0.0048%
Market 1 -0.0071% -0.0114% -0.0161% -0.0161% -0.0178% -0.0114%
coloan 2 0.0029% 0.0094% 0.0137% 0.0165% 0.0186% 0.0402%
3 0.0068% 0.0164% 0.0193% 0.0166% 0.0138% 0.0158%
4 0.0001% 0.0036% 0.0092% 0.0122% 0.0244% 0.0215%
Market 1 0.0213% 0.0405% 0.0551% 0.0586% 0.0722% 0.0750%
tas 2 0.0111% 0.0221% 0.0238% 0.0165% 0.0227% -0.0028%
3 0.0096% 0.0219% 0.0362% 0.0506% 0.0561% 0.0681%
4 0.0059% 0.0124% 0.0208% 0.0335% 0.0421% 0.0751%
In Table 4.13, we report a corresponding response function to quantify the impact of a
standard deviation innovation in the growth rates of bank balance sheets on bond risk
premium for each VAR in Table 4.12, The sample is based on weekly data over 1993-2012.
See Table 4.9 for summary statistics.
suggests that the magnitude of changes in corporate bond excess returns are associated
with corporate bonds’ credit risks. Corporate bonds present a hybrid of interest rate risks
and credit risks, and bonds’ rating is closely related to credit risks. Higher rated bonds
with lower yields are seen as less likely to default and are more sensitive to interest rate
risks, which might explain why AAA bonds have a larger change than AA bonds in the
first week. Lower rated bonds with higher yield are farther away from Treasury yields
and are more sensitive to credit risks due to their higher default possibilities. Therefore,
the lower rate the bond has, the higher credit risk it bears. The latter result indicates
that corporate bonds have normal yield curves. Specifically, yields increase in line with
maturity as investors demand higher rewards for long-term bonds as the compensation
for the greater risks being associated with them.
In summary, we conclude that higher loans demands of commercial banks and con-
sumers reflect higher credit supplies to the market, which predicts lower future excess
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returns on corporate bonds. But treasury and agency securities have opposite effects on
returns. Additionally, the magnitude of changes in excess returns are related to the cor-
porate bonds’ ratings and maturities. The larger size of innovations is associated with
lower rates and higher maturities.
4.6.1.3 Treasury Bond Excess Returns and Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
Variations
Finally we conduct vector autoregressions (VARs) for excess returns on Treasury securities
and changes in Treasury constant maturity rates.33 Table 4.14 and 4.15 provide the VAR
results and the corresponding impulse response functions for treasury bond excess returns
and constant maturity rate changes respectively. The first set of results in Panel A of
Table 4.14 shows that banking growth rates have poor incremental explanatory powers in
predicting subsequent excess returns on treasury bonds. None of banking variables can
predict all of tested treasury bond excess returns. Changes in consumer loans (coloan) and
treasury and agency securities (tas) have relatively better predicting powers in treasury
notes and bonds. Panel A in Table 4.15 suggests that consumer loans and treasury and
agency securities have different impacts on treasury notes and bonds (with the exception
of 30-year treasury bonds) in the next week. The lower future excess returns follow
increased consumer loans and decreased treasury and agency securities. It is interesting
to find that 10-year treasury bond has a very high excess return on average and large
fluctuations in the first two weeks.
The other set of results in Panel B of Table 4.14 shows that the growth rate of treasury
and agency securities (tas) has consistent effects on fluctuations in treasury constant
maturity rates for various terms; the growth rates of total equities (teq) and consumer
loans (coloan) have the explanatory power in predicting middle- and long-term constant
maturity rate variations. Panel B of Table 4.15 shows the responses of treasury constant
maturity rates. We find that the first four-week response effects of the increased treasury
and agency securities are always negative for most of treasury rates, and the responses
gradually declines along times. For example, an increase of 0.14% in treasury and agency
securities is associated with a decline in 5-year treasury rate with a response ranging from
−0.18% to −0.04% over time. It is interesting to note that the magnitude of first-week
responses is nonlinearly related to maturity with a humped shape: 5-year treasury rate
has the highest innovation among all the rates in the first week. The change of total
equities has similar impacts on treasury rates in both the timing and the magnitude of
effects. Differently, the growth rate of consumer loans is positively related to the changes
33Since constant maturity rates are computed based on the average yield of various treasury securities
for different maturities, these rates are seen as risk-free rates and used as a reference for pricing debt
securities maturing at different periods.
Chapter 4. Banks’ Leverage and Liquidity 153
Table 4.14: Vector Autoregressions (VARs) of Treasury Bond Excess Returns and
Constant Maturity Rate Variations on Weekly U.S. Banking System Growth Rates
Granger Causality Wald Tests
Equation Treasury Bond Excess Returns
Panel A: tbret1 tbret2 tbret5 tbret7 tbret10 tbret20 tbret30
teq market Chi-sq 5.3799 5.0233 5.2217 2.6901 2.9408 3.9609 1.6444
p-value 0.2505 0.2849 0.2653 0.6109 0.5678 0.4113 0.8008
market teq Chi-sq 2.6472 1.2553 7.5239 5.3515 10.0615 8.8989 7.7326
p-value 0.6185 0.8689 0.1107 0.2531 0.0394 0.0637 0.1019
coloan market Chi-sq 6.7810 4.3587 13.1871 2.6140 7.4218 1.9634 8.7429
p-value 0.1479 0.3596 0.0104 0.6243 0.1152 0.7425 0.0679
market coloan Chi-sq 12.7482 1.3861 11.0841 15.2245 20.0955 7.2533 12.7531
p-value 0.0126 0.8466 0.0256 0.0043 0.0005 0.1231 0.0125
tas market Chi-sq 2.0742 1.1119 0.8057 5.8536 3.4407 6.4602 8.6689
p-value 0.7221 0.8924 0.9377 0.2103 0.4870 0.1673 0.0699
market tas Chi-sq 1.5744 8.4034 3.8136 7.2576 11.5515 10.2062 16.5133
p-value 0.8134 0.0779 0.4318 0.1229 0.0210 0.0371 0.0024
Equation Constant Maturity Rates
Panel B: tcm1 tcm2 tcm5 tcm7 tcm10 tcm20 tcm30
teq market Chi-sq 5.3819 6.2381 5.0515 5.2269 3.7965 4.6021 5.4777
p-value 0.2503 0.1821 0.2821 0.2648 0.4343 0.3306 0.2417
market teq Chi-sq 5.5591 4.9356 8.1837 9.2184 11.2582 13.5113 9.1403
p-value 0.2346 0.2940 0.0851 0.0559 0.0238 0.0090 0.0577
coloan market Chi-sq 1.7529 0.7492 1.3636 2.4668 3.8530 5.9758 13.4535
p-value 0.7811 0.9451 0.8505 0.6506 0.4263 0.2010 0.0093
market coloan Chi-sq 4.6191 9.0507 10.5077 10.0696 9.3224 7.9907 12.2645
p-value 0.3287 0.0598 0.0327 0.0393 0.0535 0.0919 0.0155
tas market Chi-sq 8.4577 9.0898 8.2209 8.2732 8.1334 7.9397 8.7319
p-value 0.0762 0.0589 0.0838 0.0821 0.0868 0.0938 0.0682
market tas Chi-sq 11.0077 12.5228 11.0102 10.7205 9.3720 14.0910 9.4171
p-value 0.0265 0.0139 0.0264 0.0299 0.0524 0.0070 0.0515
Table 4.14 provides Granger causality Wald tests for VARs with two equations.
There is one equation for the excess return of CRSP treasury fixed-term indices
(tbret1,tbret2,rebret5,tbret7,tbret10,tbret20,tbret30) and the change of constant matu-
rity rates (tcm1,tcm2,tcm5,tcm7,tcm10,tcm20,tcm30). The other equation is for the
banking growth rate, including total equities (teq), consumer loans (coloan) and trea-
sury and agency securities (tas). Each VAR is estimated with one month lag (4 weeks).
We report the χ2 statistics testing the null that all the coefficients equal zero. The sample
is based on weekly data over 1993-2012.
of all treasury rates in the first week, and periods further out to future have negative signs
for these relations.
Overall, lower treasury bond excess returns can be predicted by a faster growing in
consumer loans or a faster declining in treasury and agency securities. This is consistent
with the impacts of consumer loans and treasury and agency securities on corporate bond
excess returns. However, their effects on treasury constant maturity rates are opposite.
The plausible interpretation is that the increased holdings of treasury securities lead to
increased treasury bond prices that are negatively correlated with interest rates, which
explains the negative relation between treasury rates and treasury and agency securities
in the first several weeks; increasing loans to consumers that reflect higher spending can
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Table 4.15: Impulse Responses of Treasury Bond Excess Returns and Constant Matu-
rity Rate Variations to Weekly U.S. Banking System Growth Rates
Impulse Response Functions
week Treasury Bond Excess Returns
Panel A: tbret1 tbret2 tbret5 tbret7 tbret10 tbret20 tbret30
Market 1 0.0072% 0.0099% 0.0738% 0.1355% 0.1665% 0.1364% 0.1771%
teq 2 0.0144% 0.0354% 0.0420% 0.0570% 0.2506% -0.0133% 0.0816%
3 0.0021% -0.0071% 0.1184% 0.0547% 0.2393% 0.0033% 0.0264%
4 0.0035% 0.0243% -0.0880% -0.1533% -0.4992% -0.0140% -0.0623%
Market 1 0.0178% -0.0097% -0.1584% -0.2156% -0.5859% -0.0157% 0.0870%
coloan 2 0.0024% -0.0150% -0.0105% -0.0269% 0.0705% 0.0449% 0.0713%
3 -0.0020% -0.0006% 0.0134% -0.0106% -0.0272% -0.0128% 0.0311%
4 -0.0165% -0.0041% 0.0349% -0.0410% -0.1388% 0.0431% 0.0517%
Market 1 0.0000% 0.0622% 0.0966% 0.0981% 0.4101% 0.0829% 0.1345%
tas 2 0.0318% 0.1444% 0.1251% 0.0330% 0.3217% 0.0243% -0.0302%
3 0.0072% -0.0153% -0.0614% 0.0758% 0.0014% 0.0552% 0.0768%
4 -0.0047% -0.0782% -0.0029% 0.1064% 0.2303% 0.0769% 0.1471%
week Constant Maturity Rates
Panel B: tcm1 tcm2 tcm5 tcm7 tcm10 tcm20 tcm30
Market 1 0.0072% 0.0099% -0.0088% -0.0097% -0.0108% -0.0112% -0.0092%
teq 2 0.0144% 0.0354% -0.0020% -0.0017% -0.0026% -0.0018% -0.0033%
3 0.0021% -0.0071% -0.0035% -0.0027% -0.0035% -0.0017% -0.0006%
4 0.0035% 0.0243% 0.0050% 0.0059% 0.0051% 0.0056% 0.0023%
Market 1 0.0017% 0.0033% 0.0040% 0.0035% 0.0035% 0.0019% 0.0022%
coloan 2 -0.0008% -0.0028% -0.0027% -0.0033% -0.0028% -0.0036% -0.0028%
3 -0.0031% -0.0043% -0.0041% -0.0029% -0.0020% -0.0008% -0.0006%
4 -0.0012% -0.0005% -0.0029% -0.0031% -0.0031% -0.0028% -0.0015%
Market 1 -0.0068% -0.0113% -0.0125% -0.0111% -0.0089% -0.0083% -0.0044%
tas 2 -0.0040% -0.0038% -0.0043% -0.0023% -0.0015% -0.0004% 0.0014%
3 0.0013% 0.0009% -0.0035% -0.0053% -0.0052% -0.0050% 0.0004%
4 0.0003% 0.0005% -0.0029% -0.0047% -0.0057% -0.0076% -0.0055%
In Table 4.15, we report a corresponding response function to quantify the impact of a
standard deviation innovation in the growth rates of bank balance sheets on treasury
bond risk premium and treasury constant maturity rates for each VAR in Table 4.14.
The sample is based on weekly data over 1993-2012. See Table 4.9 for summary statistics.
lead to a growing economy and thus rising inflation, which may induce the Fed to raise
interest rates to slow the amount of cash entering the economy.
4.6.2 Robustness Tests
The VAR results above suggest that the following balance sheet variables, leverage (lev),
total assets (ta), loans to commercial banks (cbloan), consumer loans (coloan), liquid as-
sets (liq), and treasury and agency securities (tas), have strong incremental explanatory
powers in predicting subsequent changes in market variables. Next we provide two exten-
sions to the baseline results as a robustness check. First, we add some traditional return
predictors to VARs; secondly, we investigate whether the regression results are driven by
the recent financial crisis.
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4.6.2.1 Omitted Variables
We will explore if the predictability of banking growth rates on asset variables is due to
the relation of banks with the variables that proxy for funding and economic conditions,
including the 3-month treasury bill rate (tb),34 the federal fund rate (fed), the 3-month
treasury bill/fed fund spread (tfsp), the term spread (tmsp), the TED spread (ted) and
the default spread (cbsp).35
Some of theses variables are also the standard price-based predictors. Fama and
French (1989) argue that the variations of expected returns on stocks and bonds are
positively associated with short- and long-term business conditions that are represented
by the term spread and default spread, respectively. Since both of spreads are high during
business cycle peaks and low during throngs, expected returns on bonds and stocks are
lower when economic conditions are strong and higher when conditions are weak. Also,
Fama (1990) suggests that the business-cycle variation in short-term interest rates has a
mean-reverting tendency, and the AAA yield rises less than the bill rate during expansions
and falls less during contractions. This results in a clear business-cycle pattern for the
term spread—the AAA yield minus the bill rate. Additionally, some literature such as
Thorbecke (1997) and Hsu and Chiang (2011) provide empirical evidence of the effect of
monetary policy on stock returns. Hsu and Chiang (2011) argue that there exists a positive
and nonlinear relationship between the change in Fed funds rate and excess returns on
stock prices. Finally, the TED spread might be also a good predictor since it is a good
proxy for the aggregate cost of short-term borrowing for large financial institutions. Table
4.9 has reported the summary statistics for these variables which could predict banking
system fluctuations.
Table D.1, D.2 and D.3 report a subset of results which only cover the best predictors
for each of traditional assets: leverage (lev) for stock variables, loans to commercial
banks (cbloan) for corporate bond excess returns, and treasury and agency securities (tas)
for treasury bond variables. The results show that these banking variables have robust
predicting powers in all asset variables after adding the control variables mentioned above.
We also run the robustness tests for some other banking system growth rates. Unreported
results show that inclusion of these control variables does not eliminate the importance
of the growth rates of total assets (ta), loans to commercial banks (cbloan), and liquid
assets (liq) in predicting stock excess returns; consumer loans (coloan) in predicting both
corporate and treasury bond returns as well as the change of Treasury constant maturity
rates; and treasury and agency securities (tas) and total equities (teq) in forecasting
corporate excess returns and variations in Treasury constant maturity rates.
34The 3-month treasury bill rate is included because it is the reference for calculating excess returns
35Since Chicago National Fed Financial Condition index is only available weekly measured as of Friday
close, I do not use it in the weekly Vector autoregressions.
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Also suggested is that the omitted variables are generally not useful in predicting the
subsequent variations in stock and treasury bond market as shown in Table D.1 and D.3.
However, Table D.2 indicates that corporate bond excess returns can also be predicted
by the 3-month treasury bill, the term spread, the TED spread, and the default spread,
which are good proxies for funding and credit conditions.
4.6.2.2 Sub-samples
In order to dispel the concern that the predictive value of banking growth rates on asset
excess returns is driven by the recent financial crisis, we conduct a robustness check on our
results by running VAR tests for a restricted sample period that excludes the data after
2006. This cutoff is motivated by Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010) who argue that the
first problem in the subprime mortgage market materialized in 2007. Table D.4 reports
the VAR results for the shortened sample for various assets variables. The growth rates
of leverage (lev), loans to commercial banks (cbloan), and treasury and agency securities
(tas) remain robust to the exclusion of the crisis period (2007-2012).
In particular, although banks’ leverage growth loses explanatory power in predicting
the excess returns on S&P500 index and CRSP high capitalization index, it remains ro-
bust for the return volatilities and the other excess returns. Unreported results show that
the robust results carry over to the excess returns on CRSP capitalization-portfolio 1 to 6
and all the risk-based portfolio 1-10.36 Since both S&P500 and CRSP capitalization port-
folio 7-10 are regarded as gauges of large-cap US equities markets, the lost predictability
suggests that banks’ leverage variations are not closely associated with large-cap equities.
One explanation might be that large-cap companies are more affected by idiosyncratic
risks rather than systematic risks before the recent crisis which brings behavior of most
market variables together. With regards to bonds, both the growth rates of loans to
commercial banks and treasury and agency securities remain significant in predicting the
excess returns on investment-grade corporate bonds, while the growth rate of treasury and
agency securities has stronger significance over this shorten sample period. Moreover, in
the sub-sample regression, the growth rate of treasury and agency securities remains a
strongly significant predictor of long-maturity treasury returns (20 and 30 year) and all
the treasury constant maturity rates.
It worths mentioning that Commercial banks’ balance sheet data (available in Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) involve data for all commercial banks in U.S.,
Domestically Charted Commercial banks (including large and small institutions), and
foreign-related institutions. In the main sample test over 1993-2012, the results reported
for all commercial banks in U.S. are nearly identical to the results for US domestic charted
36Risk-based portfolios are categorized into beta-based portfolios which we have reported and standard-
based portfolio which we have not reported.
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banks. However, the latter results provide the stronger significance in predicting bond
returns than the former ones over the sub-sample period of 1993-2006.37
In a nutshell, the evidence from this robustness check suggests that the predictive
value of aggregate commercial banks’ balance sheet information is also present before
the recent crisis and thus should be seen a feature of the financial system. This is con-
sistent with Adrian, Monech and Shin (2010) who find the important potential use of
market-based intermediaries’ balance sheet variables in predicting quarterly traditional
asset returns.
4.7 Conclusion
The evidence in our paper suggests that commercial banks actively manage their balance
sheets over the financial and economic cycle. Different from market-based intermediaries,
banks absorb funding mainly from retail markets (deposits) instead of wholesale mar-
kets. Additionally, the results for both the concurrent and dynamic relations between
banking growth rates and financial and economic indicators imply that banks expand
(contract) their balance sheets faster (slower) when financial and economic conditions
tighten (loosen); and banks would not fund increased demand for loans by running down
their liquid assets like what market-based intermediaries do during financial crises. This
is consistent with Gatev and Strahan (2006)’s empirical evidence that banks experience
funding inflows when non-financial market liquidity dries up.
Since banks’ leverage growth is closely related to their debt funding changes, it can
be seen as a good proxy for the tightness of banks’ funding constraints. This leverage
growth also reflects total asset growth that is a good proxy for the effective aversion of
banks varying with their funding constraints. In particular, a looser banks’ financing
constraint is reflected in a growing leverage that indicates a higher total asset growth.
This increased asset growth represents banks’ stronger risk appetite and credit supply
that are related to market liquidity. To that extent, this liquidity can be understood as
the growth rates of commercial banks’ balance sheets, and banks provide liquidity in the
face of deteriorating financing and economic conditions.
Additionally, our results show that banks’ balance-sheet variations can be utilized
to predict the subsequent asset market variations. Thus our paper contributes to the
literature on the role of intermediaries in asset pricing. Due to the limited available data
for the balance sheets of leveraged intermediaries, there are few empirical work on this
topic. Adrian , Moench and Shin (2010) and Adrian, Etular and Muir (2012) document
that financial intermediaries’ balance-sheet aggregates contain strong predictive powers
for stock and bond excess returns in both time series and cross-section. Chava, Gallmeyer
37The results for corporate bond and treasury bond variables are obtained by using US domestic bank
data.
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and Park (2010) analyse the predictability of US stock returns by using a measure of
credit standard derived from Banks’ loan report. However, all of these papers utilize low
frequency data, i.e., quarterly data, which would run the risk of missing all the interesting
variations in asset returns. Our cumulative empirical evidence provides the predictive
value of weekly commercial banks’ balance-sheet variations in excess returns for a large
group of traditional assets.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis explores the role of financial institutions in determining asset prices, both
theoretically and empirically. In Chapter 2, we explore the risk-taking choice of hedge
funds, that are most important leveraged market-based institutions nowadays, in a partial
equilibrium setting. We find that hedge-fund managers’ incentives to pursue high abso-
lute performance fees are distorted by their tournament concerns which generate relative
performance objectives. We also consider the effect of fund closure option due to the high
attrition rate in the hedge fund industry; and disentangle the idiosyncratic risk from the
fund’s systematic risk due to managers’ alpha generating abilities. Furthermore, it might
be more interesting to extend our model to a multi-period one and to consider the effect
of the size of AUM. With multiple periods, hedge fund managers face multiple HWMs
for investors entering the fund at different points, and therefore the average HWM level
is reduced, which may depress managerial risk taking. If the initial fund size is different
for funds, managers with larger AUM might be more risk averse and would like to take
lower risk in comparison with smaller and younger funds.
We further examine the impact of relative performance evaluation from a general
equilibrium point in Chapter 3. Instead of focusing on hedge funds, we generalize the
marginal investor into a portfolio manager being paid a performance fee relative to the
market return. The level of delegation is endogenously determined and is affected by the
agency problem. More importantly, we find that the increased relative performance fee
alleviates agency frictions and restricts risk premia and volatilities to disproportionately
increase, therefore stabilizing asset prices. Nevertheless, there are some more research
that we can do. First, we can also include another risky asset to examine managers’
shifting decisions between systematic risks and idiosyncratic risks. Second, we can extend
the model to include the production to investigate how financial frictions affect capital
investment and output. Additionally, Xiong (2013) argue that managers’ executive com-
pensations and their irrationally optimistic expectations lead to the excessive risk taking
of financial institutions, fueling a speculative bubble and thus crisis. Hence it is more
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meaningful to introduce different beliefs to our three-agent model, which takes a further
step to explain financial crises. The model in Chapter 3 is one of the examples of equity
risk-capital models, which include Xiong (2001), He and Krishnamurthy (2012b), He and
Krishnamurthy (2012a) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012). Specifically, the inter-
mediary sector is constrained in rasing equity capital rather than debt capital in these
models. He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) suggest that these models do no fit the
facts surrounding hedge funds and other market-based institutions as these institutions
mainly face leverage constraints due to the deteriorating capital markets. However, these
models seem more suitable to explain the behavior of banks.
In chapter 4, we find that banks increase leverage during the most severe periods
of crises but keep their leverage more persistently in normal times. Our empirical evi-
dence shows that banks provide liquidity to financial markets in the state of adversity,
and banks’ balance-sheet information can also be utilized to predict subsequent market
variations in traditional assets. In this chapter, we only examine banks’ on-the-balance-
sheet variations, while nowadays banks have many assets that are off-the-balance-sheet.
In order to complete analyzing banks’ balance-sheet adjustments over the financial cycle,
we need more off-the-balance-sheet data to run the analysis.
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Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 Chapter 2: Risk-taking Choice in Hedge Fund Tourna-
ments
A.1.1 Proof 1: The expected fund flow
Proof. The expected the fund flow E[f(∆W )] = E[a∆W 2+b∆W+c|∆W < − b2a ]P (∆W ≤
− b2a) + (c− b
2
4a)P (∆W > − b2a) is equivalent to
E[f(∆W )] = {aE[∆W 2|∆W < − b
2a
] + bE[∆W |∆W < − b
2a










Recall that we assume µw = (miθi−mjθj)(µ−r)+(mi−mj)(1+r), σw = |miθi−mjθj |σ
and d = −b/2a−µwσw , we can rewrite the following argument:
P (∆W ≤ − b
2a
) = Φ(d), (A.2)






E[∆W 2|∆W < − b
2a
] =
(b/2a− µw)σwφ(d) + (µ2w + σ2w)Φ(d)
Φ(d)
, (A.4)
where φ(.) and Φ(.) is the standard normal density and cumulative distribution respec-
tively. Insert Equation (A.2),(A.3) and (A.4) into equation (A.1) we can obtain the
expression for the expected fund flow.
A.1.2 Proof 2: The derivative of the fund flow with regard to θi
Proof. Given the expression of the expected fund flow function, we can write the first










= −[(aµw + 1
2
b)σw]





+ [a(µ2w + σ
2














Insert the derivatives of the following argument into the above equation,
∂µw
∂θi








































A.1.3 Proof 3: The manager’s optimal risk taking when risk premium
equals 0
Proof. Recall that Equation (A.11) gives the derivatives of the fund flow with regard to θi,










• When mjmi θj ≤ θ:
When θi ≥ mjmi θj , we have
∂E[f(w)]
∂θi
≤ 0 and thus the manager will decrease risk.
When θi ≤ mjmi θj ,
∂E[f(w)]
∂θi
≥ 0 and thus the manager will increase the risk taking.
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In both cases, the manager’s optimal risk level θ∗i =
mj
mi
θj , which also minimizes the
tracking error volatility.
• When mjmi θj > θ:
θi ≤ θ < mjmi θj .
∂E[f(w)]
∂θi
is always positive. Hence, θ∗i = θ.
A.1.4 Proof 4: The lower bound of the optimal risk level θ∗i
Proof. • When mjmi θj ≤ θ:
When 0 ≤ θi ≤ mjmi θj , the first derivative of E[f(w)] with regard to θi is positive.






θj ≤ θi ≤ θ, the first derivative
of E[f(w)] with regard to θi is positive at θi =
mj
mi
θj , and decreasing in θi. Hence,
the optimal point when θi ∈ [mjmi θj , θ] must be higher than
mj
mi
θj . Therefore, when
θi ∈ [0, θ], the optimal risk level θ∗i must be higher than mjmi θj
• When mjmi θj > θ:
The first derivative of E[f(w)] with regard to θi is positive. Thus, the optimal risk
level is θ∗i = θ.
A.1.5 Proof 5: the equilibrium portfolio strategy in the case with ex-
ogenous fund closure
Proof. For each hedge fund, its year end wealth Wi,2 = mi[θi(x− r) + 1 + r], and industry








































= m[θ(x− r) + 1 + r]. (A.17)
Therefore, m can be regarded as industry average mid-year performance and θ is the
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average risk taking level of all the funds.
A.2 Chapter 3: Financial Fragility and Incentives
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1,3.2,3.3
Proof. Following HK, we guess the agent’s value function as




Then the agents’ HJB equation is
ρiJ(Wit, Yt) = max
cit,αit









Given equation (3.19) , the first-order conditions for the consumption policy policy {cmt, αmt, gt}
yields the following policy.
c∗ft = ρfWft; (A.20)
α∗ft =
1




[αmt(1− gt) + gt]2σ2R
kt; (A.21)






Substitute equation (A.22) into (A.21), we can find that in order to make equation (A.21)
to equilibrate, the intermediation fee kt has to equal 0 and thus the second term in
equation (A.21) disappears. This implies that the compensation fee paid by the investor
only involves the relative performance fee. The optimal g∗t depends on the investment
opportunity set which has to be determined in equilibrium. When the manager takes a
higher leverage, i.e., αmt ≥ 1, the fund investor will more risk averse and contributes less
wealth to the fund. Recall that, in order to eliminate the manager’s incentive to divert, we




. In the intermediation market equilibrium, the investor’s risk exposure demand
has to equal the manager’s risk exposure supply, i.e.,
α∗ftWft = βγWmt. (A.23)
Proposition 3.2:
The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 3.1: Given equation (3.19), the first-order
conditions for the policy {cmt, αmt} yields the following policy.


















Since we have proved that kt = 0, the second term in equation (A.25) disappears.
Proposition 3.3:
The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 3.1: Given equation (3.19) , the first-order
conditions for the policy {cat, αat} yields the following policy.





A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. Assumption 2 suggests that the delegation supply will be the minimum of Wft


















. Hence, we have α∗ft = 1. Given α
∗













= φ−gt1−gt , indicating that the incentive
constraint slacks. If Wft >
1−φ





















∈ [0, 1). Given β = 1−βtβt , we
have βt =
φ−gt
1−gt , indicating that the incentive constraint always binds.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. Given the optimal consumption and the good market clearing conditions, we have
ρmWmt + ρfWft + ρaWat = Dt, (A.28)
which can be differentiated into
ρmdWmt + ρfdWft + ρadWat = dDt. (A.29)
Substituting the agents’ budget constraint and the dividend dynamics into equation (A.29)
and matching the the drift and volatility terms we obtain the condition for the sharpe
ratio and interest rate
DtσD = γcmt[αmt(1 + βgt)− βgt]σR + cftαft[αmt(1− gt) + gt]σR + catαatσR; (A.30)
DtµD = cmt[r − ρm + γαmt(1 + βgt)θtσR − γβgtθtσR]
+ cft[rt − ρf + αft((αmt(1− gt) + gt)θtσR] + cat(rt − ρa + αatθtσR].
(A.31)
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(1 + βgt) +
cft
Dt















































(1 + βgt) +
cft
Dt








Insert the optimal investment policies into the above two equations and rearrange the
equations, we can obtain the expression for θt and rt


























A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3.8
Proof. Since debt is in zero net supply, the market value of the risky asset is equal to the
aggregate wealth of the agents,i.e.,
Pt = Wmt +Wft +Wat. (A.36)








− 1 + λ
ρf + λρa
)Dtxt. (A.37)
The stock market clearing condition in equation (3.17) can be rewritten as
α∗mtγWmt(1 + β) + α
∗
atWat = Pt. (A.38)











gt)γWmt(1 + β) +
θt
σR
Wat = Pt, (A.39)




















Insert A.35 into the above equation we can have the expression for σR































Then we can solve σR as
σR = σD[


























































A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3.9
Proof. Since the fund investor is strictly restricted to the risky asset market, his portfolio







. Given all the agents’ new portfolio choices, the derivations of equilibrium parameters
are similar to the proof of Proposition 3.7 and 3.8.
Appendix B
Numerical Methods
B.1 Chapter 2: Risk-taking Choice in Hedge Fund Tourna-
ments
When an analytical solution cannot be obtained, we implement numerical procedures to
solve the model. The method that we use is in spirit similar to the one in Hodder and
Jackwerth (2007). The result of the model is presented in a three-dimensional plot with a
grid of mid-year performance mi, industry average new risk level θj and the optimal risk
level θi, which are shown in the X,Y, Z axis respectively. The range of mi is [0.1, 2] with
step 0.01, and with the assumption of leverage constraint. The range of risk level is [0, 5]
with step 0.01.
B.1.1 The procedures for the baseline model
First of all, we need to approximate the distribution of the random return x. The range of
x we choose is [−0.45, 0.55] and the step is 0.01. Our results are not affected by different
choices of the range of x. Given the industry mid-year performance mj , industry average
risk θj , and manager’s new risk level θi, all the possible fund value Wi,2, fundflow f(∆W ),
and compensation Ci can be calculated according to their formulas:




4a if ∆W > − b2a ,
a(∆W )2 + b∆W + c Otherwise;
(B.2)
Ci = kWi,2 + kFi + ymax{Wi,2 −Wi,0, 0}. (B.3)
In addition, we assume that x follows a normal distribution with mean µ and volatil-
ity σ. To calculate the expected fund value, we use the discrete normal distribution.
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Specifically, we compute the probability for each point of x indexed by i using the density






2σ2 , and then divide the probabilities by


















Since Wi,2 = Wi,0×mi× [1+r+θi,1(x−r)], applying the probabilities P (xi) for each
possible Wi,2, we can obtain the expected fund value E[Wi,2]. Similarly, we can calculate
the expected fundflow and expected compensation values. (In the case of risk-averse
investors, we calculate the expected utilities instead based on U(Ci) =
C1−γi
1−γ .)
Second of all, with θi varying between 0 and 5 in the steps of 0.01, we calculate the
expected compensation/utilities (depending on manager’s objective function) for each
point of θi. The one which yields the highest E[Ci] or E[U(Ci)] is the optimal risk level
θ∗i that the manager should choose.
Thirdly, we change the values of mi and θj and find the optimal risk θ
∗
i for each
combination of these two variables. In Matlab, we use the command mesh(mi, θj , θ
∗
i ),
which produces the desired optimal trading strategy θ∗i as a function of mi and θj .
B.1.2 The procedures for the extended model
The above procedures are adjusted for the following extensions of the model:
• Fund closure: When exogenous fund closure is considered in the model, we change
the wealth function by setting the fund value as 0 when Wi,2 = Wi,0×mi× [1 + r+
θi,1(x − r)] hits the liquidation bound 0.5. In the event of fund closure, managers
will get nothing; When endogenous fund closure is considered, we need to compare
the expected utility from taking the optimal risk θi and the expected utility from
outside opportunity. If the former is higher than the latter, the manager would
continue running the fund taking the optimal risk θ∗i . Otherwise, he would close the
fund voluntarily.
• Equilibrium: To find the optimal risk shifting choice in equilibrium, we implement
the above procedures to find the optimal proportion of money invested in the risky








is equal to the weighted average of optimal θ∗i . We repeat this process with differ-
ent θj until the given θj equals the implied θ
∗
j , which is the industry average risk
in equilibrium. The situation with endogenous fund closure option is a bit more
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complicated, as we need to take into account the number of managers who choose
to close down the business.
• Two risky assets: For the case of two risky assets, we add one more random variable
xid as the return of the second asset. Moreover, we assume that this second asset
is independent from the first asset (Cov(x, xid) = 0), and has mean µid = r, and
volatility σid. Firstly , we need to find the joint distribution of the two random
variable. With the x lying between -0.45 and 0.55 in the steps of 0.01 and xid lying
between -0.5 and 0.5 in the steps of 0.01, we obtain 10201 pairs of (x, xid). As shown
before, we need to calculate the probability of each possible x and xid. With index
j, the probability of xidj can be computed as:




















For each pair of asset returns, we calculate the probability as
P (xi, xidj ) = P (xi)P (xidj ). (B.6)
We denote the risk loading in the first asset as θi,1 and the risk loading in the second
asset as θi,2. θi,1 and θi,2 both lie between 0 and 5 in the steps of 0.01. With leverage
constraint, θi,1 + θi,2 must not exceed 5. Given the values of mi, mj and θj , we can
calculate the expected compensation or expected utility for each pair of θi,1 and
θi,2. The optimal trading strategy is the pair of (θi,1, θi,2) which brings the highest
expected utility.
B.2 Chapter 3: Financial Fragility and Incentives
There are two methods to solve the non-linear function of gt. For the first method,




− β γWmtWft . We do some adjustments for the result. If g > φ, we
set it as φ; if g < 0, we set it as zero.
For the second method, we can use two loops to solve the non-linear function. We
set the range of gt as [0, φ] and the step is 0.0001. We set the range of dividend scaled
wealth ωmt as [0, 1/ρm] and the step is 1. Firstly, we use two loops to calculate both α
∗
ft
and β γWmtWft for each corresponding grid of (ωmt, gt). Secondly, for each point of ωmt, we




For both methods, the fund investor’s profit sharing rule β needs to be determined
first. For each grid of (ωmt, gt), if
Wft
γWmt
≥ 1−φφ−gt , β =
1−φ
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C.1 Chapter 2: Risk-taking Choice in Hedge Fund Tourna-
ments
Here, we present two additional figures: Figure C.1 shows the optimal risky-asset al-
location θi for a risk-neutral manager who maximizes the expectation of the fund flow
Fi = max {−Wi,2, f (∆Wi)} in a market with no risk premium. Figure C.2 shows the
optimal risky-asset allocation for a risk-averse manager with exponential utility, who
maximizes expected utility from the management (flat) fee he earns on end-of-year funds
Wi,2 and new fund flows Fi = max {−Wi,2, f (∆Wi)}. Essentially, this figure presents the
optimal allocation for a mutual fund manager with tournament-like incentives due to fund
flows’ dependence on relative performance.
180
Appendix Figures 181
Figure C.1: Risk-neutral Manager i’s Optimal Portfolio Choice
to Maximize the Expected Fund Flow with a lower bound (no risk premium)
Figure C.1 presents the optimal portfolio choice θi of a risk-neutral manager who max-
imizes the expected fund flow Fi = max {−Wi,2, f (∆Wi)} in a market with no risk
premium. The horizontal axis labeled mi represents the fund’s level of interim perfor-
mance, the horizontal axis labeled θj represents the benchmark’s risky-asset allocation,
and the vertical axis labeled θi represents the manager’s optimal risky-asset allocation.
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Figure C.2: Risk-neutral Manager i’s Optimal Portfolio Choice
to Maximize the Expected Fund Flow with a lower bound (no risk premium)
- Exponential Utility
Figure C.2 presents the optimal portfolio choice θi of a risk-averse manager with expo-
nential utility, who maximizes the expected utility from the management fee he earns on
end-of-year funds Wi,2 and new fund flows Fi = max {−Wi,2, f (∆Wi)}. The horizontal
axis labeled mi represents the fund’s level of interim performance, the horizontal axis
labeled θj represents the benchmark’s risky-asset allocation, and the vertical axis labeled
θi represents the manager’s optimal risky-asset allocation.
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C.2 Chapter 3: Financial Fragility and Incentives
(a) Pt
Dt
, gt, αmt, αft
(b) pit, θt, σR, rt
Figure C.3: Comparison of Three Cases for Equilibrium Parameters
Figure C.3 presents the equilibrium parameters against the fund manager’s dividend
scaled wealth ωmt. The constrained/unconstrained region is on the left/right of the
critical level ωc. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1. The solid line represents the
case with a relative performance fee, the dotted line represents the case with an absolute
performance fee and the dashed line represents the case with a risk exposure fee.
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Figure C.4: Equilibrium Parameters in a Three-agent Model from a Different Angle:
αmt,αft,αat,pit
Figure C.4 plots the portfolio choice of agents, αm,f,a and risk premium pit against the
fund manager’s dividend scaled wealth ωmt and the fund investor’s wealth relative to
the aggregate wealth of retail investors λt. Here the size of fund manager is represented
by ωmt rather than by xt for easy comparisons between the two-agent model and the
three-agent model. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1.
Appendix Figures 185




Figure C.5 plots the price dividend ratio PtDt , volatility σR, Sharpe ratio θt and interest
rate rt against the fund manager’s dividend scaled wealth ωmt and the fund investor’s
wealth relative to the aggregate wealth of retail investors λt. Here the size of fund
manager is represented by ωmt rather than by xt for easy comparisons between the two-
agent model and the three-agent model. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1.
Appendix Figures 186
Figure C.6: Equilibrium Parameters with No Delegation: PtDt , σR, pit, rt
Figure C.6 plots the price dividend ratio PtDt , volatility σR, risk premium pit and interest
rate rt against the fund manager’s dividend scaled wealth ωmt and the fund investor’s
wealth relative to the aggregate wealth of retail investors λt. Here the size of fund
manager is represented by ωmt rather than by xt for easy comparisons between the two-
agent model and the three-agent model. The parameters are seen in Table 3.1.
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Table D.4: Robustness Tests for Sub-sample Periods 1993-2006
Granager Causaltiy Wald Tests
Stock Market Variable
cbspvw sp crspvw sptv vix vxo
lev Chi-sq 7.9536 6.2753 8.7923 7.4181 17.0766 15.7773
p-value 0.0933 0.1795 0.0665 0.1154 0.0019 0.0033
ibloan Chi-sq 9.8539 9.2672 10.9532 9.0710 17.8610 18.5149
p-value 0.0430 0.0548 0.0271 0.0593 0.0013 0.0010
cap1 cap5 cap10 beta1 beta5 cap10
lev Chi-sq 9.2319 10.3860 6.1262 8.4688 10.2618 13.8021
p-value 0.0556 0.0344 0.1899 0.0758 0.0362 0.0080
ibloan Chi-sq 18.4160 10.0485 8.4981 7.4247 11.4276 14.4530
p-value 0.0010 0.0396 0.0749 0.1151 0.0222 0.0060
Corporate Bond Market Variable
cbig cbhy cb3a cb2a cb1a cb3b
cbloan Chi-sq 8.2722 10.8523 6.7966 7.1532 8.1265 7.9132
p-value 0.0821 0.0283 0.1470 0.1280 0.0871 0.0948
tas Chi-sq 11.3699 2.9041 11.4185 10.8365 12.5746 9.7993
p-value 0.0227 0.5740 0.0222 0.0285 0.0136 0.0439
cb13 cb35 cb57 cb710 cb1015 cbg15
cbloan Chi-sq 10.6158 7.6523 7.9473 7.9060 6.7873 8.4150
p-value 0.0312 0.1052 0.0935 0.0951 0.1476 0.0775
tas Chi-sq 8.9968 9.7156 9.7083 10.1961 9.5672 13.5285
p-value 0.0612 0.0455 0.0456 0.0373 0.0484 0.0090
Treasury Bond Market Variable
tbret1 tbret2 tbret5 tbret7 tbret10 tbret20 tbret30
tas Chi-sq 2.0332 4.9568 6.1315 11.1889 7.0321 10.9851 12.1402
p-value 0.7297 0.2918 0.1895 0.0245 0.1342 0.0267 0.0163
tcm1 tcm2 tcm5 tcm7 tcm10 tcm20 tcm30
tas Chi-sq 11.3139 11.0048 9.0549 9.4270 9.5118 11.0051 8.5870
p-value 0.0233 0.0265 0.0597 0.0513 0.0495 0.0265 0.0723
Table D.4 provides Granger causality Wald tests VARs with two equations. There is
one equation for market variables. The other equation is for the banking growth rate,
including leverage (lev), interbank loans (ibloan), loans to commercial banks (cbloan) and
treasury and agency securities. Each VAR is estimated with one month lag (4 weeks).
We report the χ2 statistics testing the null that all the coefficients equal zero. The sample
is based on weekly data over 1993-2006.
